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HOW COMPANIES AND ANALYSTS TAME FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS AND
INFLUENCE CORPORATE REPUTATION
The primary objective of financial statements is to provide capital market participants
with information that enables them to make informed decisions. They also serve to
alleviate the so-called ‘agency problem’ – through true and fair disclosures, financial state -
ments contribute to keeping the interest of outsiders (shareholders) aligned with those of
the insiders (executives). Material errors, however, will render these financial statements
unreliable and can cause great uncertainties to investors and other stakeholders. Subse -
quent correction of these errors – restatements – often leads to the following question: Can
management still be trusted? And subsequently: Where were the gatekeepers?
The avalanche of accounting scandals a few years ago, coupled with the current global
credit crises, reiterate that our knowledge of corporate governance failures needs continuous
upgrading. This dissertation contributes to understanding why the watchdogs did not
bark, and also dissects how common human biases affect the mechanisms of corporate
monitoring roles, in particular during restatement crises. 
Three connected studies were conducted. A first qualitative study develops a model for
gauging restatement severity and provides insight into the forces blurring the 20/20 vision
on restatement situations. A second quantitative study is the first study to comprehen -
sively elicit analysts’ perceptions of CEO pressures and behaviours during restatements. A
third study corroborates our findings through in-depth interviews with analysts. Combined
the studies show that bounded awareness and common human biases heavily influence
functioning of executives and gatekeepers in safeguarding corporate reputation during
restatements. 
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Introduction and theoretical background 
of dissertation
This dissertation consists of five chapters. The first chapter provides a brief historical 
overview of financial reporting fraud, describing the financial statement restatement 
phenomenon and placing it within the context of accounting standards focused on 
the proper handling of such errors in financial statements. Correction of accounting 
and/or financial reporting errors in such situations involves numerous technical 
concepts, and, therefore, we will summarize a few salient points necessary to 
understanding this topic’s significance. In addition, Chapter 1 will provide a summary 
of restatement studies by regulatory bodies, and will also provide an overview of the 
various perspectives from which academics have historically studied the restatement 
phenomenon, including the often-devastating effects on share price and corporate 
reputation. The chapter concludes with the overall research question and introduces 
sub-research questions for the three empirical studies which we conducted.  
Chapter 2 presents our first study and provides a model for gauging restatement 
severity. In this study we aim to examine some of the factors clouding corporate 
transparency regarding restatements once they are announced. We will dive into the 
discourse between firm executives and financial analysts, and attempt to draw out 
the forces obscuring restatement disclosure as well as what actions can be taken by 
management to improve corporate communication during a restatement situation.
Chapter 3 describes our second study, which focuses on the factors that cloud 
analysts’ perceptions of CEOs in restatement situations. We describe a survey 
among analysts that measures their perceptions of CEO behaviour and its causes 
and consequences, such as CEO earnings-management pressures, executive job 
demands, CEO dominance and competence. We use this survey to test a model of 
the factors that determine analyst perceptions of CEO behaviour before and during 
a restatement crisis.
Chapter 4 contains the details of our third study and complements Study 2. We 
engaged analysts in interviews as a means to corroborate the findings of the first 
22
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two studies, and to elicit possible explanations directly from them as to how and why 
analysts have a bounded awareness. We also use the interviews to share with analysts 
the factors that play into the development of biases, and explore with them some of 
the important endogenous and exogenous factors determining their perceptions of 
CEO behaviour in restatement situations.
The final section, Chapter 5, summarizes our three studies and provides answers 
to our principal and secondary research questions. Next, we provide in more detail 
our conclusions on which factors obscure restatement perceptions, alongside what 
consequences this has for company executives and analysts following the restating 
firms. In addition, on the basis of our primary research findings from each of the 
three studies, combined with an overview of how other gatekeepers are affected 
by so-called ‘board-capture’ mechanisms and human biases, we will discuss the 
implications our findings have for the current gatekeeper and governance paradigm. 
The chapter also includes recommendations for improving the effectiveness of 
the current gatekeeper monitoring function, and finishes with a summation of 
the theoretical and managerial contributions of our studies, address some of its 
limitations, and offers a few suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 1
1.1 Introduction and Historical Overview of Financial Reporting Fraud
1.1.1	introduction
An avalanche of accounting scandals, starting in the beginning 
of this century, and extending to the recent global credit crisis 
and massive private frauds, have eroded public trust in large 
companies, the banking institutions, and the financial system 
as a whole. In all instances, these organizations were supervised 
and/or regulated, and had numerous watchdogs tasked with 
monitoring the reliability of not only their business models, 
but the soundness of their personal ethics as well. 
25
25Chapter 1 - Introduction and Historical Overview
Many of the earlier accounting scandals were accompanied by financial statement 
restatements, in which previously approved and adopted financial statements were 
publicly adjusted. In most cases, these restatements triggered the discovery of 
significant internal control and governance problems within these companies, causing 
substantial damage to corporate reputation and market value, and occasionally, 
leading to a historic bankruptcy or two (e.g. the demises of Enron Corp. and WorldCom 
Inc.). While the restatements themselves were obviously not directly responsible for 
such devastating consequences, as mentioned above they did set a chain of events in 
motion that eventually led to a total loss of investor confidence in management. In 
the period extending from 2001 to 2007, the incidence of restatements substantially 
increased. In 2008, that figure dropped significantly; however, the current credit crisis 
is expected to generate a new wave of restatements stemming from anticipated 
corrections of errors, mostly tied to the valuation of complex financial products.
1.1.2	Historical	overview
The separation of ownership from internal controls and management is considered 
to be at the heart of many of the corporate governance breakdowns seen over the 
last 50 years, including the phenomenon of financial reporting fraud. Shareholders, 
put at great distance by proxy and voting requirements, have no effective monitoring 
tools or corrective measures at their disposal – they are left only to watch, despair and 
try to recoup their losses through the avenue of litigation. Meanwhile, executives are 
allowed wide-ranging strategic freedom, predominantly operating in an irrational 
and biased ‘short-term memory’ mode, and oftentimes neglecting long-term and 
responsible value creation in the process (Paredes, 2005). 
Gatekeepers1 - who are not aligned, under-educated for their roles, and mainly 
operate according to their own agendas - are often exposed to conflicts of interest 
and tend to fail in their monitoring roles. Corporate gatekeepers2 include auditors, 
credit rating agencies, financial analysts, lawyers, directors, investment advisors, and 
underwriters. In the public domain, it is argued that corporate gatekeepers tend to 
focus on their own professional standing, losing sight of the larger responsibility to 
1  The term ‘gatekeeper’ is not simply an academic concept. In Securities Act Release No. 7870 (Securities Act Release, 2000), the SEC recently 
noted that ‘the federal laws make independent auditors “gatekeepers” to the public securities markets.’ This is further discussed in a speech by 
SEC Commissioner Hunt (Hunt, 2001).
2  For more theoretical consideration of the concept of the corporate gatekeeper, see R. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of 
Legal Controls (Kraakman, 1984).
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look after the interests of stakeholders (Fox, 2008). These factors are the foundation 
on which an overview report of the last 50 years in US financial reporting is based. 
Prepared by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, ‘Restoring Trust in 
American Business’ (Lorsch, Berlowitz & Zelleke, 2005), reveals a variety of corporate 
governance breakdowns mainly resulting from overconfident, ‘me-first’ executives, 
and the fundamental lack of countervailing power that rests with gatekeepers. The 
report also details:
• Uncontrolled executive powers and management discretion that originated 
in the 1950s, leading to societal concerns centered on wealth distribution. 
Antitrust measures preventing ever-larger conglomerates from achieving a 
stranglehold on the marketplace in the 1950s and 1960s was the regulatory 
answer to such power accumulation.
• Expansion for the sake of size (sales), and not of profits. Executives looked 
to maximize their power and prestige in the 1960s and 1970s, leading to the 
introduction and development of ‘behavioural’ concepts that were expected 
to explain decision making by executives, such as satisfycing, bounded 
rationality and behavioural theory of the firm (in economic theory).
• Conglomerates in the 1960s and 1970s were seen as a possible solution to 
the agency problem; it became commonplace for managers at head offices 
to monitor and control operating managers.
• Hostile takeovers and competitive failures in the 1980s aided the ascent of 
Japan and Europe. Conglomerates and their corresponding bureaucracies 
were seen as the culprit. A rise of leveraged buyouts, which effectively made 
managerial commitments to stakeholders unreliable, resulted in heavy 
critiques of US capitalism.
• Insider trading in the 1980s gave birth to the analysts’ (investment banking) 
collusion model (see Partnoy, Infectious Greed, 2003).
• Excessive executive pay in the 1990s gave rise to ‘the number’s game’ – the 
interaction between executives and analysts to beat market expectations; 
executives tested the limits of their power, and found that they could cash in 
on their position without recourse, or countervailing actions by gatekeepers 
(see Berenson, The Number, 2003).
• Financial reporting scandals caused by earnings management and perverse 
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executive rewards culminated in the first of a series of corporate failures 
in early 2000; revelations of fraudulent behaviour at Enron soon gave way 
to similar industry-rocking revelations at WorldCom, Tyco, Ahold and many 
more, as will be described further.
The report also provides insight into the ethical culture that contributed to the stock 
options backdating scandals in 2005-2006 and the credit crises and bank failures of 
2008-2009, which resulted from excessive leveraging couple with the unhealthy and 
‘off-balanced’ risk appetite of bankers.
Most of the above historical evidence of corporate misbehaviour in the last half-
century can be traced to greed (for money and power), and self-enrichment carried 
out by executives who were empowered to manage the world’s corporate assets. In 
fact, greed, bad faith and mistrust, appear to have a much longer track record in the 
author’s home country, the Netherlands.
Tulipmania by Goldgar (2007) tells of speculation schemes involving tulip bulbs in the 
1630s, an example of easily-convinced crowds and the dangers of financial risk taking. 
Goldgar demystifies the tulip ‘bulb bubble’ as well as subsequent panics over falling 
prices, by revealing that the root causes of tulipmania were loss of trust, concerns 
around capitalistic forces, and a rapidly-changing society. Goldgar repeatedly 
describes the association between obscurities of ‘value-relevant information’, and 
the societal mistrust that culminated in panic. Deceit carried out by the so-called 
‘bloemisten’ (florists) is nicely illustrated, and was recognized by the pamphleteers 
(the media) of those days. Goldgar writes: ‘When pamphleteers criticized the 
inability of bloemisten to judge value, some made a connection between this kind 
of monetary confusion and a fundamental confusion about trust’ (p. 266). In all, 
quite comparable to the notion that in the build up to the more recent credit crisis, 
bankers allegedly did not understand the pricing (nor value), of complex financial 
derivatives. As Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733), born in Rotterdam and educated at 
the Erasmus school, wrote: ‘The vices, and only the vices, are the building blocks of 
good social order.’ In 1714 he published his famous Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, 
Public Benefits, in which he writes that enjoyment of the ‘public benefits’ of power, 
population, and prosperity, requires unshackling the ‘private vices’ of fraud, avarice 
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and pride. Mandeville writes: ‘The seven deadly sins may mean moral ruin, but they 
turn out to be economic salvation.’ We now know that the last only holds to a certain 
extent.3
Greed, as a vice and as a driver of power in society, has been studied extensively 
as playing a tremendous role in the history of the past 3,000 years. Balot (2001), 
in his Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens, mentions that authors such as Solon, 
Thucydides, Herodotus and Plato frequently commented on greed in the context of 
social disruption and distributive fairness between the upper and lower classes. In 
his introduction, Balot shows that critiques of greed are woven into the economic 
and political history of the past 25 centuries, arguing that the distributive justice of 
economics leads to the dominant position in some current capitalistic societies, e.g. 
Gordon Gekko’s infamous proclamation that, ‘Greed […] is good’ in the 1987 film Wall 
Street. Newhauser (2000), in The Early History of Greed: The Sin of Avarice in Early 
Medieval Thought and Literature, shows that various kinds of greed in the period 
spanning from the First through the Tenth centuries were considered serious vices 
in society. Remediation of these sins was the driving force for those trying to convert 
pagan materialists to the Christian faith. In Avarice & the Avaricious (originally by 
Jahiz, born in southern Iraq around 776, translator Colville, 1999), author Jahiz 
mentions the high degree of social discrimination between the conquering Arabs 
and the Persian tribal and clan-based inhabitants. This leads Jahiz to treat avarice 
sometimes as a vice, and on other occasions as a virtue, but always attributes greed 
to be a universal human characteristic. A more recent book, Corporate Scandals, the 
Many Faces of Greed: The Great Heist, Financial Bubbles, and the Absence of Virtue 
by Gray, Frieder and Clark Jr. (2005), finds the authors providing a short history of 
business scandals, starting with The Mississippi Company Bubble of France (1719), 
continuing through a summary of the Railroad Scandals of the mid-1800s in the 
United States, the Ponzi schemes of the 1920s (the United States), the savings and 
loans scandals of the mid-1980s (again in the United States), and concluding with 
the more recent global corporate financial misreporting scandals (such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Tyco, Ahold and Parmalat), the Global Analysts’ Settlement and the 
Mutual Fund scandals thereafter.
3   From: Reflections on Commercial Life; An Anthology of Classic Texts From Plato to Present (Murray, 1997)
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Next to greed, many philosophers, politicians, poets and writers have written about 
the concept of self-interest throughout history. A common theme is that greed and 
self-interest are drivers of unacceptable social behaviour; though we all know and 
recognize that greed exists, still society and its gatekeepers fail to effectively address 
the problem. The ascent of the corporation, and the increase of powers assigned to 
corporate executives during the past 50 years, has only exacerbated the situation. 
In this study, we will address some of the behavioural limitations inherent in 
gatekeepers, and in the communications between executives and those gatekeepers 
who are assigned responsibilities to act as a countervailing power to potential 
misbehaviours.
Traditionally, annual financial statements were designed to enable shareholders 
to monitor and control the actions of management; in some views, the statements 
carried the additional burden of being a means to discharge the independent board 
and management of their duties to responsibly manage the company. However, 
greed and lust for power resulted in an unprecedented increase in financial fraud 
and misreporting during the past 10 years.
The primary subject of our research is such misreporting, how companies should 
manage them, and the perceptions of analysts in their role as gatekeepers, as it 
concerns the behaviours of the chief executive officer. Analysts, and their firms, 
have a reputational interest in warning investors for executive behaviour (earnings 
management) which could result in financial restatement. Analysts’ professional 
standards require them to exercise diligence and thoroughness in analyses before 
making investment recommendations. If they ignore clear warning signs of corporate 
wrongdoing, they will be blamed for incorrectly advising investors, which can lead 
to litigation and will affect the analyst’s reputation and position in analysts’ league 
tables. The next section will deal with describing the restatement phenomenon. 
Thereafter, we will continue with an overview of the more significant restatement 
studies, conducted both by regulatory bodies (section 1.2) as well as academics (section 
1.3). That overview will be concluded with a summary of how those academic studies 
are connected with our research into restatements. The section thereafter (section 
1.4) will give a short overview on how restatements affect corporate reputation. This 
overview on corporate reputation is provided as we plan to research how analysts’ 
perceptions of pressures on the CEO, both before and after a restatement, are 
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associated with their views on reputation remediation actions by the CEO (and the 
company), once the restatement has occurred. We will conclude this chapter with a 
description of the overarching research theme of our studies and provide background 
to the more detailed sub-research questions (section 1.5). 
1.1.3	Financial	statement	restatements	–	descriPtion	oF	tHe	PHenomenon
Financial Statement Restatements (hereafter referred to as restatements), are the 
corrections of errors and/or irregularities in public company financial statements 
filed with regulatory authorities. In particular, this study focuses on restatements 
filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in accordance with US 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), either by domestic US companies, 
or by so-called foreign registrants (foreign companies with securities issued and 
quoted on the US exchanges). Although historically the European Union has lacked 
harmonized reporting guidelines (Van der Tas, 1995), with the mandatory introduction 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in most EU countries (and other 
countries) becoming effective in 2005, the restatement concept and occurrences 
are a phenomenon which can be readily expected in financial statements drawn up 
under IFRS.
However, to date, few instances involving IFRS restatements have been reported. 
Thus, IFRS restatements are excluded from this study for two reasons. First, data 
on the occurrence of IFRS restatements, in particular to the date of our second sub-
study (on analysts’ CEO perceptions), has been very limited and not entirely coherent. 
Second, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), which has the task 
of supervising and enforcing IFRS implementation in the European Union, published 
its first review of enforcement actions and inherent restatements in November 2007 
(CESR, 2007). Contrary to the US environment, the CESR enforcement publication is 
anonymous and shows only in generic terms which accounting rules were misapplied. 
In March 2003, the Committee of European Securities Regulators issued its ‘Standard 
No. 1 on Financial Information: Enforcement of Standards on Financial Information in 
Europe’, which was developed specifically to assist harmonization and coordination 
of enforcement systems across EU member states.
In implementation of the standard, CESR members (the national securities regulators 
and, in some member states, the related enforcers), have laid out 21 principles 
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providing guidance around the definition of enforcement; identification of competent 
enforcement authorities with reference to powers and responsibilities; identification 
of issuers and types of documents; methods of enforcement; actions available to 
enforcers (e.g. requests for reconciliation or corrective notes, restatements etc.); and 
finally, coordination between enforcement authorities and reporting by enforcement 
authorities to the public.
Restatements are triggered by the discovery of ‘fundamental errors’, or ‘accounting 
irregularities’, which are defined as, ‘Errors (or irregularities) that destroy the fair 
presentation of the financial statements of the relevant periods or render those 
financial statements completely unreliable.’
The term ‘accounting error’ in US GAAP is defined in accordance with the Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standards 154 (FAS 154), ‘Accounting Changes and Error 
Corrections’. Paragraph 2(h) of FAS 154 defines an error as, ‘An error in recognition, 
measurement, presentation, or disclosure in financial statements resulting from 
mathematical mistakes, mistakes in the application of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles in the US (US GAAP), or oversight or misuse of facts that existed at the 
time the financial statements were prepared.’ FAS 154 went into effect for (fiscal/
book) years beginning after December 15, 2005 and superseded APB 20, ‘Accounting 
Changes’. 
To summarize, Statement FAS 154 ‘Accounting Changes and Error Corrections’, 
paragraph 2 (j) defines a restatement as, ‘The process of revising previously issued 
financial statements to reflect the correction of an error in those financial statements.’ 
Furthermore, FAS 154 paragraph 2(h) defines an error as:
An error in recognition, measurement, presentation, or disclosure in 
financial statements resulting from mathematical mistakes, mistakes in 
the application of GAAP, or oversight or misuse of facts that existed at the 
time the financial statements were prepared.
Errors also include a change from an accounting principle that is not generally 
accepted, to one that is generally accepted. In the event that an error is identified, 
a restatement is required if the error is considered material. FAS 154 paragraph 25, 
requires that errors in previously-issued financial statements be reported as a prior 
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period adjustment by restating those financial statements, requiring that:
a. The cumulative effect of the error on periods prior to those presented 
shall be reflected in the carrying amounts of assets and liabilities as of the 
beginning of the first period presented.
b. An offsetting adjustment, if any, shall be made to the opening balance of 
retained earnings (or other appropriate components of equity or net assets 
in the statement of financial position) for that period.
c. Financial statements for each individual prior period presented shall be 
adjusted to reflect correction of the period-specific effects of the error.
An important aspect of the process of establishing whether an error should be restated 
is the determination that the error is material. FASB Concept Statement (CON) No. 2, 
‘Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information’, describes materiality as:
The magnitude of an omission or misstatement of accounting information 
that, in the light of surrounding circumstances, makes it probable that 
judgment of a reasonable person relying on the information would have 
been changed or influenced by the omission or misstatement.
In the context of CON No. 2, SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99, ‘Materiality’, 
provides the SEC staff view that registrants and auditors should consider not only 
quantitative factors in determining materiality, but should also consider qualitative 
factors, examples of which are listed. The consideration of both quantitative 
and qualitative factors can result in errors that, although they may be considered 
quantitatively immaterial, are determined to be material to the financial statements. 
Therefore, there is no prescriptive or formulaic definition of materiality. Instead, the 
materiality determination is left to the judgment of management (and the auditors), 
after considering all relevant circumstances. In Appendix 1.1 we provide a more 
extensive discussion on materiality considerations in restatement situations. 
The current credit crisis is expected to increase the number of new restatements. This 
can be deduced on the basis of current litigation in process. Some more details on the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Restatements can be found in Appendix 1.2.
1.1.4	scoPe	oF	tHe	restatement	PHenomenon
The past ten years have shown a strong increase of restatement activity, from 
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some 90 cases in 1997, to around 1,500 in 2005-06 (see Figure 1.1). As mentioned 
previously, this period followed well-known accounting scandals involving major 
corporations such as Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, Freddie Mac, Ahold, Parmalat 
and HealthSouth, all of which engaged in (alleged) management fraud. In 2008, 
restatements decreased in number, however, the credit crisis and related fair value 
issues of complex financial instruments are expected to generate a new wave of 
restatements. 
The scope of the restatement phenomenon can be reflected in a number of statistical 
indicators, one of which is the number of financial restatements and class action 
suits filed for alleged securities fraud, both of which rose significantly in the latter 
part of the 1990s. Until then, financial restatements were relatively uncommon and 
the number of cases filed rarely exceeded 50. In 1997, however, the number increased 
to 97 and by 2005, the number exceeded 500. According to a 2002 report issued by 
the General Accounting Office (GAO, renamed the Government Accountability Office 
in 2004), between 1997 and 2002 nearly 10 per cent of the firms listed on the three 
major stock exchanges announced plans to file restatements. Over the next three 
years, the rate of restatement announcements increased; in the period spanning 
from 2002-05, nearly 16 per cent of all companies listed on those three exchanges 
announced restatements. In roughly the same time period (1997-2005) over 2,200 
class action lawsuits alleging securities fraud were filed in federal courts, according 
to a 2007 report from the Securities Class Action Clearing House. Restatement 
announcements caused market capitalization losses of about US $100 billion (for 
the period 1997-2002), and substantially reduced public confidence in the business 
community and capital markets (GAO, 2002). Also of note is that around 80 per 
cent of restatements revised net income downwards, 12 per cent revised net income 
upwards, 5 per cent had no impact on the net income figure, and 3 per cent never filed 
restated net incomes.
A more recent study, issued in 2007 by the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) Office of Research (PCAOB, 2007), found that of 1,711 restatements 
during the eight years spanning from 1998 to 2005, only 325 restatements caused a 
‘statistically significant’ movement in the price of the reporting entity’s shares – less 
than 20 per cent. The report states that after the implementation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the negative impact on companies announcing restatements declined 
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by 71 per cent on average (as measured by the cumulative abnormal return on days 
0 and +1). Since Sarbanes-Oxley implementation, the positive market response to 
announced restatements is 33 per cent less than prior to the legislation. In dollar 
terms, the reduction represents a net reduction in lost market value of US $207 
million per restatement announcement, or US $74.4 billion in total market value 
for the two-day announcement event window. Additionally, the report suggests 
less uncertainty on the part of investors regarding the announcements of restating 
companies, perhaps because investors believe the disclosed information conveyed by 
the restated financials is timelier and of higher quality.
Like Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004), the PCAOB Office of Research (2007) 
calculates the average two-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for days 0 and +1 
at -5.4 per cent for all 1,711 restatements covered in the period spanning from 1998 
to 2005. However, separating announcements with a negative market response 
(as opposed to those with a positive market response), revealed that the decrease 
in the average abnormal return for negative market responses nearly doubles the 
average abnormal return increase, with a two-day cumulative abnormal returns of 
-12.2 per cent for negative restatements, and +4.8 per cent for positive restatements 
(both statistically significant). Not surprisingly, the size of average abnormal return 
nearly triples when statistically insignificant market reactions to announcements 
are excluded; the two-day CAR jumps to negative 18.6 per cent for all restatements 
combined, negative 32.8 per cent for negative reactions, and to positive 14 per cent 
for positive reactions. 
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1.2 Review of Restatement Studies (and Databases) by Regulatory Bodies
1.2.1	rePorts	by	regulatory	bodies
Restatements had a significant effect on trust in corporations, their executives and 
in their gatekeepers. They also led to some well publicized significant bankruptcies. 
In some cases, employees lost big portions of their pension savings and the corporate 
reputation of ‘US Inc’ was at stake. Hence, interest by US regulators and law makers 
was extensive. When we started our studies in 2002-03, these regulators were the 
first to provide overviews of the effects of restatements on stock markets. In addition, 
they provided the first authoritative lists of companies which had encountered 
restatements and gave some more details on restatement specifics. Regulators and 
law makers in the US reacted vigorously to the restatement problem (and its causes) 
which led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This was followed by numerous 
improvements of corporate governance regulations in the world. The reports also 
describe the role of executives in restatements and illustrate that a significant 
number of CEOs and CFOs were prosecuted because of suspected intent to defraud. 
One of the reports also considers, in some more detail, the role analysts played in 
the accounting irregularities. Management intent and the role of analysts, and also 
the corporate governance measures (and their effect on analysts’perceptions) will be 
considered in more detail in studies 1 and 2, hence, this overview.
During the ten-year period (1997 to 2006), in which the occurrence of restatements 
proliferated, a number of reports/studies by regulatory bodies have been issued, 
shedding light on the relevance of restatements to capital markets and the significance 
of market reactions to restatements (both in the near term as well as further out in 
the future). These reports were initiated by either the US Senate or other regulatory 
bodies (e.g. the US Treasury, the SEC, the Department of Justice), and addressed 
the possible causes and consequences of questionable accounting practices. Those 
practices included causes, such as pressures on corporate executives to meet quarterly 
earnings projections, executive compensation practices, complexities of rule-based 
accounting standards, complex corporate financing arrangements, the usage of 
special purpose vehicles, and stock market reactions. Outlined consequences included 
implications for the accounting and auditing professions, the effect on analysts’ 
governance and independence, and corporate governance recommendations.
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Next to these reports, which were issued largely out of governmental attempts 
to engage in the policing of public responsibility, detailed analysis of causes and 
consequences of restatements can also be found in reports by the Huron Consulting 
Group (HCG), such as the ‘2004 Annual Review of Financial Reporting Matters’.4 
From 2005 onwards, Glass, Lewis & Co. has issued a number of its own detailed 
annual reports, including ‘Restatements – Traversing Shaky Ground’ (covering the 
restatement phenomenon as it built steam in 2004); and following up with ‘Getting 
it Wrong the First Time’ (2005), and ‘The Errors of Their Ways’ (2007). Audit Analytics, 
a commercial database, also keeps track of restatements, and has been used as a 
data source for the US Treasury studies referenced above. An earlier report on 
fraud, issued in March 1999, was commissioned by the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), an organization sponsored 
and funded by five main professional accounting associations and institutes, with 
the mission to improve the quality of financial reporting through internal controls, 
governance, and ethics. In its report, ‘Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997: An 
Analysis of US Public Companies’, COSO (1999) concluded that smaller companies 
were more prone to committing reporting fraud and CEO involvement appeared to 
be a general shared trait – in 72 per cent of the cases studied, the CEO appeared to 
be associate, while the CFO was involved in 43 per cent of the cases. The study was 
based on data kept by the SEC on alleged fraudulent financial reporting, so-called 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). COSO concluded that one 
of the major limitations of prior academic research regarding fraud risk factors was 
the lack of a robust conceptual model describing the link between fraud risk factors 
and the likelihood of financial statement fraud. In that conclusion, the committee 
refers to one of the first conceptual models that was proposed by Loebbecke and 
Willingham (1988), and which described the probability of material misstatement 
due to fraud as a function of three factors: 
1. The degree to which conditions are such that a material management 
fraud could be committed,
2. the degree to which the person or persons of authority and responsibility 
in the entity have a reason or motivation to commit management fraud, 
and
3. the degree to which persons in positions of authority and responsibility 
4  Huron was formed in 2002 by previous Arthur Andersen employees and reported a yearly restatement overview starting with a review of 2001 
restatements; the group issued restatement reports until 2004.
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in the entity have an attitude or set of ethical values such that they would 
allow themselves to commit management fraud.
In the section on Methods, for Study 2, we shall use current insights into drivers 
of fraud as the basis for developing our model of CEO perceived behaviour. All the 
reports cited by name in this section have been considered in this study.
One of the first reports on restatements was a report to Paul Sarbanes, the US Senate 
chairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, issued by 
the GAO in October 2002. The report, entitled ‘Financial Statement Restatements, 
Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remaining Challenges (GAO-03-
138)’, addressed the following aspects of restatements:
• The number of, and reasons for, other trends in financial restatements since 
1997;
• The impact on the restating companies’ stock market capitalization;
• The research and data available to determine the effect of restatements on 
investors’ confidence in the existing US system of financial reporting;
• SEC enforcement actions involving accounting and auditing irregularities; 
and,
• The major limitations of governance and oversight structures.
This first regulator-involved major report on restatements found that the type 
of companies involved in restatements had moved significantly into the domain 
of larger listed companies, not into the realm of small companies and companies 
operating in the technology industry who had previously been responsible for the 
bulk of issued restatements. Based on total assets, the proportion of large companies 
(assets in excess of US $1 billion), increased from 25 per cent in 1997, to more than 30 
per cent in 2001. The report also found that revenue recognition accounts for some 
40 per cent of the accounting misstatements identified in the 1997-2002 period. 
(Later in this research, we will focus more on earnings management, which often 
leads to revenue misstatements as one of the primary causes of managements’ 
involvement and intent in causing restatements.) The report also confirmed findings 
from academic researchers that restatements involving revenue recognition resulted 
in relatively greater losses in market capitalization.
The GAO report stated that the SEC, during the late 1990s and in the beginning of 
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the new millennium, considered pursuit of accounting fraud and/or irregularities as 
one of its top enforcement priorities. The GAO report addressed enforcement actions 
taken by the SEC on the basis of possible violations of securities laws by companies and 
executives, enforcement actions involving accounting firms and the charges against 
these firms on the basis of audit failures, failure to comply with Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards (non-GAAS), failure to take appropriate action when fraud is 
discovered by the auditors (Section 10A); and auditor failure to act independently as 
a result of conflict of interests, often caused by consulting (or other significant) fee-
paid assignments.
The GAO report did not stop there; it criticized the role of both security analysts and 
credit rating agencies, making reference to the possible conflicts of interest between 
analysts and their firms’ investment-banking and underwriting services. Already, 
mention has been made of the New York State Attorney General investigation and 
subsequent prosecution of a number of larger investment banking firms, actions that 
ultimately resulted in the so-called ‘Global Settlement’ of a US $1.1-billion payout by 10 
firms. The enforcement actions brought by the SEC alleged that, from approximately 
mid-1999 through mid-2001 or later, all of the 10 firms engaged in practices that 
created or maintained inappropriate influence by investment banking over research 
analysts, imposing conflicts of interest on the analysts that the firms failed to manage 
in an adequate manner. In addition, the regulators found supervisory deficiencies at 
every firm. The 10 firms who were part of the settlement were Bear, Stearns & Co. 
Inc., Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, Goldman, Sachs & Co., Lehman Brothers Inc., J.P. 
Morgan Securities Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Morgan Stanley 
& Co. Inc., Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Salomon Smith Barney Inc., UBS Warburg 
LLC and US Bancorp Piper Jaffray Inc. The agreement included measures meant to 
avoid future effects of conflicts of interest between investment banking and analyst 
departments. 
The GAO report concluded with a detailed case study of 20 major US companies, 
providing a business overview, and exploring restatement data, accounting/auditing 
firms, stock price movements, security and credit rating agencies’ recommendations 
and actions, and legal and regulatory actions. The report also included the first 
‘paper’ database of 919 restatements from 1997 to 2002. In January 2003, the GAO 
updated its previously issued report, and, to accommodate researchers, published 
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stock ticker symbols, exchange market names, dates of the announcement, entities 
that prompted the restatement, and the reason for the restatement. The GAO also 
made this database electronically available. One obstacle for impact within either the 
capital or financial markets and/or in the academic arena was that the GAO failed to 
include stock price movements around the dates of the restatement announcements, 
as the agency obtained such data from proprietary resources. 
In July 2006, the GAO again updated its 2002 report alongside its second restatement 
report to the US Senate5. A major finding in the new report, covering the period from 
2002-05, was that stock price movement in the days surrounding a restatement 
announcement were much lower than found in the original 2002 report (-9.5 per 
cent for the period from 1997 to mid-2002, and -2 per cent for the mid-2002 to 2005 
period). The report also compares the restatement database developed by GAO to 
databases developed by both Huron Consulting and Glass, Lewis & Co.6 
Following the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002, the July 2006 
report signaled that the strong increase in restatements in the initial 2002-05 period 
may indeed have been caused by:
• Company executives focusing on financial reporting accuracy that resulted 
from the certification of financial reports by management as required by 
Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
• Company self-assessment of the quality of internal controls on financial 
reporting as required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the 
opinion thereon issued by the independent auditors.
• Issuance of new auditing standards also covering standards on fraud 
identification by the newly founded PCAOB (responsible since 2003 for the 
supervision of the accounting profession).
• Increased staffing and review by SEC and other regulatory/judicial bodies.
The report found that in the period 2002-05, large companies (those with assets 
greater than US $1 billion), continued to account for an increasing share of companies 
engaging in restatement, growing from some 30 per cent in 2002, to more than 37 per 
5  ‘Financial Restatements: Update of Public Company Trends, Market Impacts, and Regulatory Enforcement Activities (GAO-06-678)’ – it also 
includes an electronic (updated) version of the restatement database (GAO-06-1079SP).
6  These reports/databases are important as they will be used for determining the sample of restatement companies we have used in the 
quantitative analysis sub-study on analysts perceptions (see Study 2).
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cent in 2005. Also in the same period, market capitalization of a restating company 
increased from US $3 billion (in the latter half of 2002), to over US $10 billion in 2005. 
The updated report identifies that cost- or expense-related issues surpassed revenue 
recognition issues as the predominant cause of restatements.
The 2006 report also mentioned some ambivalence on the part of investors and 
analysts when it came to interpreting the severity of restatements (GAO, 2006: 
34). Restatements since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the creation 
of the PCAOB could have resulted from any number of factors, such as (a) reaction 
to aggressive or abusive accounting practices; (b) greater complexity and stricter 
application of accounting standards; and, (c) improved internal controls on financial 
reporting and/or past accounting (recording) deficiencies. The report noted that some 
analysts consider the increased number of restatements to have been no more than a 
by-product of increased efforts by company executives and their auditors to achieve 
higher-quality financial reporting (restatements as part of a ‘cleansing process’), with 
the added inducement to comply, arriving in the form of heightened judicial actions 
and more severe penalties that accompanied enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
A progress report on financial reporting issued by the SEC in February 2008 provides 
the following explanation for the steep increase in the number of restatements in 
2006 (SEC, 2008: 60): 
The increase in restatements has been attributed to various causes. These 
include more rigorous interpretations of accounting and reporting standards 
by preparers, outside auditors, the SEC, and the PCAOB; the considerable 
amount of work done by companies to prepare for and improve internal 
controls in applying the provisions of section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; 
and the existence of control weaknesses that companies failed to identify 
or remediate. Some have also asserted that the increase in restatements is 
the result of an overly broad application of the concept of materiality and 
discussions regarding materiality in SAB 99, Materiality (as codified in SAB 
Topic 1M) – that is, resulting in errors being deemed to be material when an 
investor may not consider them to be important.7
7  Studies considered by the SEC in drafting their Progress Report include the GAO study, ‘Financial Restatements: Update of Public Company 
Trends, Market Impacts, and Regulatory Enforcement Updates’ (March 2007); Glass, Lewis & Co. study, ‘The Errors of Their Ways’ (February 2007); 
and two Audit Analytics studies, ‘2006 Financial Restatements: A Six Year Comparison’ (February 2007) and ‘Financial Restatements and Market 
Reactions’ (October 2007). The SEC also considered findings from the PCAOB’s Office of Research and Analysis’s (ORA) working paper: ‘Changes in 
Market Responses to Financial Statement Restatement Announcements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era’ (October 18, 2007).
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A third report was issued pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
which directs the SEC to study enforcement actions over the five years preceding the 
act’s creation, in order to identify areas of issuer financial reporting most susceptible 
to fraud, inappropriate manipulation, or inappropriate earnings management. In 
addition, Section 704 directs the commission to report its findings to Congress, along 
with a discussion of recommended regulation or legislation. This study involved the 
review of all of the commission’s enforcement actions filed from July 1997 to July 
2002, and which were based on improper issuer financial reporting, fraud, audit 
failure, or auditor independence violations. Next to categorizing of restatements, the 
study revealed the following, with respect to the parties held responsible: 
The majority of the persons held responsible for the accounting violations 
were members of issuer senior management. The study found that 157 of 
the 227 enforcement matters involved charges against at least one senior 
manager. In these enforcement matters, charges were brought against 75 
Chairmen of the Board, 111 Chief Executive Officers, 111 Presidents, 105 Chief 
Financial Officers, 21 Chief Operating Officers, 16 Chief Accounting Officers 
and 27 Vice Presidents of Finance. In addition, the study determined that the 
commission brought charges against 18 auditing firms and 89 individual 
auditors.
A fourth report was issued in February 2008 by a committee the SEC commissioned in 
July 2007 and tasked with examining the US financial reporting system and making 
recommendations intended to increase the usefulness of financial information to 
investors, and reduce the complexity of the financial reporting system to investors, 
companies, and auditors.  The report from the Advisory Committee on Improvements 
to Financial Reporting contained a number of proposals focused on how to eliminate 
unnecessary restatements. The majority of suggestions centered on restatements of 
the most recent years at the time (2006-07), when there were significant numbers of 
restatements (mainly related to lease classification and option accounting), for which 
there was lack of a statistically-significant market reaction. The reasoning behind the 
proposal was that in the absence of a significant reaction, the restatement contains 
no information of value, and thus the restatement is without meaning.
A fifth report was issued to the US Department of the Treasury in April 2008, ‘The 
Changing Nature and Consequences of Public Company Financial Restatements, 
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1997-2006’ (Scholz, 2008); commissioned to Suzan Scholz, an associate professor of 
accounting at the University of Kansas. Scholz’s study analysed 6,633 restatements 
announced during the 1997-2006 period, addressing and expanding on a number of 
issues identified in earlier GAO reports. The report also analyses restatement trends 
and characteristics, including restatement severity, accounting issues (typology) 
and the number of periods/years affected (these characteristics are also covered 
in academic studies on restatements which we will cover shortly). Next, the study 
analyses the characteristics of restating companies, their industries, exchange 
listings, size and profitability. Finally, it provides an analysis of market reactions to 
restatements, both nearby (+2 days) and further out (up to +250 days). 
Major findings of the study include that:
• The strong increase in the number of restatements (1,577 in 2006), comes 
mainly from companies not being listed on the major US stock exchanges 
(NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ).
• Over the years, the market reaction to restatements has declined; however, 
restatements caused by fraud and those resulting from revenue recognition 
issues tend to have more negative market reactions. Fraud was attributed to 
29 per cent of all restatements in 1997, while only 2 per cent of restatements 
in 2006 were linked to fraud.8 
• Restating companies are typically loss-making; in the year prior to 
announcing a restatement, more than half of the companies reported a net 
loss.
The report contains a number of illustrative graphics, a number of which have been 
attached to this research as appendices. 
While Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC to study enforcement 
actions over the period between the 1998-2002 fiscal years, it should be noted that 
misreporting is not a phenomenon exclusively occurring in US markets. In many 
other countries, misreporting and subsequent adjustments to financial statements 
have occurred. The misreporting phenomenon seems to exist in different periods 
8  Note that in absolute numbers they average to some 26 per annum.
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for different countries. In the early 1990s, questionable accounting practices led to 
corporate collapses in the United Kingdom. These scandals led to the introduction of 
more stringent accounting guidelines.9 However, no extensive reports and/or studies 
are available that document these events systematically. This is also due to different 
treatment for the correction of accounting errors under various GAAP frameworks.
1.2.2	rePorts	on	sPeciFic	corPorate	scandals	and/or	Financial	rePorting	Fraud
Some of the more significant corporate scandals have been the subject of in-depth 
studies. The pervasive economic effects and implications of these frauds on governance 
systems, the role of gatekeepers, management decision making, whistleblowers and 
corporate ethics can be seen as explanation for heightened attention. For example, 
the Powers Report on the Enron accounting scandal – formally titled, ‘The Report of 
the Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors 
of Enron Corp’ (Powers, Troubh & Winokur, 2002) – explains the substance of the 
most significant related-party transactions involving ‘special purpose vehicles’, 
and highlights the most important associated accounting, corporate governance, 
management oversight, and public disclosure issues. The investigators found that 
personal enrichment had taken place (Enron’s chief financial officer Andrew Fastow 
profited some US $30 million from the deceitful accounting practices), and that many 
transactions served to hide the true nature of Enron’s operations and transactions. 
Enron had taken out hedges with itself, which led to significant losses in the end 
(effectively there was no hedge). The resulting restatement reduced shareholders 
equity by a total of US $1.2 billion, and led to Enron’s demise. The report indicates that 
both internal gatekeepers (the audit committee, the independent board, internal 
audit and legal counsel), as well as outside gatekeepers, (in particular independent 
Arthur Andersen auditors and external counsel), failed in their roles mainly 
because of complacency, a lack of deeper probing, and insufficient accounting and 
financial reporting knowledge. In addition to the Powers Report, the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate (the Permanent Subcommittee of Investigations) 
issued a report in December 2002, ’Oversight of Investment Banks’ Response to the 
Lessons of Enron’, Volumes I and II’, consisting of some 1,750 pages with depositions, 
hearings and comprehensive documentation on the special purpose vehicles and 
transactions used in the Enron case. As Senator and Committee Chairman Joe 
9  See Moriarty and Livingston (2001).
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Lieberman put it in an October 2002 press release (Lieberman, 2002):
This report – submitted to us by Committee staff - examines the roles of 
the private and public sector watchdogs – the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Wall Street stock analysts, and the credit rating agencies 
– that monitored the financial activities of Enron in the years leading up to 
its spectacular meltdown. What we found was systemic and catastrophic 
failure across-the-board. … The watchdogs were asleep at the gate. Despite 
the magnitude of Enron’s implosion, virtually no one in the multi-layered, 
public-private system that is supposed to protect investors saw the disaster 
coming or did anything to prevent it. … Why didn’t the watchdogs bark?
In the case of US home mortgage giant Freddie Mac, which had a significant 
restatement resulting form an understatement of reported earnings (and equity) by 
some US $1.5 to US $4.5 billion, a variety of investigative reports were produced by 
independent legal counsel Baker & Bots. Known as the Doty Report (Doty, 2003), the 
document served as evidence in a hearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Trade, and Consumer Protection for the House of Representatives in September 2003. 
Similarly, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, which has regulatory 
responsibilities for the mortgage lender (including sister agency Fannie Mae amongst 
others), also issued a lengthy report on the accounting irregularities at Freddie Mac.
These independent investigations are massive in scope and also referred to by 
Gertsen, Van Riel and Berens (2006) in terms of how they paralyzed the operations 
and management of a company. To illustrate, in the Freddie Mac case, Baker & 
Bots reviewed over 250,000 pages of documentation. They imaged the hard drives 
of numerous employees, obtained e-mail records stored on company servers, and 
searched over two terabytes of electronic files. They conducted over 200 interviews 
of Freddie Mac employees, senior management and members of the board. They 
also listened to over 11,000 minutes of trader tapes – recordings of telephone 
conversations by securities traders – a time-consuming and laborious process for all 
touched by the investigation.
In March 2003, the GAO issued a report to the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Financial Services (GAO, 
2003a) entitled, ‘Investment Banks: The Role of Firms and Their Analysts with Enron 
and Global Crossing’. As part of yet another mandate falling out of the Sarbanes-
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Oxley Act, the GAO was asked to study the involvement of investment banks with two 
companies, Enron and another business harmed by accounting irregularities, Global 
Crossing. Following the failures of those institutions, analysts at investment banks 
who had made favourable recommendations for the companies came under public 
scrutiny. The banks allegedly pressured analysts covering Enron and Global Crossing 
to provide favourable or misleading investment recommendations in order to keep 
or win lucrative work from the two companies, creating serious conflicts of interest. 
The GAO then reviewed publicly available documents pertaining to investment bank 
involvement with Enron in five structured finance transactions and other client 
relationships.
The five transactions the GAO analysed were typical of a variety of relationships 
that Enron had with several investment banks, and were among those in which 
investment bankers allegedly assisted Enron in manipulating its earnings. However, 
those transactions were not included in Enron’s restatement of its financials for the 
period spanning 1997 to the second quarter of 2001. The GAO report also examined 
whether it was the same investment bankers at those securities firms who pressured 
the research analysts covering Enron and Global Crossing to issue favourable or 
misleading investment recommendations (i.e. buy ratings), in order to keep or obtain 
lucrative investment banking work from those companies. These practices resulted 
in conflict-of-interest issues that have led the public to question the independence 
and objectivity of recommendations research analysts make about public companies 
and prospects for those investors’ equity securities.
In May 2002, the SEC approved changes to both NASD and NYSE rules that re-
established a required separation between the investment banking and research 
departments of a securities firm. That same December, both NASD and NYSE 
proposed additional analyst rules, which were eventually implemented by the SEC 
in 2003. Those rules aimed to achieve compliance with the directives on analysts’ 
independence and reward structures falling out of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Also in 
December 2002, the GAO convened a governance and accountability forum (GAO, 
2003b), which discussed challenges facing regulators, the profession, and boards 
of directors and management of public companies in effectively implementing the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and related regulatory actions that could be taken to improve 
public confidence in US corporate governance and accountability systems. The 
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major accountability breakdowns of 2001 and 2002 were only exacerbated by the 
unprecedented massive breakdowns and bankruptcy of giants such as Enron and 
WorldCom. The GAO forum focused on four interrelated areas that needed to be 
strengthened – corporate governance, the financial reporting model, the accounting 
profession, and regulation and enforcement. 
1.2.3	ratings	agency	rePorts	on	restatements
Fitch Ratings, in a credit policy update report issued in March 2005 (Fitch, 2005), 
predicted that 2005 would be the year of financial restatements. Outside the United 
States, Fitch argued restatements would result from thousands of companies 
switching from local accounting standards to International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), and restating their opening 2004 balance sheets to present 
comparative figures. The prophecy came true; however, it was unfortunately not 
related to IFRS implementation. More than 970 US public companies restated their 
earnings in the first 10 months of 2005, versus 619 for the whole of 2004. In a similar 
2006 outlook on accounting and financial reporting risk (Fitch, 2006), Fitch argues 
again that the impact of IFRS and global convergence to fair value accounting 
standards would be felt. The ratings agency also warned of the possible effects of 
new accounting standards for stock options, pensions and other post-employment 
benefits, merger and acquisition accounting, and derivative and hedge accounting.
In the 2007 outlook (Fitch, 2007), Fitch warned that fair value accounting would be the 
major accounting theme for 2007 – indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, they were 
spot on. Fitch warned that the ramifications of stock option accounting and expected 
delinquent filings and restatements, due to the backdating of stock options, may 
well continue into 2007. Furthermore, the ratings agency mentioned that criminal 
investigations against high-profile executives were expected to continue gracing the 
headlines and keeping the spotlight on that issue. In their January 2008 report (Fitch, 
2008) the emphasis was again on fair value accounting, which would be exacerbated 
by the ongoing credit crisis. 
1.2.4	relevance	oF	regulatory	rePorts	to	our	researcH
This concludes our overview of significant reports issued by regulators (and other 
official ‘rule-making’ entities) on financial restatements. These regulatory reports 
were relevant for our studies for the following reasons:
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• The reports show that the scope of the restatement problem increased 
in the period 2002-06; the reports support the notion that restatements 
became a very relevant issue in corporate financial reporting and the role of 
gatekeepers;
• The reports provided information on the type of restatements, who 
prompted these, and their market effects; 
• They provided some insights into the effects of legislation and governance 
measures and created awareness of the importance of concepts, such as, 
materiality, tone at the top, whistleblower issues, and the ‘tip of the iceberg’ 
effect, caused by subsequent forensic investigations; 
• Finally, they provided lists of restatement cases which could be used for 
sampling purposes in our next studies.
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1.3 Review of Academic Studies into Restatements
For many of the larger fraud and/or restatement cases, reports by regulators, 
independent counsel or forensic investigators have been made public. The strong 
increase in restatements in the period 2002-06, has led standards-setters and 
regulators to respond with a number of initiatives and legislation aimed at curbing 
those trends. Some of the causes and effects of restatements have been addressed 
in those reports and studies, however, deeper underlying causes and effects have 
been addressed in more detail in the following academic studies. These studies on 
restatements can be grouped into the main categories which follow. We will provide 
an overview of the more significant studies first. Thereafter, in section 1.3.11, we 
will present how these various studies tie in with our own investigations of how 
restatements are managed by executives and how analysts perceive the causes and 
consequences of those managerial actions. In each of our three studies we shall 
consider relevant research in more detail.
1.3.1	eFFects	on	market	caPitalization	(stock	Prices);	increase	in	tHe	cost	oF	caPital	
and/or	tHe	eFFect	on	corPorate	and	executive	rePutation
Owers, Lin and Rogers (2002) found that the negative market effect of restatements 
is strengthened when management fraud and/or subsequent CEO resignation is 
involved. Their research was based on some 170 restatements identified by text-
searching the Wall Street Journal for restatement news in the period between 1994 
and 1997. Callen, Livnat and Segal (2002), also found that  for restatements during 
the period between 1986 and 2001, downward revenue-adjusting restatements, 
decreased return on assets on average by some 8 per cent; Palmrose et al. (2004) 
documented some 400 restatements covering a period between 1995 and 1999, 
finding that restatements associated with negative implications for management 
integrity had more severe stock price reactions; documenting a corresponding negative 
9 per cent average abnormal return around the two-day restatement announcement 
period. Anderson and Yohn (2002) found a negative 3.49 per cent cumulative 
abnormal return during a seven-day window surrounding the announcement of 
the accounting problem in a sample of 161 restatements that took place from 1997-
1999. Similar results were found by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996), Richardson, 
Tuna and Wu, (2002), Wu (2004) the GAO (2002) and Turner, Dietrich, Anderson and 
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Bailey (2001). Also, restatements related to fraudulent activity and that affect core 
accounts, cause the greatest stock price declines (Palmrose et al., 2004; Anderson 
& Yohn, 2002; Owers et al., 2002) (see Figure 1.3). In a draft paper by Barniv and Cao 
(2006) the authors develop a theoretical framework to gauge investor reactions 
on restatement announcements, based not only on subsequent analysts’ revisions 
in earnings forecasts, but also including the level of information innovation and 
analyst characteristics. They find that high-innovation level restatements, defined as 
forecasts that are both above the analysts’ prior forecasts and above the consensus 
forecast, trigger a stronger immediate price response. They confirm earlier research 
that documents containing forecasts by reputable analysts (All-Stars by Zacks, and/
or StarMine, a Thomson-Reuters subsidiary), are on average more accurate compared 
to those of unranked analysts. Their study confirms the importance of analysts as 
‘reputational intermediaries’ in an era in which restatements have proliferated and 
analysts’ judgments are under scrutiny by investors (see Figure 1.2).
In summary, a number of studies covering different restatement periods, have 
estimated the impact of restatement announcements on market capitalization, 
estimating average negative declines of 4.2 per cent (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005), and 
negative 9 per cent (Palmrose et al., 2004) when using a two-day window surrounding 
the restatement announcement; negative 9.5 per cent (GAO 2002 report), and 
negative 11 per cent (Richardson et al., 2002) using a three-day window; and negative 
13.4 per cent using a seven-day window (Anderson & Yohn, 2002). Cheng and Chung 
(2006) document post-announcement drift subsequent to restatements. They find 
an average buy-and-hold abnormal return of negative 34 per cent over the 36-month 
horizon for a sample of restating companies. They did not, however, examine the 
determinants of the under reaction.
Another study, conducted by Professors John Graham of Duke University, Si Li of 
Wilfred Laurier University and Jiaping Qiu of McMaster University (2008), looked at 
data from a GAO database of 919 restatements announced by 800 public companies 
between January 1997 and June 2002. They then combed through a database 
maintained by Loan Pricing Corp., which collects data on commercial loans made to 
both United States and foreign corporations.
 
They found that the subsequent loan spreads for companies that made restatements, 
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measured in basis points over Libor (the London Interbank Offered Rate), increased to 
some 210 basis points from an average of 141. At companies where restatements were 
a result of fraud rather than of error, the spread increased by another 35 basis points, 
to 245 points over Libor. The study found that loans contracted after restatements 
tended to have ‘significantly shorter maturity, higher likelihood of being secured (by 
assets) and more covenant restrictions.’ The loans, post-restatement, also tended 
to be more concentrated, with fewer lenders participating. The authors presume 
that lenders perceived a greater risk in the loans and thus heightened monitoring 
activities, something for which they also charged higher annual and upfront fees.
1.3.2	restatements	as	Proxies	For	earnings	management
In a number of studies (Palmrose & Scholz, 2003; Palmrose et al., 2004; O’Connor, 
Priem, Coombs & Gilley, 2006; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Desai, Hogan & Wilkins, 
2006; Burns & Kedia, 2006; Burns & Kedia, 2008; Efendi, Srivastava & Swanson, 2007 
and Devers, Cannella, Reilly & Yoder, 2007), authors consider restatements as a proxy 
for earnings management. Management intent is specifically addressed by Hennes, 
Leone & Miller (2006 & 2008), who find that when using independent or forensic 
investigations in restatement situations (examining some 250 restatements in the 
period 2002-06) as a proxy for management intent, the executive turnover is 70 per 
cent for CEOs, and 92 per cent for CFOs. For unintentional cases, these percentages 
are much lower, 14 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively. For restatement research, 
Hennes et al. stress the importance of making the distinction around the basis of 
management intent as it provides a meaningful measure of the severity of the 
restatement, its governance consequences, and its subsequent market price reactions. 
Examining the period between 1995 and 2002, Burns and Kedia (2008) find that the 
likelihood of a restatement is positively related to the sensitivity of the CEO’s option 
holdings to stock price changes. They also found that other components of CEO 
compensation (in particular equity, restricted stock, long-term incentive payouts, and 
salary plus bonus), do not have a significant impact on the propensity to misreport in 
financial statements. 
1.3.3	 restatements	 and	 Financial	 rePorting	 knowledge	 /	 exPertise	 by	 Financial	
executives
The Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees was established in October 1998 by the NYSE and the National 
51
51Chapter 1 - Introduction and Historical Overview
Association of Securities Dealers to address concerns expressed by the SEC regarding 
the effectiveness of audit committees. Abbott, Parker and Peters (2004), in a study on 
the effectiveness of the Blue Ribbon Committee recommendations, find a significant 
association between audit committees who lack a member with financial expertise, 
to the occurrence of financial restatements covering restatements in the period 
from 1991-99. In a more recent study, Plumlee and Yohn (2008b) investigate the 
underlying causes of restatements occurring in the period 2003-06. Based on an 
analysis of the corporate disclosures on the restatements, they find that some 37 per 
cent of those restatements were due to misinterpretations of complex accounting 
standards. However, they also conclude that half of the restatements analysed were 
caused by basic internal control errors. Of the restatements caused by complexity 
of the accounting rules, more than 50 per cent can be attributed to lack of clarity in 
those rules, and some 35 per cent to erroneous rule application judgment. Plumlee 
and Yohn also expect that the convergence of US GAAP with IFRS will lead to more 
management judgment, and hence, to more restatements.
1.3.4	restatements	and	corPorate	governance	and	tHe	role	oF	gatekeePers	
Agrawal and Chadha find that the probability of restatement is lower in companies 
whose boards or audit committees have an independent director with financial 
expertise; they also note that the restatement probability is higher in companies in 
which the chief executive is related to the founding family (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005). 
Abbott et al. (2004) and Rezaee (2005) both find a significant number of cases that 
result in CEO and/or CFO turnover; Arthaud-Day finds that CEOs and CFOs involved 
in material financial restatements are more than twice as likely to be replaced, 
compared to a non-restatement sample. However, they could not associate severe 
restatements – defined as those triggered by external parties (SEC and/or auditors) – 
with a higher rate of turnover of the CEO/CFO (Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton & Dalton, 
2006; Desai et al., 2006 and Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson & Lapides, 2000). Farber 
(2005) reports on a sample of some 90 restatements for which SEC investigations 
are used as a proxy for fraud, finding that those fraud firms have fewer outside board 
members, fewer audit committee meetings, use audit firms other than the Big Four 
public accounting firms, and also have a higher percentage of instances in which the 
CEO is also the chairman of the board. 
Interestingly, some three years after the restatements/fraud, the above indicators 
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of poor governance have been addressed. In fact, the number of audit committee 
meetings exceeds those of the control group. Farber also finds that institutional 
interest and/or analyst following a restatement does not increase in the governance 
repair period. This is explained as a logical result from investors doubting the fiduciary 
responsibilities of firms and their management post-fraud event. John C. Coffee 
(2006) has written extensively on the role of gatekeepers, or rather, lack thereof, in 
the corporate scandals referred to earlier. In his book Gatekeepers: The Professions 
and Corporate Governance, he continues his earlier work on explaining gatekeeper 
failures as documented in a series of working papers at the Columbia Law School 
and in the Berkeley Program in Law & Economics (‘Understanding Enron: It’s About 
the Gatekeepers, Stupid’, (July 2002); ‘Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge 
of Fashioning Relevant Reforms’, (2004), respectively). He has defined gatekeepers 
as ‘reputational intermediaries’ whose value is derived from their ability to add 
value and/or credibility to financial information based on attaching their name and 
reputation to the information attested to. He asserts that gatekeeper failures have 
been caused by a) a decline in deterrence and legal threats during the 1990s initiated 
by changes in securities legislation; b) increased managerial pressures to perform 
(short-term earnings management), linked with perverse executive compensation 
systems; and, c) escalating stock prices and related euphoria, over-confidence and 
positivity biases (Coffee Jr., 2006). Coffee provides an interesting analysis of the 
causes of gatekeeper failure based on gatekeeper market competitiveness and based 
on whose reputation is at stake. Of interest to our study is Coffee’s conclusion that 
for analysts, it is their personal reputation and table position which drives their 
gatekeeper performance. This conclusion could imply that compared to the other 
gatekeepers which Coffee scrutinizes (auditors, rating agencies and law firms) 
analysts are more prone to individual prestige battles which could imply a greater 
sensitivity to biases. Corporate governance relates to the way in which a firm deals 
with the so-called ‘agency problem.’ Shareholders of publicly traded companies 
cannot monitor or influence management’s actions directly, meaning that they 
cannot exert direct control over the day-to-day actions and transactions executed by 
management. As managers might not have the same interests as shareholders, this 
separation of ownership and control leads to the agency problem.
The agency problem is an essential element of the so-called contractual view of the 
firm, first developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983). 
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Viewing the firm as a network of contracts among various stakeholders, the agency 
problem is expected to be controlled or mitigated by the board of directors (either 
through a one-tiered board which includes non-executives and is the predominant 
model in the United States and United Kingdom, or alternatively, by the two-tiered 
board structures predominantly found in continental Europe).
The responsibilities of boards, along with their structures and objectives, have come 
under severe scrutiny after the recent corporate scandals (including restatements). 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and comprehensive corporate governance practices in many 
countries have been enhanced since these scandals occurred. Recent advances in 
corporate governance have included:
• Chief executive officers and chief financial officers must take explicit 
responsibility for fairly and accurately reporting their firm’s financial 
position by certifying the financial statements;
• Companies must file annual internal control reports that evaluate the 
effectiveness of internal controls on financial reporting and disclosures,;
• Audit committees must comply with new regulations governing their 
composition, expertise and procedures; and,
• Greater penalties have been introduced and imposed for managerial 
misconduct as part of these attempts to prevent accounting fraud. 
By 2003, the three major stock exchanges in the United States required that each listed 
firm have a completely independent audit committee. In 2003, these exchanges also 
required that all members of the audit committee be financially literate, and at least 
one member have financial expertise. In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act tightened 
regulation of auditors and provided the SEC with expanded enforcement authority 
against auditors, officers and directors. Now, with the introduction of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act a few years in the past, a number of studies and surveys have revealed 
that senior management considers such governance changes to be an impediment 
in the execution of corporate strategy (Zhang, 2007; Bargeron, Lehn & Zutter, 
2007). In its deliberations over the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress’s final conclusion 
regarding the importance of internal financial controls was consistent with what 
academic literature had been saying for years. Experts in accounting theory have 
long emphasized the importance of internal controls in ensuring the production of 
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accurate corporate financial statements for all interested parties.
From a historical point, and considering the impact of the current credit crisis, it is 
interesting to note that the internal control provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
were taken nearly verbatim from another act implemented more than a decade 
earlier, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, which 
required managers of all covered banks to annually evaluate risks and corresponding 
mitigating internal controls. Altamuro and Beatty’s (2007) recent empirical study 
found evidence that the provision accomplished its purpose by improving the quality 
of earnings reporting by regulated banks. 
Byard, Li and Weintrop (2006) have studied the association between corporate 
governance and the quality of information available to analysts. Their research shows 
that analysts’ information on corporate performance increases with the quality of 
corporate governance. Farber (2005) finds that firms encountering financial reporting 
fraud had poor governance compared directly to a sample of non-fraudulent firms. 
He also finds that these firms took actions to improve their corporate governance in 
the period following the fraud announcement. The firms that followed-through on 
improvement of governance measures had superior stock price performance in the 
period of governance remediation – though it must be noted that his findings on 
those points were only observed over a period of about three years. 
Even more recently, Brown and Caylor (2008) have examined which governance 
provisions are associated with higher firm operating performance. Out of 51 
governance provisions, they found only six provisions positively associated to firm 
financial performance. However, none of those six provisions were mandated by the 
three major US stock exchanges after the corporate governance revisions following 
2002’s corporate scandals. In addition, none of those provisions were anywhere close 
to Brown and Caylor’s findings of which governance provisions ‘protect ’against 
earnings management. One of those provisions – no former CEO is allowed to serve 
on the board – could be considered a provision capable of unfreezing so-called board 
capture.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also required that companies carry out a self-assessment 
of internal controls over financial reporting and disclosures. These self-assessments 
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were followed by the issuance of a review and opinion by independent auditors. At 
the end of 2005, a summary report of 10-K filings with internal control provision 
audit opinions, revealed that from 3,665 filings, in 542 cases an adverse opinion was 
rendered by the respective independent audit firms (PwC Report). The categorization 
of material weaknesses on internal controls, which lead to these adverse opinions, 
showed that some 10 per cent of these weaknesses consisted of GAAP applications. 
More than anything else, this clearly should have signaled to analysts that additional 
restatements were highly likely. However, to our knowledge, and based on a sample 
review of analysts’ reports following companies with an adverse 404 opinion, not a 
single analyst made reference to these material weaknesses in controls, an important 
subset of corporate governance measures.
1.3.5	restatements	and	lower	earnings	and	accrual	Quality
Accounting accruals are often used by researchers to examine issues concerning 
earnings quality. Researchers have either used short-term working capital accruals 
or longer term assets/liabilities accruals to investigate earnings manipulation 
(Sloan, 1996; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman & Tuna, 2005; Dechow, Ge, Larson & Sloan, 
2008). In a recent and comprehensive study based on some 2,190 AAERs10 filed by 
the SEC (spanning the period from 1982-2005), various accrual measures are used 
to develop a model for predicting material accounting manipulations. Dechow 
et al. enhance the research carried out by Beneish (1999), and extend the basic 
model for predicting manipulations based on discretionary accrual accounting by 
also introducing measures of non-financial (primary) statement factors, such as 
off-balance items, abnormal changes in employee numbers, operating leases, and 
finally, incorporating financial market performance measures into a model. In the 
analyses however, it is concluded that the primary accruals concept in the model has 
the highest predictive power of manipulation. Richardson et al. (2002) find that a 
primary motivation for companies to manage earnings through accrual accounting 
abuse is to be able to attract capital at lower rates/prices. They also document that 
information underlying accrual accounting decisions contain significant indicators 
for earnings misstatements (restatement population between 1971-2000), and cite 
work by Richardson et al. (2002) and Coles, Hetzel and Kalpathy (2006).
10  The SEC issues ‘Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases’ (AAERs) during or at the conclusion of an investigation against a company, 
an auditor, or an officer for alleged accounting and/or auditing misconduct. These releases provide varying degrees of detail on the nature of the 
misconduct, the individuals and entities involved and the effect on the financial statements.
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1.3.6	restatements	and	contagion	eFFects11
The existence of a ‘contagion effect’ has been well documented around a variety of 
corporate events such as bankruptcy announcements, dividend announcements, 
earnings releases, and stock split announcements (Lang & Stulz, 1992; Laux, Starks 
& Yoon, 1998; Tawatnuntachai & D’Mello, 2002, respectively). The explanation for 
contagion effects is that homogeneity of firms within an industry causes investors 
to re-assess the strengths and/or weaknesses of industry rivals. Whether accounting 
restatements are contagious has been studied from a number of angles. First, 
Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson (2008) find that, after a restatement, (non-restating) 
firms in the same industry have share price declines unrelated to analysts’ earnings 
per share revisions. In particular, they find that there is a larger share price penalty 
for peer firms with higher accounting accruals, and firms that use the same external 
audit firm. Gleason et al. confirm the findings from an earlier study by Gonen (2003), 
which produced results indicating that for allegedly fraudulent restatements, 
there is, on average, a significant negative abnormal return for industry rivals of 
the announcing firm around the announcement day. Akhigbe, Martin and Whyte, 
in a study of the WorldCom bankruptcy, examine how information released about 
WorldCom prior to its bankruptcy filing affected institutional investors, creditors, and 
competitors (2005). Despite the heightened uncertainty facing investors during this 
period, they find that apparently well-diversified institutional investors and creditors 
were largely unaffected by the events leading to WorldCom’s failure. However, 
large competitors were affected. Akhigbe et al. believe this to be an indicator that 
shareholders, analysts, and portfolio managers consider how firms with indirect ties 
to a financially distressed company may be affected. An additional explanation for 
the contagion, according to Akhigbe et al., is that the allegations of accounting fraud 
in this bankruptcy coupled with SEC probing into the operations of other telecom 
companies, dominated investors’ sentiments and clouded their decision making.
Second, Kang (2008), based on signaling and attribution theory, finds that 
reputational penalties for alleged financial reporting fraud have spill-over effects 
for firms with director interlocks – situations in which a director serving on the 
board of the (alleged) fraudulent firm is also a board member of the ‘infected’ non-
11  The phrase ‘information transfer effect’ is used in the accounting literature to refer to a positive or negative cross-sectional dependence in 
the stock returns of announcing and non-announcing firms. This phenomenon is also known as an ‘information spill over’ or ‘contagion’ in the 
finance literature.
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fraud firm. Attribution theory (and the so-called fundamental attribution bias), has 
provided evidence that observers overestimate internal causes and underestimate 
external causes when explaining negative outcomes. Desai et al. (2006a) find that 
the reputational penalty for executives of restating firms is substantial – 60 per cent 
of these firms replace senior executives within 24 months, compared to 35 per cent 
for the control group of non-restating firms. Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) also study the 
reputational and stigmatization effects of restatements, not only on the CEO and 
CFO, but of the contagious effects on independent directors’ reputation and positions. 
They find that turnover compared with control firms is as follows – CEO turnover is 
24.2 per cent, versus 13.7 per cent; CFO turnover is 59 per cent, versus 30 per cent; 
and director turnover is 34.6 per cent, versus 19.3 per cent. Finally, audit committee 
member turnover is 47.8 per cent, versus 27.5 per cent. Thus, these turnover figures 
are significantly higher for restatement firms compared to control firms.
Long-term stock price effects have also been studied by Cheng and Chung (2006), 
who document post-announcement drift, subsequent to restatements. They find an 
average buy-and-hold abnormal return of negative 34 per cent over the 36-month 
horizon for the sample of restating companies.
Finally, a paper by Xu, Najand and Ziegenfuss (2006) investigates the intra-industry 
effects of earnings restatements due to accounting irregularities. The researchers 
detected a significant contagion effect for rival firms whose cash flow characteristics 
are similar to those of the restating firm. The restatement does not seem to influence 
all the firms in the industry, or firms that have a high probability of involving the same 
type of accounting irregularity as the restating firm does. Being unable to detect any 
competitive effect, nor a significant change in the implied cost of equity capital of 
the rival firms, the trio suggests that the contagion effect is due to the revision in the 
expected short-run future earnings of the rival firms.
1.3.7	restatement	studies	outside	tHe	united	states
Academics in other countries have also studied the restatement phenomenon, while 
chiefly exploring the practice in terms of market capitalization. Sun and Zhang (2006) 
studied restatements in China, finding that similar to the US environment, fraud firms 
have higher management turnover than corresponding non-fraud firms. However, 
in tracking down instances where the chairman and CEO take executive positions 
58
58
after having been dismissed, they find a large portion of those leaving the fraud firms 
move to management positions in other firms. In fact, some 15 per cent of CEOs, and 
some 25 per cent of chairmen, receive promotions in those firms. Only a very small 
portion of CEOs and chairmen receive legal or administrative penalties. They further 
find that CEOs and chairmen in China, with a certain political background, are less 
likely to receive legal or administrative penalties. In Korea, 290 company executives, 
bank managers, bureaucrats and shareholders have been indicted for alleged public 
fund-regulated fraud in the period following the Asian Crash. Daewoo (1997-98), was 
the biggest corporate failure in Korea’s history, and sparked a domino effect leading 
to numerous other corporate bankruptcies. The former CEO was arrested and charged 
with accounting fraud and embezzlement after allegedly inflating Daewoo’s financial 
statements by an estimated US $40 billion. Kamran and Goodwin (2006) studied 
some 195 earnings restatements by Australian firms for the period between 1970 and 
2003 and found that restatement firms have higher growth potential and are smaller 
than non-restating firms from the same industry. They confirm findings from other 
studies mentioned above – restatements are generally negatively associated with 
market value.
Coffee, in a working paper entitled, ‘A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the US and 
Europe Differ’ (2005), theorizes that differences in the structure of share ownership 
account for differences in corporate scandals, both in terms of the nature of the 
fraud, the identity of the perpetrators, and the seeming disparity in the number of 
scandals at any given time. In dispersed ownership systems, corporate managers 
tend to be the rogues of the story, while in concentrated ownership systems, it is 
the controlling shareholders who play the corresponding role. Coffee cites Parmalat 
(Italy), and Hollinger (Canada), as primary examples. Corporate managers tend to 
engage in earnings manipulation, while controlling shareholders tend to exploit 
the private benefits of control. Ferrarini and Guidici (2005) attribute the litigation 
proceedings in the Parmalat case to be a result of significant differences between law 
enforcement in Italy as compared to the United States.
1.3.8	restatements	witH	sPeciFic	academic	attention
The highest-profile corporate scandals, Enron and WorldCom, have been addressed 
by academics on numerous occasions from a variety of angles. The Elsevier academic 
search engine Scopus produces 442 scientific articles with Enron in the title field 
(December 2008); WorldCom produces 36 hits. 
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In Special Issues 6 and 7 (August 2004) of Critical Perspectives on Accounting, the 
overarching theme of various contributions is the disappointing failure of the 
accounting and auditing firms, considered to be the primary external gatekeepers 
(O’Connell, 2004; Reinstein & McMillan, 2004). Next, the regulatory framework and 
responsibilities of both the SEC and FASB are considered, as well as the conflicts of 
interest which the external auditor (Arthur Andersen), had in the Enron case. In the 
special issue, Briloff (2004) provides a host of examples demonstrating that the 
auditing profession has failed in its key duty to assure reliable external financial 
reporting. Further articles address the quality differences and procedures within 
auditing firms to detect financial statement fraud. Craig and Amernic (2004) carried 
out a discourse analysis (content coding) of Enron’s letter to shareholders, which is 
paired with a content analysis of the testimony provided by Berardino, the Arthur 
Andersen CEO at the time. In addition, a large number of business schools around 
the globe have issued articles and/or case studies dealing with the phenomenon of 
corporate scandals. 
 
1.3.9	restatements	and	tHe	media	and	PoPular	Press
In 2003, the Pulitzer Prize for Explanatory Reporting was awarded to the Wall Street 
Journal for a series of articles called, ‘The Corporate Scandals of 2002: Causes and 
Effects’. In his introduction to the 10 articles that were awarded the prize, managing 
editor Paul Steiger wrote:
Suddenly, the forbidding, behind-the-scenes mechanics of corporate 
accounting, finance and regulation were of urgent relevance to every 
American. As complex revelations about one big company after another 
burst forth, even the most sophisticated readers found themselves hard-
pressed to make sense of them.
Steiger also noted that his reporters tracked investigations, even triggering 
investigations in some cases, with their reporting. In a 2007 study, Dyck, Morse and 
Zingales (2007) found that, based on a sample of some 230 companies written about 
in the period between 1996 to 2004 (including cases such as Enron, HealthSouth and 
WorldCom), that the Factiva search engine contained an average of some 800 articles 
per case, reflecting the newsworthiness of those scandals. Dyck et al. also found that 
members of the media actually prompted some 16 per cent of the fraud cases in his 
sample. Interesting to note is that Dyck et al. also argue that the Texas edition of the 
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Wall Street Journal was the whistleblower of the Enron fraud, further substantiating 
the publication’s contributions to the root of reporting on the fraud.
The Enron and WorldCom cases have inspired many authors, including insiders, to 
write about these scandals from a variety of angles. To illustrate this point by using 
the online Amazon book title search engine, a search results in some 500 hits for 
Enron, and some 90 for WorldCom. A December 2008 search on Factiva, searching all 
news sources on Enron, returned some 70,000 results, while a search for WorldCom 
returned some 20,000. Interestingly, some of the more ‘popular’ books on corporate 
scandals, such as: Conspiracy of Fools (Eichenwald, 2005, on Enron), The Smartest 
Guys in The Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (McLean & Elkind 
2003), Confessions of an Enron Executive: A Whistleblower’s Story (Brewer, 2004), 
Het Drama Ahold (Smit, 2006) and De Prooi (Smit, 2008, on ABN-AMRO), are based 
partly on publicly available information, but also contain significant and revealing 
references to minutes of board meetings, off-the-record interviews with executives, 
independent board members, politicians and regulators, and reviews of confidential 
corporate and governance documents (in Enron’s case, including FBI notes of 
interviews, testimonies before federal grand juries, and finally, personal diaries). 
These publications prove that in the age of the Internet, historical ‘immune systems’ 
of secrecy and corporate confidentiality, combined with aggressive information-
mining capabilities of business journalists and reporters, no longer protect corporate 
executives from public scrutiny and moral judgment.
       
1.3.10	analysts’	ability	to	anticiPate	and/or	Predict	restatements
A number of studies document that restatements with revenue recognition and/or 
management fraud issues are associated with greater adverse stock price movements. 
Analysts rate companies on asset management and portfolio attributes, and they 
are required to estimate, among other factors, the future earnings of the companies 
they follow. Analysts also issue buy/sell recommendations and target share prices for 
the companies they follow. Consequently, they are expected to have a professional 
interest in recognizing restatement warning signs (red flags), and/or predicting 
forthcoming restatements as these restatements will effect share prices and future 
earnings potential. There is mixed evidence regarding the ability of analysts and/or 
other market participants (internal or external), to predict restatements. Papers by 
Efendi, Kinney and Swanson (2005), and Desai, Krishnamurthy and Venkataraman 
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(2006), show that short-sellers and insiders predict restatements, while Griffin (2003), 
reveals that analysts do not anticipate and/or predict restatements. Griffin also finds 
that in a few instances, analysts downgrade companies before the restatement 
announcement; however, the biggest revision by far occurs the month after the 
restatement announcement is made, thereby suggesting that many analysts simply 
react to the bad news. Griffin examines how analysts and other ‘insiders’ react to 
those corrective restatements that lead to securities fraud. The analysis provides 
interesting insights into how and why analysts respond to bad news, however, the 
fraud cases he includes have not been categorized into specific legal allegations, 
including violations of federal securities laws. In a recent draft paper, Givoly, Hayn 
and Yoder (2008) assess to what extent analysts anticipate earnings management 
and, if so, whether they use this capability to produce earnings forecasts which adjust 
for the earnings management component. They find that analysts’ forecasts are 
much closer to the number that management will report – the ‘managed’ earnings 
number, rather than the ‘clean’ unmanaged earnings number.
1.3.11	relevance	oF	academic	studies	For	tHis	dissertation
Until the end of 2001, restatement companies were smaller than the average of about 
9,000 companies contained in ratings agency Standard & Poor’s Compustat database 
(see Figure 1.4). However, beginning in 2002, average assets of restatement companies 
were greater than the average, peaking in 2005 with average assets of US $7 billion 
(compared to the Compustat average of US $5.2 billion), and documented in a 2008 
report to the US Treasury. This means that from being a more or less insignificant 
issue for capital market participants and regulators, it became a phenomenon with 
unprecedented impact on corporate ‘well-being’ and it tarnished reputations of 
companies, their executives and gatekeepers.  If there is an increased likelihood of 
encountering restatements for larger companies, a reasonable expectation would 
be that analysts develop some kind of ‘radar’ function, signaling to them suspect 
corporate situations. However, empirical evidence shows that analysts ignored 
many red flags, which – without the benefit of hindsight – could be identified in 
pre-restatement periods. Excessive executive remuneration packages, earnings 
management pressures, dominant and often narcissist CEOs, audit committees with 
insufficient financial expertise, the ever-increasing complexity of accounting rules, 
and gatekeepers with substantial conflicts of interest, are all among those red flags. 
Our study will show that four key factors – earnings management, CEO competence, 
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CEO job demands, and factors relating to integrity and governance – are to a large 
extent, ignored by analysts in their assessments.
In summary, the academic studies reviewed above, are of relevance to our studies in 
the following ways. (Also of note is that in Study 2 we will get back to some of these 
studies in more detail in developing our hypotheses):
• Studies (1.3.1) on the effects of restatements on market capitalization 
provide background on factors determining the severity of restatements, in 
particular when management intent is applicable. In Study 1, the concept of 
severity, and which factors enhance or mitigate severity, will be studied in 
more depth.
• Studies (1.3.2) on restatements as proxy for earnings management will be 
relevant in Study 2. In that study on analysts’ perceptions of CEO behaviour, 
we will define ‘Earnings Management Pressures’ as a key cause for exectives 
getting involved with earnings management, often leading to restatement 
situations.
• Studies (1.3.3) on financial reporting literacy will be used both in Studies 1 and 
2, as important ingredients for defining the role of countervailing powers; 
more specifically, does financial expertise in audit committees change the 
perceptions of analysts on CEO pressures and behaviour?
• Studies (1.3.4) on corporate governance and the role of gatekeepers provide 
support for studies 1 and 2. In both studies the strength of governance 
measures before and after the restatement announcement will be 
considered. In particular in the restatement recovery period, we expect that 
our studies will demonstrate a strong relationship between governance 
remediation actions and how analysts perceive the company in its abilities 
to regain trust and reputation through CEO behaviour.
• Studies (1.3.5) on earnings and accrual quality deal with the issue of 
accounting discretionary space of executives and the related topic of 
management judgment in choosing and applying accounting principles. 
In Study 2 we will consider how analysts’ perceptions of this ‘accounting 
discretionary space’ influence their assessments of CEO behaviour in 
restatement situations. 
• Studies (1.3.6) on contagion effects of restatements are of interest to 
our studies because the threat of spill-over effects of restatements on 
63
63Chapter 1 - Introduction and Historical Overview
independent board members (and other gatekeepers) could affect the views 
of analysts in assessing effective countervailing powers in the restatement 
recovery period.
• Other studies (1.3.7 through 1.3.9) deal with restatement studies on 
companies outside to US, to illustrate they are not just a US phenomenon, 
in particular considering the implementation of IFRS. Finally, we mention 
a few academic studies which addressed particularly significant and/or 
high profile restatement cases. These studies provide colour to the earlier 
studies.
• Finally, studies in 1.3.10 deal with analysts’ ability to anticipate restatements. 
Both studies 1 and 2 deal with analysts’ perceptions in restatement situations, 
hence their relevance. Study 2 in particular will consider in greater depth 
academic studies into judgement and decision making by analysts.
64
64
illustrations	and	Figures
Figure 1.1 Number oF restatemeNts: 1997-2006 (source treasury report; scholz 2008)
Figure 1.2 restatemeNt aNNouNcemeNt returNs aNd market returNs over the decade (source treasury report; 
scholz 2008)
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1.4 Impact of Financial Statement Restatements on Corporate Reputation
1.4.1	tHe	value	oF	good	corPorate	rePutation
One of the core assumptions in reputation management is that a good corporate 
reputation provides a company with a license to operate. A corporate reputation 
describes what people think and feel about a company, based on information 
they have been exposed to about its products, employees, social initiatives, past 
performance, or future prospects (Van Riel & Fombrun, 2007). Corporate reputations 
represent aggregated assessments of organizations’ institutional prestige (Shapiro, 
1987). Stakeholders need these aggregated assessments to reduce uncertainty in 
general, and specifically with regard to the decision-making process (Poiesz, 1989).
Among an organization’s financial stakeholders, there are two types of financial 
audiences that are especially critical in an organization’s reputation-building activities 
– lead analysts and institutional investors. Financial analysts have been known to 
possess a ‘herd mentality,’ meaning that analysts are influenced by opinion leaders 
within their own field of work (see Bernhardt, Campello & Kutsoati, 2006). Hence, 
having a good corporate reputation with lead analysts will create a positive aura 
for a company. A good corporate reputation positively impacts analysts’ earnings 
forecasts because of the future profitability associated with higher reputations – 
evidence has shown that such a corporate reputation has beneficial implications 
for future profitability by helping organizations attain superior performance 
outcomes (Cordeiro & Sambharya, 1997; Roberts & Dowling, 1997). Stark (2002), 
for example, notes that shareholder returns for companies with a strong corporate 
reputation have been, on average, 25.5 per cent, versus 10.7 per cent for their peers. 
Similarly, reputation also affects investment decisions by institutional investors. 
From an organizational perspective, maintaining a good corporate reputation with 
institutional shareholders is most critical, given the power that these shareholders 
can exert (Van Riel & Fombrun, 2007). 
There is some evidence that organizations with a strong corporate reputation are 
less likely to experience restatements (Cao, Myers, & Omer, 2008). Presumably they 
are motivated to prevent damage to their reputations. In addition, CEOs and other 
top executives might be motivated to prevent damage to their personal reputations 
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(Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, & Hambrick, 2008). Hence, the value of having a good 
corporate reputation works both ways – it can increase a company’s financial 
performance, but also prevent damage to its performance. On the other hand, there 
is also evidence that rather than avoiding fraudulent behaviour to protect their 
reputations, companies can try to protect their reputations by colluding with board 
members and other gatekeepers to provide legitimacy for their actions (Tillman, 
2008).
No matter whether or not a good reputation can help to prevent restatements, once 
a restatement does occur, it seems likely that it can severely damage a company’s 
reputation. The fact that restatements can be critical for a company’s reputation is 
highlighted by the amount of media coverage devoted to many restatement cases. 
For example, in a 2007 study, Dyck et al. found that based on a sample of some 230 
companies written about in the period 1996 to 2004 (including cases such as Enron, 
HealthSouth, and WorldCom), the Factiva search engine contained an average of 
some 800 articles per case, reflecting the newsworthiness of those scandals (see 
Table 1.1).
As perceptions of the organization by key resource providers change, and the 
expectations of the organization’s future profitability are adjusted downward, 
corporate reputation will be damaged (Van Riel & Fombrun, 2007). As we will show, 
a restatement cannot only directly damage a company’s profitability by making 
downward adjustments to its profits, but can also decrease the level of trust that 
stakeholders have in the truthfulness of the company’s financial reporting. This 
decrease in trust, which is especially likely when fraud is involved, can damage the 
level of trust in the company as a whole, and hence its reputation.
 
1.4.2	measures	oF	corPorate	rePutation
There are basically three conceptual paradigms within reputation measurement that 
influence the way that corporate reputation is measured (Berens & Van Riel, 2004).
The first paradigm is built on the stance that a corporate reputation is based on 
the social expectations that people have of companies. Within this paradigm, there 
are basically two ways of looking at reputation. The first sees reputation as equal 
to attitude. The supposition is that a corporate reputation can be decomposed into 
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various partial images corresponding to different social expectations, e.g. the image 
of a company as employer, or the image of the company as a sound investment. 
Reputation measurement within this paradigm entails the identification of relevant 
attributes and subsequent rating of a company based on these attributes. The 
reputation score is formed by the average score on all attributes. An example of a 
reputation ranking based on this method is Fortune’s Most Admired Companies. 
Companies within the Fortune 500 are grouped into industries and a customized 
questionnaire is created. This questionnaire is sent to more than 12,000 executives 
within the companies, board members of those companies, and financial analysts 
who follow that particular industry (Stark, 2002). Respondents rate companies in their 
own industry on eight criteria – innovativeness, overall quality of management, long-
term investment value, social responsibility to the community and the environment, 
ability to attract and retain talented people, quality of products or services, financial 
soundness, and finally, the wise use of corporate assets. A company’s final Fortune 
score is the average of its scores across the eight criteria.
The foundation of the second stream within the social expectations paradigm is that 
corporate reputation is an overall assessment (Gestalt). Corporate reputations are 
measured directly by asking respondents about their feelings toward a company. An 
example of this is the RepTrak™ Pulse, developed by the Reputation Institute. The 
Pulse score is the result of four questions regarding the feeling, trust, admiration 
and esteem a respondent feels towards a company. Beyond the four Pulse questions, 
respondents are also asked to rate a company on 23 key performance indicators that 
are grouped around seven reputation drivers that stimulate stakeholders to support 
the company, regarding aspects such as purchasing and investment decisions, 
products and services, innovation, workplace, governance, citizenship, leadership and 
performance. To identify the implications of corporate reputation, respondents also 
fill out a section on their supportive behaviour intentions, such as the willingness to 
purchase. The RepTrak™ study takes place via an online survey and is held annually 
among the general public. In 2008, the RepTrak™ study was executed in 27 countries 
on six continents (Reputation Institute, 2008). Companies included for measurement 
are the world’s largest companies as judged by total revenue. Rated companies also 
must have significant consumer presence and be familiar to the general public.
The second paradigm distinguishes associations on the basis of different corporate 
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personality traits that people attribute to companies (Berens & Van Riel, 2004). An 
example is the corporate personality scale developed by Davies, Piger and Sedor 
(2008). The corporate personality scale consists of 49 items belonging to seven 
dimensions – agreeableness, enterprise, competence, ruthlessness, chic, informality, 
and machismo. 
Finally, the third paradigm within reputation measurement is focused on corporate 
associations with a basis consisting of different reasons people have to trust or 
distrust a company (Berens & Van Riel, 2004). The corporate credibility scale developed 
by Newell and Goldsmith (2001) falls within this paradigm. The corporate credibility 
scale contains eight attributes within two main dimensions, namely, expertise and 
trustworthiness.
1.4.3	corPorate	rePutations	oF	restating	comPanies
In order to get an approximate feeling for the effect of financial restatements on 
corporate reputations, the reputation scores of restating companies before and 
after the restatement were examined. Given the financial nature of the topic, the 
Fortune database provides the best entrance to determine the reputational effect of 
restatements, as the reputation database is composed of perceptions of executives, 
directors and analysts. The RepTrak™ Pulse survey measures corporate reputations 
among the general public, which may not be aware of the announcement of a 
financial restatement. Moreover, the Pulse construct has only been in use since 2006, 
putting strenuous limitations on the sample. The corporate personality and corporate 
credibility scales have mainly been used for scientific purposes, hence there are no 
readily available databases containing the results of multiple companies.
The sample consists of some of the restating companies used in the empirical parts of 
this thesis. The Fortune database is built on surveys executed in the first two months 
of a calendar year. Hence, the month of a restatement is important in pinpointing the 
years before and after a restatement. Companies with restatement dates in January 
or February of a certain year are removed from the sample, as it is ambiguous to 
determine whether the effect of the announcement is fully incorporated at the time 
of reputation measurement. Crosschecking the company names of the restating 
companies with the available reputation data in the Fortune databases resulted in 
the following useable sample, as stated in the table below.
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table 1.2 comparative overview restatiNg compaNies with available reputatioN data
Announcement date Year of reputation score 
preceding announcement
Year of reputation score after 
announcement
BP June 2006 2006 2007
Credit Suisse March 2004 2004 2005
General Motors March 2006 2006 2007
Goodyear October 2003 2003 2004
Norsk Hydro April 2006 2006 2007
Time Warner September 2006 2006 2007
The reputation scores of the restating companies as listed in the Fortune database 
are provided in the table below.
table 1.3 reputatioN scores oF a sample restatiNg compaNies
Reputation score preceding 
announcement
Reputation score after 
announcement
Difference
BP 8.17 7.32 -10.4%
Credit Suisse 5.34 5.24 -1.9%
General Motors 4.57 5.60 +22.5%
Goodyear 5.56 4.86 -12.6%
Norsk Hydro 6.81 6.68 -1.9%
Time Warner 6.50 5.71 -12.2%
Despite the limited number of cases in the sample, it is very interesting to see that 
financial restatements appear to have a negative effect on the attitude towards a 
company after the statement (as measured by Fortune). Five out of the six companies 
show a decline in their reputation score after they announced a financial restatement. 
Only one company, General Motors, experienced an improvement in its corporate 
reputation.
In order to gain more insights in these results, the window around the restatement 
was broadened to gather more years, capturing potential effects of temporal bias. 
The available data did not allow us to establish a time series with at least two years 
before and after the restatement announcement date for Goodyear, Norsk Hydro and 
Time Warner. The results for the remaining three companies are shown in the graph 
below.
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Figure 1.5 reputatioN aNalyses bp, credit suisse aNd geNeral motors
As the graph highlights, BP’s reputation was at its peak just before the restatement 
announcement in June 2006. The years following the announcement show a sharp 
decline in BP’s reputation. Credit Suisse only experienced a local low point around 
the time of the announcement and consistently showed improving reputation scores 
after the announcement. General Motors’ reputation score dropped dramatically in 
the Fortune measurement in the beginning of 2006, though this is most likely due 
to its poor financial performance and talk of potential bankruptcy at that time. The 
revelation of General Motors not entering into bankruptcy may have caused the 
upsurge of its reputation score in 2007. 
The case of General Motors is consistent with findings from the literature which 
suggest that the amount of the impact of a crisis is affected by what the reputation 
of the company was beforehand (see Van Riel & Fombrun, 2007; Rhee & Valdez, 
2009). In the case of General Motors, its reputation was already severely damaged 
before the restatement and hence, the effect of the financial restatement did not 
translate into a further decline of General Motors’ reputation.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
General Motors Credit SuisseBP Plc
200820072006200520042003
73
73Chapter 1 - Introduction and Historical Overview
Given the limited sample size, it is not possible to draw solid conclusions about 
the effect of financial restatements on corporate reputation. Nonetheless, it is 
very interesting to see that in three out of six cases, the reputation loss after the 
restatement announcement is more than 10 per cent. As research shows that 
reputational losses during a crisis average to 8-15 per cent of the market values of 
affected companies (Palmrose et al., 2004; Van Riel & Fombrun, 2007), it becomes 
clear that the negative impact on the company can be enormous. 
1.4.4	ceo	rePutation	oF	restating	comPanies
Not only is the reputation of the company at stake during a financial restatement 
situation, but also the personal reputation of the CEO him/herself:
Executives and directors experience personal devaluation when their 
companies perform poorly. They tend to be fired, they tend not to be rehired 
elsewhere, and those who are rehired tend to be hired in lesser capacities or 
at lesser firms. (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008: 231)
The underlying reason for this, as stated by Wiesenfeld et al. (2008), is that corporate 
failure can lead to stigmatization and subsequent denigration of the CEO, who, as 
the figurehead of the company, often takes most of the blame. This is because the 
media has the propensity to attribute the company’s performance to the actions of 
the CEO (Hayward, Rindova & Pollock, 2004). 
Wade, Pollock, Porac and Graffin (2008) find that the higher the reputation of the 
CEO before the crisis, the harder the fall in status after the crisis. With respect to 
financial restatements, this is clearly visible in the case of Kenneth Lay, the CEO of 
Enron. In only a few months time, his status as a revolutionary leader in the public 
utility industry was completely destroyed, and he was crucified in the media (Wade 
et al., 2008). 
Such damage to a CEO’s reputation is often not only a personal misfortune, but can 
have serious consequences for the company as well. The image of the celebrity CEO 
serves as an intangible asset for the company and is directly tied to the company’s 
reputation (Ketchen, Adams & Shook, 2008; Wade et al., 2008). A celebrity CEO serves 
as a benefit to the corporate reputation so long as business takes its normal course. 
However, in times of crisis, the negative effects of CEO celebrity might rise to the 
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surface. A celebrity CEO receives increased attention and hence any gaps between 
actual and expected firm performance are magnified (Ketchen et al., 2008). In 
particular, unethical or illegal behaviour by a celebrity CEO provides the company 
with added negative media attention, further highlighting damage to the corporate 
reputation.
1.4.5	Factors	mitigating	tHe	imPact	oF	restatements
Handling the crisis in a proper way will mitigate the negative effects of a financial 
restatement. For example, in a study by Knight and Pretty (1999), it was shown that 
companies experiencing man-made catastrophes could be divided into two groups: 
the ‘recoverers,’ whose stock after an initial dip ultimately rose 10 per cent; and the 
‘non-recoverers’ whose stock dropped by 15 per cent. It seems likely that the amount 
of the impact is affected by the steps a company takes to handle the crisis (Van Riel 
& Fombrun, 2007). As Knight and Pretty (1999) explained it: these catastrophes offer 
an opportunity for management to demonstrate their talent in dealing with difficult 
circumstances. 
In order to shield the CEO’s and the company’s reputation during a restatement 
crisis, it is important that a CEO engages in damage control. This is a factor that Wade 
et al. (2008) label ‘social astuteness’  – being able to understand perceptions and 
respond accordingly. A good example of this is the decision of CEO James Burke of 
Johnson & Johnson to remove Tylenol from the store shelves after the 1982 product 
tampering scare. Not only did the decision positively reflect on Burke, it also restored 
the corporate reputation of Johnson & Johnson as a supplier of safe products. In 
the empirical parts of this thesis, we will take a close look at the nature of these 
reputational remediation actions.
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1.5 Principal Research Questions and Thesis Overview
1.5.1 IntroductIon and PrIncIPal research QuestIon
The primary purpose of financial statements is to provide capital market participants 
(investors, creditors, financing entities and other stakeholders) with information 
that enables them to make informed decisions (Lev & Zarowin, 1999). To be useful, 
financial information should be relevant, timely and faithfully represent real-world 
phenomena as well as be comparable and understandable (FASB & IASB, 2006). In 
other words, financial statements must serve to increase the quality of financial 
judgment and the ability of market participants to make informed decisions. 
Judgment based on financial statements works in two directions.
The first, backwards-looking judgement, answers questions such as how has the 
company and its management performed compared to industry peers, and whether 
the company utilized its resources (e.g. capital, employees, etc.) in an efficient, 
effective and competitive manner. The second, forward-looking judgement, predicts 
such considerations as whether the company and its management team will deliver 
adequate (above peer group) returns in the future, and whether the company will 
utilize its resources in such a manner that it will attract financial resources, customers, 
employees and investors in the future. 
A Discussion Paper (FASB & IASB, 2006), jointly developed by the US Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB), and issued in July 2006, described the objectives of financial reporting 
as follows:
The objective of general purpose external financial reporting is to provide 
information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors 
and others in making investment, credit, and similar resource allocation 
decisions.
  
To help achieve its objective, financial reporting should provide information 
to help present and potential investors and creditors and others to assess 
the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of the entity’s future cash inflows 
and outflows (the entity’s future cash flows). That information is essential 
in assessing an entity’s ability to generate net cash inflows and thus to 
provide returns to investors and creditors.
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Financial statements also serve to alleviate the so-called ‘agency problem’ (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983) – which chiefly asks, how outsiders (e.g. 
investors, lenders, etc.), who are in a principal-agent relationship with insiders (e.g. 
executives and the chief executive officer, in particular), ensure that their outsider 
interests are properly served. Insiders have access to a wide range of proprietary 
information on their firm’s competitive strengths, such as its technologies, its 
customer base, the power of its workforce (including its top management team) and 
contractual positions. Add to that information the knowledge they have about their 
firm’s relative weaknesses, such as aging production facilities, new (threatening) 
technologies, impairments in tangible and/or intangible asset bases, and so on. 
Insiders may also have private (adverse) information on their own investment choices 
(assets/projects), or discover negative qualities of assets/liabilities in the course of 
business transactions – making them privy to sensitive information well before such 
information is made known to outsiders, or the public, if such information is ever 
made known.
Another facet of the agency problem is that outsiders are unable to observe insiders’ 
risk appetite and other less-quantifiable business actions, such as assessing insiders’ 
diligence in making investment decisions and/or the selection of business partners. 
Transparent financial reporting should mitigate these insider-outsider informational 
asymmetries by providing information on a firm’s earnings, investments, capital 
strengths (solvency) and financing position (including liquidity) – not only in an 
absolute quantitative sense, but also in the more difficult to measure qualitative 
sense. Such qualitative measures include quality of earnings, quality of debtors/
customer base, quality of workforce and its knowledge base, and – last but not least – 
quality of a firm’s top management team and the appropriateness of its management 
reward system. The collective of these qualitative company characteristics should be 
considered as a key component and/or contributor to both a company’s reputation 
and that of a company’s top management team. 
Restatements render earlier published financial statements (and the information 
contained therein) unreliable. Restatements threaten the subtle balance in the 
information supply-and-demand equilibrium and, by definition, substantially increase 
the agency problem. A restatement announcement creates instantaneous doubts, not 
only on the exact quantitative measures of a company’s financial performance (such 
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as net earnings and shareholders’ equity), but it also creates immediate uncertainty 
as to the reliability of a company’s management team, the team’s integrity and 
can call into question whether management’s private objectives and behaviours 
(the motivations and actions of the insiders), were aligned with the interests of 
investors and other stakeholders (the outsiders). Therefore, restatements represent 
a phenomenon tied to myriad implications for the judgment and decision making of 
capital market participants, in particular analysts, in terms of their assessments of 
both quantitative and qualitative aspects of a company’s performance as well as its 
top management. 
In section 1.3, we described and summarized earlier research on the restatement 
phenomenon. Basically, two strings of research can be distinguished. The first 
group of studies deal with the quantitative aspects of the effects of restatements 
on share prices, alongside the consequences of restatements on analysts’ earnings 
estimates and expected future financial performance. Most of these studies are 
based on archival data and statistically associate financial or other characteristics 
of restatements with capital market data. A second collection of research deals 
with causes and consequences of governance measures, executive reward systems, 
contagion, and the reputational effects of restatements. Again, these studies are 
predominantly based on associations between the more qualitative characteristics of 
the restatement environment (e.g. board composition, CEO and/or CFO accounting 
expertise, network relationships), and after-the-fact occurrences and characteristics 
of the restatement phenomenon. 
Both strings of research reveal that behavioural attributes of firm executives (and of 
CEOs in particular), and those attributes of analysts themselves, play a key role in how 
the market ultimately reacts and interprets restatement situations. Consequently, 
the tenor of communications by both the company and the analysts following the 
company is coloured accordingly. The overarching theme in our research is to assess 
how well and to what extent analysts, as gatekeepers to the health of a company, 
are able to distinguish between restatement facts (financial information), and 
restatement ‘coloured background’ information  (e.g. perceptions of CEO pressures, 
assessments of CEO abilities and strength of countervailing powers).
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For our purposes, important drivers of analysts’ judgment and decision making will 
include an examination of the effects of perceptions of CEO pressures, executive 
job demands, CEO confidence levels, and CEO dominance on analysts’ work in the 
wake of a restatement. Do analysts’ perceptions of CEO pressures and characteristics 
influence analysts’ judgments of CEO behaviour before and after a restatement 
announcement?
The main research question in this thesis is:
Which factors (‘blinders’) in a restatement situation can obscure gatekeepers’ (in 
particular analysts’) perceptions and tarnish corporate reputation?
More specifically, we address the following questions:
• Which factors obscure communication on restatements and thereby affect 
perceived severity of a restatement?
• Which factors blur analysts’ views (as gatekeepers) of CEO behaviour and a 
company’s reputation when taking remedial actions as part of restatement 
situations? 
• Do such blinders explain gatekeeper failure and why restatements come as 
a ‘predictable surprise’? 
We shall use a combination of qualitative studies, along with a survey approach, 
to enable us to answer the primary research questions. Therefore, our planned 
theoretical contribution is to uncover how restatement situations are coloured by 
a firm’s internal governance and power struggles alongside informational demand 
forces imposed by capital market participants. Next, we will assess and model how 
certain behavioural biases and bounded awareness influence analysts’ judgment 
and decision making in restatement situations.
Our contribution to management and accounting practice can be summarized as 
follows: If companies, their executives and gatekeepers would have an improved 
understanding of how restatements, and in particular their behavioural effects on 
monitoring functions, affect the potential longer-term value drivers of a firm, then 
they (both management and gatekeepers) can take more adequate actions in the 
future to protect firm value and corporate reputation. In that context corporate 
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reputation is considered to be of essence for a company in its ability to attract and 
secure capital, employees and customers. Restatements can affect a company’s 
license to operate. Therefore, a deeper insight into which factors obscure a clear view 
by capital market participants (in particular analysts) in restatement situations, can 
help managers and gatekeepers in making better decisions to remediate damage 
caused by a restatement. 
Bonner (2008) provides a framework for studying judgment and decision-making 
issues in the domain of accounting information. Judgment and decision making in 
that context involve not only producers and users of financial and/or accounting 
information, but also regulators and gatekeepers. Her framework greatly informs our 
sub-study steps and will provide justification for many of the research methodologies 
that follow. The steps followed in this thesis are shown in Figure 1.6 (Study Overview). 
In this chapter, we have explained that judgement and decision making by market 
participants following a restatement are of vital importance in determining the 
impact of the restatement. In the following sections, we will explain how the other 
chapters of the thesis build on this premise.
1.5.2	study	1	–	content	coding	study	and	restatement	communications
The various regulatory reports and academic studies into the restatement 
phenomenon, as described in section 1.2 and 1.3, provide evidence that restatements 
have serious consequences for a firm’s perceived financial performance. However, 
restatements not only imply that past financial performance was misstated and/or 
misunderstood, they also contain significant, more intangible messages on factors 
such as strength of corporate governance, (in)adequacy of internal controls, pressures 
on management to outperform competitors, and evidently, how management could 
manoeuvre itself into such a trust-imploding position. Trust and reputation, as more 
fully described in section 1.4, are precisely the two most vulnerable intangibles driving 
a firm’s value – they take long to build, however, they may vanish within moments of 
a restatement, or other (financial) crisis announcements. 
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background	descriPtion	section	i		 	 	 	 	 	  
      
     
         
 
     
 
         
(Following Bonner’s Framework (2008) – Judgment and Decision-making in Accounting 
– adapted to this thesis.)
Judgment and decision making following restatement(s) is an important task for 
capital market participants.
Can	we	quantify	the	factors	that	influence	analysts’	judgment	of	CEOs	in	restate-
ment	situations?	And	hence	influence	firms’	reputational	assessments?
Quality of financial analysts’ judgment following restatement situations can have 
significant impact on a firms’ reputation and that of its CEO. Which	factors	blur	
analyst’s	views?
Figure 1.6 study overview
Certain dimensions of restatements are expected to have a significant impact on 
severity judgment by capital market participants and impact reputation assess-
ments. Which	factors	obscure	a	clear/untainted	view?
study	1
Do analysts recognize
earnings management
pressures on CEOs?
Do analysts recognize
executive job
demands of CEOs?
Are analysts influen-
ced by biases in their 
JDM on restatements?
study	2	   
 
Do analysts confirm these biases and bounded awareness? (Through direct ques-
tioning.) 
study	3
Do these blinders explain gatekeeper failure? (Provide suggestions for improving 
the role of the independent board.)
conclusions	and	discussions
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Restatements deal with misstatements of financial information and/or disclosures 
in a company’s primary financial communication mechanisms. Understanding the 
precise nature of the financial information distortion in itself is already a demanding 
task, given the current complexities of financial accounting standards and the wide 
topological variety in type of restatements, as Figure 1.7 (Simplified Typology of 
Restatements) reveals.
However, both companies and financial analysts are expected to have adequate in-
house financial expertise, which enables them to make judgments in the context 
of restatement announcements and their subsequent follow-up communications. 
We would expect that companies, particularly the CEO and CFO, would know what, 
how, and when to communicate on restatement matters. Similarly, we would expect 
financial analysts to be able to ask the ‘right’ questions and probe their sources 
deeply enough to gather the information they need to assess the company’s now-
revised financial position and assess its future performance potential. 
Next, restatements not only imply that corrective financial disclosure actions need 
to be taken; they require an explanation as to what caused them to happen in the 
first place. Again, what makes this issue complex to judge is the ‘discretionary space’ 
available to senior management in selecting and applying accounting principles. 
As can be seen in the current disclosures required to be made by management in 
the ‘Management Discussion and Analysis‘ section of financial statements (or 
comparable sections), management uses considerable judgment, and applies 
significant estimates, in its application of accounting principles to financial 
reporting. Therefore, along with the dimension of the ‘simple’ financial distortion, 
is the dimension of management’s integrity and/or intent when using this 
‘discretionary’ accounting space. This dimension is important as it will be the basis 
for distinguishing accounting errors (unintentional), from accounting irregularities 
(intentional misstatements). Unfortunately, in all too many cases, management did 
not stay within the discretionary accounting space in issuing its financial statements, 
but instead propelled its company into accounting and reputational limbo. Obviously, 
applying judgment to this dimension of information supply (from the CEO and CFO), 
and information demand (from analysts, auditors, and regulators) is a much more 
tedious task. 
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Therefore, our first research question is to consider which primary dimensions can be 
developed to assess the severity of restatements. We plan to apply a grounded-theory 
approach to this question, and will utilize content coding to corporate (executive) 
communication expressions (press releases), analysts’ reports, and the combined 
communications between executives and analysts (transcripts of conference calls 
hosted by the restatement company).
Study 1 – Sub-research question 1:
 
What type of restatements can be distinguished in terms of severity?
From studying the restatement literature, and also based on practical experience, it 
becomes evident that each and every restatement situation is different. Different, 
not in the sense of its ‘birth’ (the restatement origin is always a correction of 
fundamental errors in accounting), but rather on its ‘genetic’ makeup, composition 
and development/ grooming. The process of how restatements come to life within 
an organisation, how pressures of governance and executive power-play influence 
the disclosure and communication processes, and finally, how restatement causes 
are remediated, determine to a large extent how the assault on the company’s 
‘reputational’ and financial health will be judged by stakeholders. We need to 
be able to strip away the colouring influence of noise factors, which enhance the 
perceived severity of restatements and assess whether analysts are able (and 
enabled) to recognize those factors that serve to exacerbate the perceived severity 
of restatements. Again, our grounded-theory approach will help us to discover these 
restatement ‘noise’ factors. On that basis, our next research question will be:
Study 1 – Sub-research question 2:
Which factors obscure communication on restatements and enhance 
reputational risks in restatement situations? 
Once a restatement hits a company, its senior executives are under severe pressure 
from the independent board, forensic investigators, the company’s independent 
auditors, and legal counsel (both internal and external). Practice also reveals that in 
many instances, particularly when there are doubts about the integrity and/or intent 
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of senior management, independent legal counsel, together with forensic experts, 
will start investigating the causes and background factors that contributed to the 
restatement. Credibility of senior leadership is at stake. Management needs to provide 
comfort on dual dimensions of the restatement severity plane – first, is management 
taking appropriate governance, internal control and compliance actions? And second, 
is management in a position to communicate openly in order to mitigate information 
distortion concerns? Therefore, our third sub-research question will be:
Study 1 – Sub-research question 3:
Which steps can be taken by a company to mitigate reputation risks in 
restatements?
The answers to the above questions will help us understand how restatement 
situations tend to become clouded, or coloured, by background noise. Stakeholders 
and outside gatekeepers, including analysts, are often only allowed to see the 
communication ‘outcomes’ of deliberations taking place within a company. Should 
a company fail to put such ‘background noises’ into the right context – adding to 
pressing uncertainties that the market is already struggling with on both dimensions 
of restatement severity – then restatement recovery can be seriously impaired. The 
need to better understand factors obscuring communication around restatements, 
and understand how uncertainties arise, is the fundamental reason for our 
research questions in Study 1. Providing transparency around the primary causes of 
restatement severity can help us understand how analysts react to restatements in 
their role of gatekeeper. This knowledge can help executives and boards to improve 
their management and communications during a restatement crisis.
1.5.3	study	2	–	analysts’	survey:	measuring	analysts’	PercePtions	oF	ceo	beHaviour	
in	restatement	situations
With the objective of the first sub-study being to gain a deeper understanding of the 
severity dimensions of a restatement situation, we additionally expect to uncover 
forces enhancing reputation risk in restatement situations, along with the remedial 
actions that can be taken by the firm’s executives and/or board to mitigate reputation 
risks. These forces and subsequent remedial actions must be ‘peeled off’ in order 
to obtain a clearer view of the underlying forces which contributed to pressuring 
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companies, and, in particular, the CEOs of those companies, into misstating their 
financial position. In Study 2, we plan to develop a model of analysts’ perceptions of 
CEO behaviour. In particular, we are interested in uncovering whether in the period 
leading up to the restatement, analysts recognize pressures on the CEO to commit 
and/or support accounting practices that will result in financial misstatements. Next, 
we seek to uncover which forces, biases and perceptions taint analysts’ views of CEO 
behaviour in restatement situations. As discussed in section 1.2 and 1.3, regulatory 
reports and academic research show that financial performance pressures often 
lead to misstatements. Literature in organizational psychology indicates that CEOs 
(particularly those of larger public companies), under numerous pressures to perform, 
share certain character traits that might make them more prone to succumbing 
to these financial performance pressures and reverting to the use of accounting 
irregularities.
In developing our model with an eye towards identifying and categorizing these 
pressures, we referred to academic literature on earnings management pressures 
(including executive rewards), executive job demands, corporate governance and the 
effects of CEO confidence levels. In addition, in new standards that became effective 
on January 1, 2006, the (US) Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts (CFA) requires 
compliance with the following standard (Standard V) on ‘Investment Analysis, 
Recommendations and Action’(CFA Institute, 2006):
Diligence and Reasonable Basis. Members and Candidates must: 
1. Exercise diligence, independence, and thoroughness in analyzing 
investments, making investment recommendations, and taking investment 
actions. 
2. Have a reasonable and adequate basis, supported by appropriate research 
and investigation, for any investment analysis, recommendation, or action.
However, as the CFA does not provide detailed guidance on which steps can be 
taken to discover fraud, we will look at, and borrow heavily from, another gatekeeper 
profession – that of the independent auditor, which offers comprehensive guidance on 
fraud detection. In that profession, comprehensive standards and working practices 
have been developed to uncover pressures, opportunities, and rationale for financial 
fraud. In developing our analysts’ survey, we shall consider guidance provided by the 
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American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (SAS 99), and the fraud discovery 
auditing standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Taking this 
work a step further, the first part of our second study can be defined as follows:
Study 2 – Sub-research question 1:
Do analysts recognize earnings management pressures and executive job 
demand pressures on CEOs before a restatement?
Analysts often disregard information that does not neatly fit into their proprietary 
spreadsheet models, which have been developed specifically to assist them in 
assessing current earnings and predicting future income streams. This assertion is 
partly based on academic studies focused on detailing how analysts collect company 
performance data, studies focused on their innate abilities, and studies exploring 
the information-processing routines of analysts (see Ramnath, Rock & Shane, 
2008). In our second study, not only do we plan to uncover how CEO performance 
pressures influence analysts’ judgment and decision making, we also aim to assess 
whether and how, countervailing powers – such as CEO competence, the strength of 
internal gatekeepers and governance – help to keep the CEO in check. Therefore, in 
addition to the first layer of reputation factors concealing the misstatement kernel, 
and which were peeled away in Study 1, these layers of pressure on CEOs, and the 
corresponding countervailing powers therein, are a deeper external covering that 
must be dissected.
 
Next, a large number of archival data studies provide support for the notion that 
analysts are biased in their assessments of company and CEO performance. There 
generally is an under reaction to good news and an overreaction to bad news; analysts 
tend to overestimate private information and underestimate public information 
(e.g., Odean, 1998). Therefore, we need to make an attempt to peel away the third 
layer surrounding restatement situations. This layer consists of biases, and so-called 
‘bounded awareness’; we expect these more irrational factors, caused by common 
human biases, to play a not-insignificant role in analysts’ judgment of restatement 
situations. Therefore, our second question in Study 2 follows:
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Study 2 – Sub-research question 2:
Do performance pressures and job demands influence analysts’ judgment of 
CEO behaviour in the period before a restatement is announced?
Our first study intends to analyse the communication remediation efforts for 
the period immediately following a restatement announcement – the so-called 
restatement reputation remediation period. In terms of market sensitivity, this period 
can be considered extremely demanding on a firm’s executive and non-executive 
leadership team, their gatekeepers and communication experts. The same is true 
for the analysts following a restatement company, particularly if they ignored earlier 
warning signs (red flags) in the period to be restated. Analysts’ regret and annoyance 
around their issuance of ‘mis-ratings’ can be expected to influence their judgments. 
Similar to the previous step, our model and research attempt to distinguish for this 
period between the rational information sources (earnings and job demand pressures 
as well as countervailing powers), and the more difficult to gauge biases in analysts’ 
formation of judgment. We shall also consider whether the perceptions of analysts 
in the period before the restatement influence their perceptions in the reputation 
remediation period. The third question in Study 2 is as follows:
Study 2 – Sub-research question 3:
Do analysts interpret reputation remediation behaviour of CEOs in the 
restatement recovery period in a rational manner? Is there an influence of 
biases?
1.5.4	study	3	–	analysts’	interviews	corroborating	studies	1	and	2	
In Study 3 we plan to corroborate the findings of our previous two studies. At the 
same time, we will attempt to obtain background material focusing on analyst 
judgment and decision-making in restatement situations. This material can then be 
put to use in the discussion section as we interpret and seek explanations for the 
findings of the studies. We are particularly interested in some of the endogenous 
CEO characteristics, such as integrity, dominance and confidence. We believe that 
semi-structured interviews provide a good basis for obtaining such information, as 
the interviewer has the ability to make reference to the specific restatement situation 
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and explain the context of the CEO characteristics being assessed.
The following research questions will be addressed:
Study 3 – Sub-research question 1:
Do analysts assess CEO endogenous factors (e.g. integrity, dominance, 
confidence) in restatement situations, and does it impact their assessment of 
the role of the CEO before and after the restatement?
Study 3 – Sub-research question 2:
Do analysts recognize and assess exogenous factors (earnings management 
pressures and executive job demands) in restatement situations, and do these 
factors impact analysts’ judgment and decision-making of CEO behaviour 
both before and after the restatement?
Study 3 – Sub-research question 3:
Do analysts consider which constituents failed in their gatekeeper role?
Study 3 – Sub-research question 4:
Do the interviewees corroborate or contradict findings of Study 1 and Study 2 
(other than the above)?
1.5.5	conclusions	and	discussion
We will conclude our thesis with a section providing answers to the above questions. 
In addition, we shall consider how our research findings around the functioning 
of analysts as gatekeepers in restatement situations can be extrapolated to other 
gatekeepers who monitor corporate and CEO performance. On the basis that 
behavioural biases can play a significant role in the monitoring functions of all 
gatekeepers, we will discuss how boards, and in particular their audit committees, can 
enhance their countervailing powers and assist the firm in dealing with a restatement 
crisis, or other crisis situations.  Finally, we will describe the limitations of our research, 
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and offer suggestions for future research in the domain of behavioural accounting, 
crossing over into the area of corporate communication, including suggestions for 
additional research in the area of reputation management.
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Chapter 2
Study 1: Restatement Communication and Factors Enhancing 
or Mitigating Corporate Reputation Damage1 
2.1 Introduction
As described in detail in sections 1.2 and 1.3 of this thesis, 
previous academic research on restatements has addressed 
their causes and consequences, including breakdowns in 
corporate governance structures, effects on market value, 
the role of management reward systems, the occurrence of 
management fraud, the restatement categories that are most 
likely to attract litigation (e.g. shareholder lawsuits) and the 
role of auditor failures, possibly caused by conflicts of interest 
(e.g. selling consulting services). In section 1.4 of this thesis, we 
addressed the impact of financial restatements on corporate 
and CEO reputation. However, research to date does not 
1  This chapter is adapted from: Fred H.M. Gertsen, Cees B.M. van Riel, & Guido Berens, Avoiding Reputation Damage in Financial Restatements, 
Long Range Planning 39 (2006) 429-456. It is based on a first qualitative study which was carried out in the period 2003-2005, shortly after 
an avalanche of accounting scandals had hit both the US and European capital markets. The study was published in 2006 in a Special Issue 
of Long Range Planning, entitled: ‘Controlling the Public Corporation’ and was edited by Robert Eccles, Robert Grant and Cees van Riel. The five 
papers in that Special Issue provide an overview on how weaknesses in corporate strategies, failures in corporate governance mechanisms, 
and breakdowns in internal controls all interconnect. The articles also contained suggestions on how to limit collateral damage in restate-
ment situations and how to regain trust and reputation after such an event.
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provide a theoretical framework for classifying restatements in a 
manner which can be used to develop guidelines around dealing 
with a restatement when the time comes for issuance. Further, 
due to the great variety in accounting technicalities which cause 
companies to restate, there exists a need to develop a more 
simplified typology which will enable both researchers and 
practitioners to assess the severity of a restatement situation 
and develop appropriate reputation remediation actions. 
Academic research on restatements, as described in more detail in section 1.3, can be 
grouped along the lines of the following two dimensions:
A. Quantitative effects due to information distortion leading to restatement.
B. Qualitative effects due to governance and/or integrity failures surrounding 
a restatement.
The quantitative effects of financial restatements find their cause directly in the 
accounting essence of a restatement – the adjustment of a fundamental accounting 
error and/or irregularity. In many cases a restatement implies a significant (material) 
adjustment (mostly downwards), in net income and shareholders’ equity of the firm. 
Consequently, share prices drop. The capital markets, including analysts, adjust future 
earnings potential downwards. Typically, these aspects of restatements can serve as 
relatively straightforward inputs into the future corporate earnings models used by 
capital market participants to assess the future value of a firm. In section 1.3 of this 
thesis, the following academic studies were considered to be part of this dimension 
(the original LRP article references: Rezaee (2005); Agrawal & Chadha (2005); Healy 
& Wahlen (1999); Dechow et al. (1996); Cheng & Farber (2005); Erickson, Hanlon & 
Maydew (2006); Burns & Kedia (2006); Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki (2003); Palmrose et al. 
(2004); Coffee (2004) and Kinney, Palmrose & Scholz (2004). Their work focused on:
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• Effects on market capitalization (stock prices) and/or cost of capital (section 
1.3.1);
• Restatements as proxies for earnings management (section 1.3.2), and
• Lower earnings quality and/or accrual quality (section 1.3.5).
The qualitative effects of financial statements are caused by a reassessment in the 
market of the reliability, integrity and strength of the firm’s executive team. Simply 
put, the market re-rates the firm’s reputation and that of its senior executives. 
This reassessment is caused by a perceived lack of executives’ capabilities to 
manage the company, missing industry knowledge, apparent weaknesses in the 
governance and internal control environment, and/or a lack of integrity. Evidently, 
these more intangible aspects of restatements are much more difficult to assess, 
and, consequently, market participants will fall back to heuristics (rules of thumb) 
to gauge the implications to a firm’s future. These qualitative, reputational aspects 
of restatements are more susceptible to subjective interpretation by market 
participants, and hence, lead to biases in judgment on the value and reputation of a 
firm. Similar to the previous paragraph, the following studies were grouped here in 
our overview of academic studies in part 1.3:
• Lack of financial reporting knowledge/expertise by executives (section 
1.3.3);
• Poor corporate governance (section 1.3.4.);
• Contagion effects of restatements (section 1.3.6); and,
• Effect on corporate and executive reputation (section 1.4).
In order to gain a deeper understanding of these two primary dimensions of 
restatements, distortion and intent, we designed a case study to uncover whether 
the ‘communication actions’ of the primary players in restatement situations can 
be associated with the dimensions of information distortion and/or that of intent/
integrity. Next, based on experience in the accounting practice with one of the major 
public accounting firms, we wanted to discover and model those forces which play 
a role in exacerbating the apparent crisis situation caused by restatements, and 
those factors which could be identified as mitigating the crisis. In other words, which 
forces have an impact on how market participants assess a firm’s position on the two 
dimensions of a restatement?
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Therefore, Study 1 aims to provide and test a model in which the following sub-
research questions can be answered:
(I a): What type of restatements can be distinguished?
(I b): Which factors enhance reputation risks in restatements?
(I c): Which factors mitigate reputation risks in restatements?
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2.2 Theoretical Framework: Classification of Restatements – Just Black, or 
Shades of grey?
Research by Dechow et al. (1996) and by Palmrose et al. (2004) has shown that the 
reaction of the stock market to a restatement is caused by two main factors – the 
decline in the firm’s future prospects, and the increase in uncertainty about these 
prospects.
The decline in the firm’s prospects is partially determined by the degree to which 
the restatement lowers the company’s net income. The perceived pervasiveness of 
the problem (how many areas are affected), and its persistence (how many years/
quarters are restated), also determines the decline in value as pervasive and persistent 
problems may continue for some time. Furthermore, the nature of the restatement is 
also a relevant factor. Restatements may relate to a number of different accounting 
issues (see Table 2.1).
table 2.1 major types oF accouNtiNg issues iNvolved iN restatemeNts
Percentage of all financial restatements, 
2000-2004
Revenu recognition 19%
Equity 15%
Reserves, Accruals and Contingencies 15%
Capitalisation/ Expense of Assets 9%
Inventory 5%
Research has shown that restatements involving revenue recognition issues have 
greater adverse effects than restatements involving other issues (Anderson & Yohn, 
2002). The reason is presumably that revenue figures are considered especially 
indicative of a company’s future profit potential. In addition, revenue recognition 
issues are more likely to attract lawsuits (Palmrose & Scholz, 2003). Similarly, revenue 
recognition ranks high on the agenda of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) because it is the most frequent cause of a restatement and underlies many 
cases of accounting fraud.2 Finally, the risk of material misstatement of financial 
2  Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101: Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements, US Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington DC, (1999). 
Available at: http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab101.htm (1999); L.E. Turner, Speech by SEC staff: Revenue recognition, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Washington DC, (2001). Available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch495.htm(2001).
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statements is generally greater when accounting estimates are involved, as opposed 
to essentially factual data. Estimates, such as those for goodwill impairment, stating 
acquisitions at fair value, inventory obsolescence, uncollectible receivables and 
warranty obligations, are subject to the unpredictability of future events as well 
as errors arising from data mismanagement. Besides diminishing the perceived 
future prospects of a company, restatements tend to create further uncertainty, 
as they often damage the credibility of management and the company’s reporting 
system, particularly when fraud is involved. If management has tried to mislead its 
stakeholders, investor confidence in the trustworthiness of information from the 
management is diminished. Consequently, investors vary more widely in the value 
they place on the company. As Dechow et al. (1996) point out, this wider variation 
can in turn lead to a lower company value. While previous studies have looked at 
the different mechanisms through which restatements affect firm value, they do not 
provide a classification of different types of restatement. On the basis of previous 
findings, we propose two dimensions that categorize a restatement situation 
according to its severity, namely:
1. The degree of distortion of value-relevant information; and,
2. The degree of management intent.
The degree of distortion refers to the decline in the perceived value of the company, 
as a result of the income effect of the restatement, and its pervasiveness and 
persistence (among other things). Intent refers to the degree to which management 
has knowingly and purposely distorted its financial figures and is likely to do so again. 
It is related to investor uncertainty about the company’s value.
The two dimensions of the severity of restatements are illustrated in Figure 2.1. These 
two dimensions create four types of restatements, differing in their overall severity. 
‘White Lies’ rate low on both intent and distortion, and are therefore relatively 
harmless. More serious are what we call ‘Grey Accounting Hocus Pocus’ and ‘Purple 
Delusion’. The former implies a high degree of distortion performed more or less by 
accident. This will likely decrease the company’s perceived future prospects (because 
it usually decreases the company’s performance), but not the credibility of its future 
financial reports.
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Figure 2.1 perceived iNteNt aNd distortioN as two dimeNsioNs oF FiNaNcial restatemeNts
On the other hand, ‘Purple Delusion’ implies a low-level, but deliberate distortion. 
This will not decrease the company’s future prospects much, but will decrease 
investors’ faith in the truthfulness of the company’s future financial reports, leading 
to uncertainty in the market over the company’s prospects. Finally, there is ‘Black 
Magic Fraud’ which involves the deliberate creation of a high level of distortion. 
These are the most serious cases because they decrease both the company’s future 
prospects, and the credibility of its future financial reports. Because of the complexity 
of accounting issues, what is relevant is not so much the objective level of distortion 
and intent, but the level of distortion and intent as it is perceived by the market and 
other stakeholders.
In every restatement case, there are factors that can aggravate the perceived level 
of distortion and intent, and also factors that alleviate them. For example, the 
credibility of a company’s corporate communication could be of vital importance in 
determining the reaction of the public. We will discuss these factors in our Empirical 
Findings section.
However, the ‘objective’ level of distortion and intent matters less than the level 
perceived by the public and other stakeholders. There are a number of issues that can 
put tremendous pressure on restatement scenarios, increasing the level of distortion 
and intent the public perceives to be present, and thereby damaging a company’s 
market value. There are also opportunities to respond to these issues in a way that 
can limit the damage. These include forthright communication about the problems 
as well as actions to solve them. Table 2.2 shows the overall results of our analysis 
Purple Delusion
White Lies
Black Magic Fraud
Gray Accounting 
Hocus Pocus
Malicious
Intent
No Malicious 
Intent
Immaterial 
Distortion
Material 
Distortion
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with respect to these five responses, and our reasoning with respect to the issues and 
responses in dealing with restatements. As is clear, companies that are successful in 
taking these proactive actions suffer less damage to their share price than companies 
that are less successful. In the following sections, we will expound on the results of 
our study in greater detail. 
Figure 2.2 issues aNd respoNses with respect to perceived iNteNt aNd perceived distortioN
Issues
Discrediting of management
Comprehension gap
Tip-of the iceberg effect
Paralysis
Non-alignment
Percieved distortion
Market value
Perceived intent
Responses
Communication
Confirming the problem
Blame taking
Communicating openly
Actions
Taking gouvernance measures
Action in compliance with norms
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2.3 Methods
We developed our classification of restatement situations as well as issues and 
responses in dealing with them through a grounded theory approach. Grounded 
theory refers to ‘the discovery of theory from data’, and involves a continuous 
interaction between a research model and the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This 
means that the categories and relationships distinguished in the research model are 
generated from initial data, and further data is subsequently interpreted in light of 
the research model, but may also lead to adjustment of the model. Our main research 
material consisted of archival data for about 14 European and U.S. restatement cases 
between January 2002 and December 2004, listed in Table 2.3 These 14 cases were 
selected from a larger sample of restatement cases on which the researcher had 
collected company press releases, conference call transcripts and analyst reports. 
From this larger set of restatements we selected these 14 cases based on the following 
considerations: the restatements should be for a sizeable company, well covered by 
analysts; the stock-price effects were significant in the days following the restatement 
announcement; we selected both US cases and a few well publicized European cases; 
the cases should have different positions (based on preliminary data available) on the 
scale of information distortion and the scale of management intent. 
The data of the 14 cases we selected, consists of some 400 press releases, conference 
call transcripts and analysts’ reports containing about 5,175 restatement-related 
quotations (see Appendix 2.3 for an overview of documents and quotations selected; 
gross a number of 500 documents were selected, however, after perusal on their 
relevance, some 400 remained). We chose the beginning of 2002 as the starting point 
because at this time the SEC regulation on ‘Fair Disclosure’ (FD) became effective.
This means that, from this date forward, company conference calls with analysts 
and representatives of the media are part of the public domain. We chose the 
companies’ press releases as their first (and subsequent) official explanation of 
the restatement background, its causes, financial implications and consequences. 
Next we used analyst-produced reports from analysts following the companies as 
both a response and ‘opinion’ on how these analysts perceived the restatement 
situation, and also how they perceived the actions of senior executives. Finally, the 
conference call transcripts were used to analyse the interactions between analysts 
and the executives under scrutiny and interrogation. Timelines for each restatement 
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case were composed in order to assist the coders in placing text pieces in context of 
time development – timelines for Freddie Mac and Nortel have been illustrated in 
Appendix 2.1 In addition to analysing the documents, we interviewed nine experts 
in the field, analysed media reports and studied literature on the market response to 
restatements. This provided a validation of the conclusions drawn from analysing the 
documents. Specifically, we interviewed a senior risk management partner and four 
other senior executives at a major accounting firm, a directors’ and officers’ (D&O) 
insurance executive at a major insurance company, a managing director at a major 
business information service provider and two professors of accountancy at two 
leading European business schools. 
Consistent with Glaser and Strauss’s notion of theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), we selected restatement cases to achieve a maximum level of variability. For 
example, after we had identified the level of ‘distortion’ and ‘intent’ as two relevant 
dimensions in our model, we selected further cases on the basis of their variation in 
these two dimensions (see Heugens, Van Riel and Van den Bosch, 2004). In addition, 
because of the differences between accounting principles in the United States and 
Europe, we selected cases from both regions. We conducted a content analysis of 
the archival data, designing a coding scheme which aimed to identify the types 
of action that protect companies from damage triggered by financial statement 
restatements.
Content analysis is a technique that enables the researcher to make quantifiable 
and/or qualitative inferences based upon written or transcripted spoken language. 
Content analysis has been defined as ‘a research method that uses a set of procedures 
to make valid inferences from text’ (Weber, 1990). Content analysis provides a number 
of advantages generally associated with qualitative methods such as richer domain 
detail, preservation of context information, and the advantage of a good fit with 
grounded theory development. In the accounting domain, content coding has been 
used to analyse social and environmental disclosures (Milne & Adler, 1999), and to 
analyse self-serving behaviour of executives in accounting narratives (Hooghiemstra, 
2003). 
The coding analysis was conducted with the help of AtlasTi content analysis software. 
This software allows for grouping/categorising of documents, codes and (descriptive) 
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memos in various levels. This suited our research objectives well as we wanted to 
employ three levels of coding: abstract (positive/negative actions), intermediate 
(broad categories of actions below positive/negative), and concrete (more detailed 
codes describing specific behaviours underneath each intermediate-level code). 
This coding scheme was applied to the archival data by four independent coders. 
These coders were instructed on the background and relevance of restatements for 
companies and capital market participants. They were also handed a coding support 
schedule which provided a description of what they needed to look for in the texts 
provided to them. Inter-coder reliability was ensured by mixing the four coders into 
different combinations on the 14 cases. Inter-coder reliability was measured using 
Cohen’s Kappa, which on average was in excess of 0,7, details of which can be found in 
Appendix 2.2 (Cohen’s Kappa is used to adjust inter-coder reliability for the expected 
frequency of coders assigning the same codes by chance). The code categories, and 
sub codes that we used in the coding scheme are also shown in Appendix 2.2. 
The codes related to ‘openness’ and ‘governance’ were by far the most frequently 
occurring (45 per cent and 32 per cent of all codes respectively), with codes related 
to confirming, blame taking/giving, and conformity occurring relatively infrequently 
(5 per cent, 5 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively). Therefore, the results regarding 
openness and governance might be more reliable as they generally are based on a 
larger number of quotations. The table in Appendix  2.3 provides some more detail 
on the positive and negative codes as assigned by the coders. Of interest are the 
averages of both the coding scheme: positive communication codes attracted a 75 
per cent score, and negative, a balancing number of 25 per cent. 
To generate an illustrative overview of companies’ behaviour with respect to the 
managerial responses that we have identified (provided in Table 2.2), we used a 
number of heuristics and control measures. For every case, we tabled the number of 
occurrences of every type of behaviour over time, from the time of the announcement 
of the restatement, to the time the issue was resolved, i.e., when the actual restated 
results were filed. We did this both for the positive actions and for the corresponding 
negative behaviours. For behaviours associated with confirming the problem and 
openness, we looked especially at the early period. Our reasoning was that these 
behaviours are only useful to the market if they occur early. For example, Freddie 
Mac and Cablevision largely ‘defused’ the issues by confirmative communication 
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at the beginning of the crisis. If a company only communicates about the details of 
its restatement after months of investigations and governance changes, this does 
not help to restore trust. For behaviours with respect to governance, we looked at 
behaviours throughout the period, although here too we considered early action as 
better than subsequent measures. Finally, for actions with respect to blame taking 
and acting in compliance with rules and standards, we looked at the entire period 
without favouring early actions over subsequent measures. In fact, compliance with 
standards and rules is mainly relevant at the end of the restatement episode, i.e. 
when it is resolved.
We also obtained input from the original coders and asked them to assess the five 
managerial responses based on their coding involvement on specific cases. On 
average, the coders substantially came to the same conclusions, compared with 
applying the above mentioned heuristics.
 
Based on the detailed coding analyses and resulting coding tables as presented in 
Appendix 2.3, we provide examples of graphs of the occurrence of some types of 
positive company behaviour in Figures 2.6 and 2.7 Figure 2.6 shows Freddie Mac’s 
scores on communicating openly and taking governance measures. Figure 2.7 shows 
a similar graph for the Nortel case. In section 2.4.3 we will discus these two opposing 
cases in greater detail.
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2.4 Empirical Findings
2.4.1	enHancers	oF	rePutation	damage
In our research, we observed issues that can increase either the perceived intent, or 
the perceived level of distortion involved in a restatement, or even a combination 
of the two. We distinguish among five such issues, as shown in Figure 2.3. We will 
explain them in the following paragraphs.
Discrediting of Management
Managers are often discredited following a restatement – be it in a court of law, the 
court of public opinion, or as they suddenly find themselves in search of a job. Senior 
management is frequently implicated in class-action lawsuits and/or SEC actions. 
Also, in many cases executives are ‘suspects’ in internal corporate investigations, or 
regulatory investigations. The Justice Department and other criminal investigators 
all potentially discredit senior management. Furthermore, remedial actions, often 
agreed upon with regulators, can lead to immediate executive changes. In such 
cases, the new management – based on hindsight – may question (or even reject), 
prior and current assertions. In accounting, many judgments and estimates need to 
be made based on a high degree of uncertainty, and their accuracy can often only 
be evaluated afterwards. Hindsight may induce new managers to be particularly 
negative about the judgments made by previous managers. In addition, previously 
settled issues of accounting judgment (often dating back many years), and estimates 
will be revisited. 
Expansion in the scope of an investigation will often lead to minute scrutiny of 
management’s previous role in accounting decisions. In such cases, even things that 
were rightly considered ‘immaterial’ when they occurred can qualify as material 
if there is evidence to substantiate that intent was there to distort the financial 
position on purpose. Discrediting can also spring from relatively minor events. For 
example, the absence of Shell’s chairman during an initial conference call about the 
company’s reserves restatement could be seen as the start of a series of publicly 
debated credibility issues involving Shell’s senior management. This includes the 
potential leaking to the press of confidential (internal) e-mails to discredit senior 
management involved in this case.
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Figure 2.3 issues iNFlueNciNg perceived iNteNt aNd distortioN
Management credibility is a precious commodity that can easily be damaged in 
a restatement situation. Damage to management credibility is one reason why 
investors respond more negatively to a restatement than would be justified by only 
looking at its net income effect. This is consistent with marketing research, which has 
demonstrated that credibility acts like a halo – low credibility puts all of a company’s 
actions in a negative light (Arnold, Goldsmith, Lafferty & Newell, 2000; Newell & 
Goldsmith, 2001). Therefore, when management is publicly discredited, this can 
strongly influence the market’s perception of intent as well as distortion, affecting 
the market value of the company.
Comprehension Gaps
The fundamental difference between a restatement originating from an accounting 
irregularity (perpetrated with clear intent), as opposed to an accounting error 
(perpetrated accidentally or resulting from a genuine misinterpretation), is often 
not sufficiently appreciated and/or recognized and hence results in unfair media 
treatment. The full spectrum of accounting adjustments, ranging from ‘changes 
in estimates,’ ‘correction of errors,’ and ‘restatements,’ is subject to many complex 
technical rules and judgment calls within the accounting domain. There may be a 
significant comprehension gap between the actual event and the message that is 
communicated. Senior executives often do not fully comprehend the significant 
differences in restatement categories and the perceptions that markets (i.e. analysts) 
have of the restatement. This may lead to misunderstandings and uncertainty in 
the market, and therefore to an additional loss of market value. For example, in one 
conference call by Nortel, the company stated that the impact of its restatement 
would not be ‘material,’ but when pressed was unable to give an exact definition of 
- Non-alignment of manage-
ment and gatekeepers
- Descrediting of management
- “Tip-of-the-iceberg” effect
- Paralysis in communication
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this phrase, leaving analysts guessing.
Q: Material, how does Nortel define material? Five per cent? Ten per cent? 
I mean, is there a metric you use in saying you don’t think it will have a 
material change at this point?
A: Well, I think material was - you know, material in the marketplace. We’re 
just trying to make sure people understand that if there’s an adjustment, it 
would be in an immaterial way.
Following this lack of clarity, there was an additional drop in Nortel’s share price3. If 
management is not able to articulate the restatement category with the required 
nuance, then the dialogue with the market will fail miserably.
Research into the way in which audit committees evaluate the quality of financial 
reports has shown that a significant difference exists between financial ‘experts’ and 
financial ‘literates’ (McDaniel, Martin & Maines, 2002). Financial literates are people 
who can read and understand basic financial statements, while financial experts have 
professional experience or certification in accounting or finance. Financial literates 
are more likely to react to reporting issues that are prominent in the business press 
or are of a non-recurring nature. Therefore, markets (which are financially literate 
rather than expert), tend to overreact to restatements. It requires considerable force 
of argument and the right accounting rhetoric to differentiate between good and 
bad restatement situations. Therefore, the ability of management to communicate 
in a timely and proper manner about the category and nuance of a restatement is a 
crucial driver when it comes to the degree of distortion and intent perceived by the 
public.
‘Tip-of-the-Iceberg’ Effect
Empirical evidence suggests that many financial restatements share a ‘tip-of-the-
iceberg’ effect. What is, in many cases, a financially-immaterial restatement, can 
oftentimes trigger a complete loss of credibility. In many cases an expansion in the 
scope of accounting investigation takes place, resulting in other transactions, accounts 
and balances coming under scrutiny (Dooley, 2002). Also, a single restatement often 
3  Nortel Networks Conference Call with the Investment community to Provide Update on Business Performance, Status of Restatements and 
Related Matters, Fair Disclosure Wire, 2 June, 2004; see also R. Le Maistre, Nortel leaves all doors open, Light Reading, (2004). Available at: http://
www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=53776 (2004).
106
106
leads to a questioning of the company’s other accounting and disclosure practices. 
When more irregularities and errors come to light, more damage to the company’s 
market value follows. 
Palmrose et al. (2004) have shown restatements that affect more financial statement 
accounts trigger more negative stock market reactions. For example, Ahold’s 
restatement in 2003 led to an investigation of not only its U.S. subsidiary Foodservice, 
for which accounting fraud had been discovered, but also of all the company’s North 
and South American businesses. The news of this expansion in scope triggered 
an additional negative stock price reaction4. Thereafter, the forensic accounting 
investigation, commissioned by the Supervisory Board, found some 400 issues that 
needed to be adjusted in order to bring Ahold’s accounts back into compliance with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). When looking at the long-term 
effects of the restatement, we can see that although Ahold recaptured part of its 
market value at the end of the restatement period, it did not recover completely.
This tip-of-the-iceberg effect can also take place at the level of industry players. For 
example, in the wake of the Ahold case, the vendor allowance accounting practice 
of the entire U.S. food industry was questioned. The effect can be attributed to a 
number of ‘demand for information integrity’ forces, such as:
• Overly harsh cleansing operations, in which executives throughout 
the company are sacrificed before due and fair investigation has been 
completed. This may be due to the escalation of the investigation to the 
level of the independent supervisory board, thereby encompassing the 
personal reputations of board members. Remedial actions often qualify as 
reputation repair actions which have a highly rhetorical character, serving 
mainly to insist that the board has control over the company. In addition, 
regulators press companies to take remedial actions within a certain 
timeframe.
• A change of auditor, leading to a radical scrutiny of fine-grained technical 
accounting and disclosure issues: ‘All (small-boned) skeletons out of the 
closet!’
4  Raghavan & Bryan-Low, Ahold probes expand beyond unit; Wall Street Journal (July 8, 2003)
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• The involvement of forensic accountants, who exercise extreme professional 
scepticism. They are appointed by the board and essentially takeover 
accounting data discovery and control from management, leaving no stone 
unturned.
The above ‘demand for information integrity’ forces may result from the behind-
the-scenes- power play that takes place, most often in the corporate boardroom. 
Management needs to be fully aware of these forces as such forces tend to lead a life 
of their own, and prove to be most difficult to manage. They are likely to aggravate 
the level of perceived distortion and the degree of perceived intent involved in a 
restatement situation.
Paralysis in Corporate Reaction and Communication
In corporate crisis situations of the magnitude triggered by restatements, fear and 
lack of experience intuitively lead to a defensive communications strategy, or worse, 
to no communication at all. This can be seen in the case of Adecco, after the company 
announced an internal control ‘issue’ in January 2004 (interpreted by the market as a 
potential restatement), a period of silence and secrecy followed that left the market 
guessing. Finally, nine months later, independent counsel concluded that there were 
no material financial issues to be reported. But by then, the damage to public trust 
had already been done. Adecco’s stock price had decreased substantially shortly 
after the initial announcement and did not quite recover at the time the crisis was 
dissolved.
Of course, silence is understandable. The threat of shareholder lawsuits can serve to 
gag a company and/or individual executives who do not wish to risk making even 
reasonable, good-faith disclosures. Further, involvement in (potential) litigation 
implies a fundamental change in a company’s communication strategy. As noted 
above, in many cases, the board appoints forensic investigators to take control, and 
as a consequence, the command structure of a restatement process shifts away 
from the chief executive and chief financial officer to the independent board, and 
ultimately to the independent auditors, lawyers and forensic investigators. This often 
leads to what is called ‘Kaltstellung’ in German, i.e. a complete operational paralysis 
and shelving of executives, which will impair morale and normal communication 
with stakeholders for a considerable period. Paralysis in corporate reaction and 
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communication most likely leads to a worsening of both the perceived intent and the 
perceived impact of the restatement.
Non-Alignment of Management, Auditors and Other Gatekeepers
Following a restatement, a lack of alignment between management, the auditors 
and other gatekeepers can often aggravate the situation (Coffee, 2002). ‘Alignment’ 
refers to a common view over how to handle a problem. Because of their different 
professional backgrounds and experience, different groups each employ their own 
codes (language, vocabulary) and cognitive frames (see Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Bettis 
& Prahalad, 1995), discussing theories and mental maps. These codes and frames 
enable groups to define and solve problems, but will also lead to different opinions, 
attitudes, and hence, communication behaviour. This limits their ability to strike up a 
dialogue with other disciplines and with external stakeholders. Researchers in strategy 
have argued that such a dialogue (i.e., alignment) seems especially important when 
extreme pressure and unusual circumstances are involved (Prahalad, 2004). Indeed, 
most restatement cases create enormous pressure on the corporate governance 
status quo, because such an event can lead to irrevocable loss of reputation, financial 
disaster, and even imprisonment. As a consequence, the ‘normal’ rules of corporate 
(and collective) management suddenly change. In such a situation, alignment is 
particularly important.
Before a restatement is filed, a lack of alignment can be apparent from the lack of 
information flow from management to the board and the auditors. In addition, it 
may be reflected in a lack of responsiveness of management to recommendations 
made by the auditors. The result of such nonalignment can be the filing of a report 
under Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act. Section 10A ‘requires reporting 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) when, during the course of 
a financial audit, an auditor detects likely illegal acts that have a material impact 
on the financial statements and appropriate remedial action is not being taken by 
management or the board of directors.’ This language implies that the auditors have 
alerted management to the questionable nature of its accounting practices, but that 
management took no heed of the warning. Such a situation signals misalignment 
between management and auditors because the dialogue between them has failed. 
Ultimately, the auditors then decide that they have to report the matter to the SEC, 
which may lead to a restatement.
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According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, Gramling 2000 & 2003), 
only six Section 10A reports were filed between 1996 and 1999. The GAO concluded 
that the most likely reason for this low incidence was that in most cases in which 
illegal acts likely occurred, management took appropriate remedial actions when 
their auditors alerted them to the problems. Simply put, in the majority of cases a 
dialogue was possible. However, between 2000 and 2003, the number of Section 10A 
reports rose to 23. Therefore, while such extreme cases of non-alignment in which 
a Section 10A report is necessary are relatively rare, their number has increased 
considerably in recent years. It seems likely that when the stock market perceives such 
a misalignment between the company and its auditors, it will react more negatively 
to the announcement. Non-alignment may signal to investors that internal controls 
have failed and that top management is involved in the underlying problems. 
Investors are then more likely to suspect malicious intent, leading to uncertainty in 
the market and therefore to a loss of market value. Although not focusing specifically 
on alignment, Palmrose et al. (2004) argued that when the auditor announces a 
restatement, rather than the company, the market reaction is negative.
After a restatement is announced (possibly following a Section 10A report), 
problems of non-alignment generally only become worse. Following a restatement 
announcement, new management team members and/or new independent auditors 
are often appointed. The relationship with previous management and predecessor 
independent auditors then tends to become even more strained. If we pile on to 
this an ongoing SEC investigation, short-sellers, market reaction, and the natural 
tendency of ‘new’ management to start with a clean slate, the pressure can become 
quite intense. Therefore, the non-alignment of management with gatekeepers 
creates the risk that the public perception of the company’s intent will spiral out of 
control. If managers do not cooperate, this increases the risk that the effect of the 
four previously mentioned issues gains in power, resulting in devastating damage to 
the firm’s reputation and market value.
Summary of Findings on Restatement Severity Forces
The five issues discussed above are not absolute, nor are they necessarily disastrous. 
However, the fact that all these factors tend to occur in combination may create 
substantial pressure. Management, reaffirming its prior accounting and reporting, 
and independent auditors (whether incumbent, predecessor, or successor), may be 
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able to withstand such mounting pressure. However, in circumstances where the 
‘old’ management team has been removed or suspended, and auditors have been 
replaced, who is responsible for the previously reported financial statements? Who 
stands for their validity? Who or what is left to countervail restatement pressure, 
where appropriate? In such cases, independent boards and their audit committees 
and executives share this heavy responsibility.
2.4.2	mitigating	Factors	on	rePutation	damage
So far, we have seen that the severity of a restatement case can be categorized 
according to the degree of malicious intent perceived by stakeholders, and by the 
degree of perceived material distortion. In addition, there are several problems 
and pressures that can aggravate a company’s position in terms of either intent 
or distortion. However, we argue that companies can also influence the perceived 
degree of intent and distortion by the way in which they act and communicate to 
analysts and other gatekeepers. Based on our analysis, we distinguish five ways in 
which companies can limit the damage (see Figure 2.4). The first three ways deal 
with communication about the underlying problems, and mainly serve to reduce the 
amount of perceived distortion (though some of them may also reduce the degree 
of perceived intent). The other two means deal with actions to solve the underlying 
problems, and mainly serve to reduce the degree of perceived intent.
Figure 2.4 respoNses to alleviate perceived iNteNt aNd distortioN
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Confirming the Nature of the Problem
In the restatement cases we analysed, providing confirmative statements regarding 
the nature of the problem and voluntary explanations to analysts or the media 
noticeably improved the understanding of these stakeholders. Confirmatory 
statements are also likely to reduce the perceived amount of distortion, because a 
lack of understanding may lead to ‘wild’ – and most likely, negative – speculation. 
This contention is consistent with research in consumer inference making, which 
has shown that people tend to lower their evaluation of a product when they 
have insufficient information about it (Lim & Kim, 1992). Our cases also show that 
executives often answer the analysts’ questions in a rather straightforward manner. 
Few executives see questions as an opportunity to flesh out issues raised, or use a 
question as an opening to persuade the markets that correct strategic decisions have 
been taken (see the section on  ‘Communicating Openly,’ which follows).
Taking the Blame
When executives start blaming each other or third parties, this is likely to lead 
analysts to question whether corporate governance is still in control. Research in 
corporate communication has suggested that when management tries to shift 
the blame for a crisis away from itself, this can aggravate the perceived severity 
of the situation because stakeholders believe that control mechanisms have failed 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Therefore, blame giving can increase the amount of 
perceived distortion. Additionlly, refusing to take the blame can damage executives’ 
perceived trustworthiness (Kellerman, 2006). Such a lack of trustworthiness can 
affect the belief that the company has misled the market and will try to do so again. 
Unless executives are clearly not to blame for the problems, appointing blame should 
be avoided; explaining how and why the restatement need occurred suggests to be 
a better strategy.
Our sample showed that the amount of blame taking behaviour in a number of 
cases was consistent with the reaction of the market; however as no larger sample 
was tested, this serves as illustration only. Nevertheless, important to note is that 
apologies are rare in most restatement cases; often a public apology is avoided 
because of possible litigation. In a few cases, no apology whatsoever was made. An 
exception to this fear for litigation is Shell’s Jeroen van der Veer, who has admitted 
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to errors made in the past on several occasions, and whose candour has been greeted 
positively by analysts5:
They shouldn’t have happened and all of what we can do as new team 
about that, we deal with it, we deal with it as quickly as possible, as fully as 
possible and as openly as possible.
Communicating Openly
Many investors and market participants use a company’s scope of disclosure as a 
proxy for the degree of seriousness of the accounting issues. Similar to confirming 
the general nature of the problem, the more detail offered, the less widespread the 
problems are assumed to be, leading to a decrease in the perceived level of distortion. 
Furthermore, upfront disclosure of the damage that the restatement may cause on 
business operations and/or financing facilities is a constructive factor in the dialogue 
between companies and analysts. An overview of experimental research by Healy 
and Wahlen (1999) suggests that analysts are more likely to ‘see through’ earnings 
management practices when financial statements clearly discuss and provide 
disclosure of the ‘managed’ items. This supports the notion that voluntary disclosures 
enhance the information supply chain’s understanding and increases transparency. 
Gietzmann (2006) and Mazzola, Ravasi and Gabbioneta (2006), also provide evidence 
for the positive influence of openness when communicating a company’s strategy to 
investors. Open communication is likely to reduce the perceived degree of distortion 
involved in a restatement situation, which in turn should reduce the damage to 
market value. In our research, and for illustrative purposes only, the degree of 
openness was consistent with the market’s reaction to the restatement in 13 of the 
14 cases. While previous restatement research has not looked at openness in depth, 
Palmrose et al. (2004) did show that if a company offers an estimate of the financial 
effect of the restatement in its initial announcement, the negative effect on its share 
price is diminished.
The cases we analysed provide suggestive evidence that precise command of 
accounting language as a quality of financial leadership has been dismissed in favour 
of ‘governance credos’ and sound business performance litany. For example, and to 
illustrate only, in one conference call by Qwest, the chief executive outlined measures 
that have been taken to improve future business performance, rather than providing 
5  Royal Dutch Petroleum Co (Shell) Conference Call: ‘Recategorisation of proved hydrocarbon reserves’; Fair Disclosure Wire, March 18, 2004
113
113Chapter 2 – Study 1: Restatement Communication and Factors Enhancing or Mitigating Corporate Reputation Damage
details on the effect of the restatement:
I don’t think we’re ready to put another number out yet. But if you look at 
what we announced last week in our enterprise space, we consolidated our 
general business branches with our national account branches, eliminating 
a lot of redundant directors and middle management. We did not take any 
sales people out. We look across the business at what the opportunities 
are for consolidation within the various segments that had not been yet 
integrated. We also, in our IT space, have, I think, tremendous opportunity 
for ongoing continued in that 8 per cent productivity increase range or for 
better to make a huge, huge difference.6
Using such general, reassuring words instead of giving precise figures regarding 
the impact of the restatement is plausible from a reputation-repair point of view. 
However, any suspicion of accounting hocus-pocus must be addressed in clear and 
understandable language.
If there is no suspicion of fraud (i.e. if the degree of malicious intent is low), then 
executives seem to pay greater attention to communicating openly on the financial 
reporting issues of the restatement. This seems natural given the lower risk of 
litigation involved. For example, in one conference call by Shell, Malcolm Brinded, 
executive director of exploration and production, displayed his detailed knowledge of 
the situation by responding in an open and explanatory fashion, volunteering details 
and background.7
Q: Your 2003 reserve replacement ratio is now 63 per cent; am I right in 
thinking that is a change from April the 19th, when it was 60 per cent?
A: That’s correct, Andrea. That’s a small technical change.
Q: A small technical change. Well, what exactly -
A: Well, essentially, the 63 per cent is based on the production in that year 
of 1,408, I think it is, million barrels divided by the production as at the end 
of the year - the reserves as at the end of the year. Just to give you some 
feel, the 63 per cent is for 2003; the five-year figure - because I think it’s 
important to highlight that, because on April 19th I talked about the five-
year figure which we hadn’t worked out then of being 50 to 60 per cent - is
actually around 66 per cent; and the three-year reserves replacement figure 
is around 94 per cent. Those are all on an organic basis.
6  Q1 2003 Qwest Communications Earnings Conference Call; Fair Disclosure Wire, May 29, 2003
7  Royal Dutch Petroleum Co (Shell) Conference Call ‘Advance Advice to Annual Report Publication’, Fair Disclosure Wire, May 24, 2004.
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What is remarkable is the relatively low level of attention that most companies 
devote to explaining the accounting background or accounting judgments causing 
the restatement of incorrect accounting information. Chief executives clearly avoid 
dialogue on technical matters and leave technicalities to the chief financial officer. 
However, various cases show that the markets nevertheless expect the chief executive 
to explain the technical details and to show that he or she has command of technical 
accounting issues. For example, during a conference call with Ahold, one analyst 
posed the following question to the interim CEO: ‘... In terms of the reconsolidation, or 
the proportional consolidation of the joint ventures, what has driven that decision to 
do that at this point?’8 Answering such a question adequately requires considerable 
knowledge of accounting principles. 
With the introduction of the required explicit sign-off by the CEO and CFO on financial 
statements, a clear market signal was given. Numerous restatement cases and 
subsequent litigation document the unsuccessful efforts by corporate executives in 
claiming, ‘But the auditors agreed!’ This provides clear evidence that the ultimate 
responsibility for the true and fair presentation of financials is the domain of both 
the CEO and CFO. The executives also must face closer scrutiny by regulators. The 
SEC has the objective of reviewing every listed company at least every three years. 
As of August 2004, comment letters by the SEC and companies’ responses have 
been made publicly available; companies must assume that the financial press will 
obtain copies. The tactic of the SEC to make such comment letters public is likely to 
be copied by other securities regulators, who want to avoid drawing in responsibility 
for financial reporting by pushing their comments back to management publicly. 
By making this process of critiquing the application of GAAP public, the SEC clearly 
again establishes that the CEO and CFO bear ultimate responsibility for resolving the 
problems diagnosed by the regulators. 
In addition, the CEO and CFO are responsible for ‘unadjusted audit differences’. 
This technical phrase refers to the auditors’ list of proposed adjustments to the 
financial statements, which, on an individual basis or taken as an aggregate, do not 
warrant adjustment of those financial statements due to them not being considered 
material (hence the phrase ‘unadjusted differences’). Most audit firms require the 
8  Q4 2002 Royal Ahold Earnings Conference Call, Fair Disclosure Wire, February 24, 2003
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CEO or CFO to concur with this decision, by attaching the schedule of unadjusted 
differences to the letter of representation. This letter of representation is the 
instrument auditors use to have management provide representation on aspects 
of the financial statements on which the auditors were not able to independently 
obtain corroborative or satisfactory audit evidence. For example, the completeness of 
contracts concluded, guarantees issued, minutes of meetings held, off-balance sheet 
arrangements and full disclosure of litigation and claims typically find their way into 
the management representation letter. Under most Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards frameworks, this letter is part of a normal audit procedure. The inclusion 
of the summary of unadjusted differences requires management to be on guard for 
a number of reasons. In subsequent years, and if confronted with a restatement, 
these unadjusted differences will be one of the focal points of forensic investigators 
or regulators trying to uncover whether accounting decisions were subject to an 
unacceptable accounting ‘bias’.
In summation, lack of technical accounting knowledge will no longer be considered 
as an excuse or a ‘mitigating’ factor when judging management’s involvement in 
financial reporting matters. If anything, in order to create trust and build financial 
reputation, precise command of accounting language will be necessary for not only 
the CFO, but also the CEO, as the latter is the figurehead of the company and carries 
primary responsibility for its financial viability and strategic direction.
Taking Corporate Governance Measures
In cases where there was a suspicion of intent or fraud, CEOs and/or board members 
of the companies we studied made frequent attempts to persuade analysts and the 
media that appropriate remedial actions had been taken. In fact, a number of cases 
illustrate that (often regulatory) remedial actions were taken under time pressure, 
sacrificing senior members of management for cause, without publicly justifying 
precisely what that cause was. This is substantiated by five of our 14 cases, where 
relatively high scores on governance actions combined with relatively low scores on 
communicating openly about the problem. 
Similarly, previous restatement research has shown that when a company takes 
appropriate governance measures (such as increasing the number of outside 
directors), it often results in an improvement in stock and bond prices (Farber, 2005; 
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Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 2004). The reason is presumably that proper governance 
decreases the expectation that the company will act with malicious intent again. 
In addition, Gietzmann (2006) and Mazzola et al. (2006) demonstrate the role of 
governance in assuring investors of the credibility of a company’s strategy.
In order to avoid the alignment problems discussed under ‘Issues in Restatement 
Situations’, it seems important that companies take remedial governance actions 
in cooperation with both the internal audit committee and external auditors. In 
the past, the relationship between executives and internal audit committees could 
be characterised as one of ‘act and inform’. With the changes resulting from new 
governance regulations, boards and audit committees now need to actively, rather 
than passively, involve themselves with management when it comes to financial 
controls and reporting matters. The new regulations imply that the board/audit 
committee’s active role should extend to overseeing at least the following:
• Management’s antifraud programs and controls, including management’s 
identification of fraud risks and implementation of antifraud measures;
• Management’s potential to override controls, or other inappropriate 
management influence;
• Mechanisms for employees to report concerns (whistle-blowing 
procedures);
• Receiving and reviewing periodic reports describing the nature, status and 
eventual disposition of alleged or suspected fraud and misconduct; and,
• An internal audit plan that addresses fraud risk and mechanisms to 
ensure that the internal audit committee can express any concerns about 
management’s commitment to appropriate internal controls or to report 
suspicions or allegations of fraud.
A good example of the start of such a governance reform programme can be seen 
at Tyco (Pillmore, 2003). The company’s reforms included separating financial 
management from operations management, establishing new positions dealing 
with corporate governance that report directly to the board, and establishing clear 
principles and policies. Such programs give a positive signal to the market. By the time 
the restatement issues were resolved, Tyco’s share price had recovered substantially, 
and was actually significantly higher than just before the restatement.
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For their part, external auditors are working in a zero-tolerance environment as a 
result of the corporate scandals – a much greater focus is placed on what is material, 
both from a quantitative and a qualitative perspective. Accounting and auditing 
rules are very complex; and the ways for auditors to defend themselves are quite 
limited. Furthermore, the changes brought about by the convergence of different 
accounting frameworks led to the use in accounting of more ‘fair values,’ resulting 
in higher inherent subjectivity (more use of judgment), and consequential volatility. 
Audit firms have learned their lessons from the restatement phenomenon.
In issuing audit opinions on financial statements, risk aversion was a trait of the 
accounting profession for many decades. Now, with the introduction of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and corporate governance changes, audit 
firms are avoiding any risk with respect to the application and/or interpretation 
of GAAP. Audit partners will often use the so-called technical office of their firm (a 
department that advises technical accounting matters), to obtain a final ‘blessing’ 
on accounting and/or auditing issues. Auditors strictly apply the rules, leaving no 
room for management’s interpretations and/or wishes. Management, for its part, 
increasingly uses its own legal advisors to check its auditor’s opinions on technical 
accounting issues. This can jeopardise the trustful, open and direct communicative 
relationship between auditors and their clients that previously existed. In most cases 
the relationship between companies and their auditors will become more formal, 
often sterile, and always highly technical. In turn, this may lead to polarisation, with 
each party looking after its own interests first and foremost. In sum, while resolving 
complex financial reporting matters should be a team effort by management, current 
changes in regulation may render such a team effort increasingly difficult.
Acting in Compliance with Standards and Rules
The objective of regulators is to weed out the underlying causes of restatements. In 
the United States enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in mid-2002 was the political 
reaction to corporate and executive misconduct. Many other countries followed 
suit with stricter and more comprehensive corporate governance rules. Most of 
these frameworks cover such issues as whistle-blower protection, audit committee 
responsibilities and expertise requirements, auditor independence and a ban on the 
provision of certain consultancy services. Last, but not least among those provisions, 
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was executive responsibility for internal control systems. 
The internal control provisions item has required U.S.-listed entities to invest heavily 
in (re-) designing, testing and documenting their internal controls. As a consequence, 
auditors have also upgraded their audit methodology by expanding the scope of their 
procedures, the compliance standards they test against and upgraded their internal 
quality and documentation standards. Tyco is an example of a company that clearly 
stated its adherence to rules and regulations:
We’ve implemented new conservative standards for financial reporting, 
which, by the way, accounts for a substantial portion of the charges we are 
announcing today. We have instituted a new spirit of transparency with 
investors and regulators and we’ve instituted changes to the company’s 
internal culture with new compensation guidelines, and stronger standards 
of internal disclosure and reporting. With regard to the internal audits, 
and operating reviews, we’ve acted with deliberation, but with a sense of 
urgency.9
As we saw earlier, Tyco’s share price successfully recovered after its restatement. 
It seems likely that by closely adhering to policies and regulations after being 
confronted with the necessity for a restatement, companies can regain some of the 
trust that was lost following the restatement. The reason is presumably that when 
a company complies well, the market will be more confident that it will not act with 
malicious intent again.
2.4.3 Two opposing Cases: Freddie MaC and norTel
We will further illustrate the validity of ‘damage-containing’ responses in dealing 
with financial restatements by discussing two of the cases we have analysed, Freddie 
Mac and Nortel. Both cases concerned the timing of revenue recognition – revenues 
were shifted from previous years to future years, or vice versa. Of the cases that we 
analysed, they are also the ones that attracted by far the most media attention.
However, the two companies differ greatly in how they handled the restatement 
crisis.
9  Q2 2003 Tyco International Earnings Conference Call, Fair Disclosure Wire, April 30, 2003.
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Freddie	Mac
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, known as Freddie Mac, is one of 
the largest participants in the U.S. secondary mortgage market, where financial 
institutions buy and sell mortgages in the form of loans and mortgage-related 
securities. In 2003 for example, Freddie Mac purchased some 25 per cent of the U.S.-
originated conventional mortgages, which totalled US $2,800 billion. In December 
2003 Freddie Mac’s total assets amounted to US $800 billion, making it one of the 
largest financial institutions in the world. In January 2003 Freddie Mac announced 
that it expected to restate its previously issued (and audited) financial statements 
for 2002, 2001 and 2000. The ensuing legal, accounting and forensic investigations, 
regulatory scrutiny, SEC involvement, shareholder litigation, management changes 
and employee turmoil lasted for more than 12 months. The net cumulative effect 
of Freddie Mac’s restatement was an increase of US $5 billion in the company’s net 
income in the year ended December 2002, which included a net cumulative increase 
of US $4.4 billion for 2000, 2001 and 2002 and US $600 million for periods prior to 
2000. These corrections of past accounting errors could be considered material to 
the company’s financial position; in other words; the accounting errors were large 
enough to substantially distort the financial picture of the company. The investigation 
into the restatement revealed that Freddie Mac had engaged in substantial earnings 
management practices, deliberately delaying the accounting recognition of earnings 
in order to achieve a steadier, smoother growth curve (Yurday & Duffie, 2004; and 
OFHEO, 2003).
The Freddie Mac case scores relatively high on the recommended actions that we have 
described, as judged from our analysis of the archival data pertaining to the case (see 
Table 2.2). The initial restatement underestimated the ultimate accounting effects of 
the restatement, and mentioned the complexities of hedge accounting as the major 
cause for the restatement. However, once management intent with respect to the 
smoothing of income became apparent, remedial actions were taken immediately 
with full disclosure of details. The newly-appointed management adopted a full and 
fair disclosure strategy, providing open and confirmative details of the complexities of 
hedge accounting for Freddie Mac’s portfolio of derivatives. Mastering the accounting 
rhetoric and volunteering accounting explanations were key characteristics of 
management’s communication strategy. Remedial and governance actions were 
taken swiftly and discussed comprehensively in press releases and conference calls. 
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Compliance with standards and corporate reporting regulations was announced as 
an explicit strategic (and tactical) goal. Ultimate reporting by independent counsel 
provided many details of the accounting issues that needed to be resolved and of 
the remedial actions being taken. Before the restatement, a lack of alignment was 
evident. For example, one analyst concluded:
Independent counsel Baker Botts found that information given to the board 
was often ‘tightly scripted and controlled.’ Various accounting issues were 
often presented in such a way to make it seem that the company was in 
compliance with GAAP. Furthermore, the investigation found that CEO 
Brendsel and Vice-chairman David Glenn had not addressed the need 
for ‘prompt corrective action’ when the board and audit committee had 
concerns over accounting policy in the fall of 2001 and the spring of 2002.10
However, comments made by the company in a conference call after the restatement 
was resolved suggested that it realised the detrimental effects of such a situation:
… along with management practices that are described in the report and 
found their way into the Treblay Report will be a principle that management 
needs to be sure that information gets up to the board, that raises the 
questions that delivers to the board the opportunity to deliberate on difficult 
questions. To challenge or to probe the wisdom of general strategies, that is 
a mistake for management to keep those bottled up and to micro-manage 
the transmission of that information to the board.11
The behaviour of Freddie Mac is also reflected in media reports surrounding the 
restatement. We asked Factiva Insight to conduct an analysis of media reports covering 
the 14 financial restatement cases we had selected, also with the aim to corroborate 
our own findings. Nortel and Freddie Mac had by far the most extensive coverage in 
global major business publications (Factiva covered some 260 articles on Nortel, and 
200 on Freddie Mac). The Factiva analysis showed topics of media coverage, which 
confirmed our own findings. A large part of those reports described the accounting 
issues under consideration, reflecting the fact that Freddie Mac was open on what 
these issues were (see Figure 2.5 for details). Freddie Mac’s shares dropped about 7 
per cent immediately after the restatement, but steadily increased in the subsequent 
10  FRE, Internal Investigation Reveals Widespread Accounting, Control, and Disclosure Weaknesses; Troubling Excerpts Below, Prudential: analyst 
report, July 23, 2003; Thomson One Analytics.
11  Freddie Mac Conference Call, Fair Disclosure Wire, July 23, 2003
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12 months, ending above the original price by the time of the restatement’s 
resolution. It seems that the company was able to limit the damage caused by the 
restatement. Obviously, presentation of these data is for illustrative purposes only. 
Future research, using appropriate sample sizes of restatements (or other crisis 
situations) and our proposed model for analysing corporate communication efforts 
could try to statistically associate and validate communication efforts and share 
price movement.
Nortel
Nortel is a global communication technology provider specialising in the business-
to-business market. In 2003, its revenues totalled US $9.81 billion. On 23 October, 
2003, Nortel announced that it had discovered some revenue recognition issues that 
would lead to a reduction in previously reported revenue, part of which would need 
to be deferred. The revenue adjustments were estimated to result in a net decrease 
in revenues for 2001, 2002 and 2003. Nortel’s audit committee undertook an 
independent review assisted by an independent law firm. Judging from our analysis 
of the company’s conference calls and press releases, as well as reports by analysts 
and the media, Nortel scored relatively low on the positive behaviours that we have 
identified in dealing with this situation (see also Table 2.2).
Over and over again, the outcome of this investigation was postponed. Only limited 
information was disclosed on the scope and depth of the accounting problems. The 
company merely stated that the impact of the restatement would not be ‘material,’ 
without clearly explaining what this meant (see the section on comprehension gaps 
above). Six months after the initial restatement, a number of management changes 
were announced, including to the president and chief executive, chief financial officer 
and controller positions. However, these actions were taken without publicising the 
underlying reasons. The uncertainty continued another almost nine months. Analysts 
then became suspicious and interpreted other changes in reporting practices as a 
negative sign. For example, one analyst’s report stated: 
Our concern is that investors and analysts will find it difficult to regain 
confidence in Nortel if the company does not provide the level of granularity 
the investment community needs to check its results against comparable 
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and standalone companies…,12 adding, ’While Nortel has talked the talk on 
disclosure, we are very concerned that it may not walk the walk - specifically 
on its business segment reporting.’
Clearly, this analyst was concerned about the effectiveness of Nortel’s changes 
because the information the company provided was not sufficiently detailed and 
substantiated. Such concerns were also apparent in the financial press. Most reports 
describe Nortel’s measures to hold executives accountable as well as the ongoing 
internal and external investigation, but devote relatively little attention to the 
accounting issues (see Figure 2.5).
Finally, in January 2005, some 15 months after its initial announcement, Nortel 
provided details of its accounting restatements and simultaneously announced 
substantial leadership changes. New key positions had been established, including 
chief marketing officer, chief strategy officer, president of federal systems, president 
of charity and president of professional services. In addition, the position of chief 
information officer had been given more strategic importance. The company had 
also appointed additional directors. Finally, Nortel commissioned Accenture to lead 
a comprehensive assessment of, and assist with, the transformation of its financial 
processes, organisation structure and the underlying systems and tools. Nortel 
expected this project to be completed within 18 to 24 months.
Nortel’s shares fell about 19 per cent on the day of the restatement and were even 
lower by the time the restatement was resolved, although investors did react 
positively to the rigorous changes at the end of the restatement episode. Nortel did 
not quite succeed in restoring investor confidence after the announcement of the 
restatement.
12  Earnings Update, Networking & Data Infrastructure, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, analyst report, August 19, 2004: Thomson One 
Analytics.
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Figure 2.5 coNteNt oF media reports For Freddie mac aNd Nortel
In comparing the cases of Freddie Mac and Nortel, the relationship between the 
positive managerial actions that we have identified, and the relative movement in the 
share price, provides (illustrative) support for the notion that an open, confirmative 
and explanatory communication strategy helps the recovery of the share price after 
a restatement (see Figure 2.6 for Freddie Mac, and Figure 2.7 for Nortel). While both 
companies suffered an initial decrease in their share prices close to the day they 
issued their restatement, Freddie Mac recovered from this decrease to a much higher 
degree than Nortel. Because the initial market reaction was similar for the two 
companies, it seems likely that this difference in recovery can be attributed to the 
differing ways in which the companies handled the crisis. 
Similar, illustrative graphs were set up for all 14 cases. Put together, a pattern can be 
recognized which shows that positive communication behaviour (as per our coding 
scheme results) has a favourable impact on share price development. However, we 
reiterate that only testing with appropriate sample sizes and with application of 
proper statistical techniques, valid statistical conclusions can be drawn. Nevertheless, 
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to provide an estimate of the effect of a restatement on the market value of a 
company, we calculated for each case the percentage change in the adjusted share 
price during:
1. The three days surrounding the restatement announcement; and,
2. The period between the day before the announcement, and the day the 
restatement was resolved.
Figure 2.6 sample graph oF coNteNt codes For the Freddie mac case
This method, similar to the one used by Palmrose and Scholz (2003), provided us with 
an estimate of how severe the initial market reaction to the restatement was, and to 
what degree the company managed to recover. For purposes of putting our overall, 
illustrative results table together (Table 2.2) we rated companies based on the degree 
to which they recovered, attributing a higher rank to companies that recovered from 
a more serious negative market reaction in share price just after the restatement 
announcement. When the adjusted share price at the end of the episode was even 
lower than just after the announcement, we rated this as —‘--’; when the price was 
about the same as just after the announcement, we rated it as ‘_’; when it had gone 
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up but did not quite reach the level it had just before the announcement, as ‘+/_’; 
when it had about reached the original level, as ‘+’; and when it exceeded the original 
level, as ‘++’.
As mentioned before, we also analysed media reports. This analysis was based on 
world-wide major news and business publications in the English language. Search 
keywords and search strings for companies and market issues were constructed and 
searches were conducted through Factiva with the number of quotes mentioning 
each content category for each company tabled (see Figure 2.5).
To expand on why Freddie Mac and Nortel were selected for a more detailed 
comparison, the companies both:
1. Were involved in the same restatement issue (revenue timing);
2. Received the most media attention of all cases (with 206 and 256 articles in our 
media analysis for Freddie Mac and Nortel, respectively); and,
3. Differed substantially in the way they responded to the crisis.
Figure 2.7 sample graph oF coNteNt codes For the Nortel case
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Although Freddie Mac’s restatement involved adjusting the results for previous 
years upwards, while for Nortel this was the reverse, we believe that this does not 
undermine the comparability of the cases. In both cases a revision upwards in one 
period was compensated by a revision downwards in another period (either past or 
future), thus leaving net revenues over the longer term unaffected. Also, the fact 
that fraud was involved is likely to weigh much more heavily on the market than 
whether the revision was upward or downward. This conclusion can be drawn from 
the fact that in both cases, the company’s stock price decreased immediately after 
the announcement.
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2.5 Results
Making up the Balance: Do’s and Don’ts of Responding to Restatement Pressures
Restatements of financial statements can trigger serious damage to public trust 
in large companies. However, recent high-profile scandals may have obscured the 
fact that the consequences of a restatement are not necessarily disastrous and 
that companies can limit the amount of damage to some degree. Previous research 
on restatements has focused on the causes and consequences of restatements. 
Relatively little work has been done on the way companies are – and should be – 
managing restatements. In this section, we have argued that there are several issues 
that may increase the damage a restatement inflicts on the public trust. These issues 
involve obstacles to ‘proper’ communication and actions, such as the difficulty of 
communicating clearly, if at all, about the causes of the restatement and the loss 
of management credibility after the announcement. These factors can aggravate 
the level of distortion in the financial statement that the public perceives, as well 
as the degree to which the public believes that actions were taken with malicious 
intent. They may then lead to a substantial reduction in public trust, accompanied by 
a decline in the company’s market value.
It is important for managers to recognise these issues and to act upon them using a 
proper communication strategy and taking appropriate remedial actions. Doing so 
will limit the level of distortion and intent perceived by the public. For example, the 
cases that we have analysed suggest that communicating openly, taking the blame, 
and complying with rules and regulations can limit the amount of damage done by 
the restatement. However, while many of the companies we studied implemented 
corporate governance changes and adhere to new rules and regulations, only a few 
communicated clearly and openly about the restatement. Most managers tend to 
focus on getting their business ‘back on track’, rather than explaining exactly what the 
causes of the restatement were in the first place. However, a proper understanding 
by the market of what exactly was the problem, and how it was fixed, is vital for 
restoring trust in the company.
Given this finding, why do managers focus so little attention on offering explanations? 
One reason may be that the job demands a restatement situation places on managers 
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is too high for most executives to handle. And for many executives, extremely 
detailed insight into financial matters may be beyond their expertise. In addition, a 
restatement situation may put intense pressure on executives to perform. 
As recent research suggests, such intense pressure may interfere with executives’ 
information processing and decision-making capabilities (Hambrick, Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2005a). This in turn can lead to inadequate information-providing behaviour 
by managers. Other recent research in managerial decision making by Bazerman 
(2005) and his colleagues has suggested that managers may not only be ‘bounded’ by 
limits on their cognitive capacities, but also by systematic biases. For example, because 
people want to think of themselves as capable, moral and deserving, they sometimes 
do not see the ethical doubtfulness of their own behaviour (Chugh, Bazerman & 
Banaji;, 2005; Bazerman, 2005). In a restatement situation, some managers may truly 
believe they have not done anything wrong and act accordingly by not complying, or 
complying inadequately, with stakeholder requests for information.
Finally, executives might be so focused on some aspects of a situation that they 
completely overlook other aspects. Bazerman et al. termed this phenomenon 
‘bounded awareness’ (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006). For example, managers’ focus on 
the future of the company, rather than its past, might not only make them reluctant 
to talk about what happened, but in some cases make them completely oblivious 
to stakeholder demands for information. Investigating the role of executive job 
demands and other ‘bounding’ factors in the degree to which managers succeed in 
communicating adequately about a restatement may be a worthwhile avenue for 
future research.
Taking the blame for the problems underlying the restatement was also rarely 
witnessed among the cases we studied. This seems natural given the fact that 
taking the blame for misdeeds leaves one more vulnerable to litigation. However, as 
Kellerman (2006) and other researchers have argued, in many cases blame taking is 
essential in restoring trust. When managers avoid blame for something that is clearly 
their responsibility, this is likely to erode public trust even further. On the other hand, 
recent studies by Kim and his colleagues have suggested that while blame taking 
can restore trust in the case of ‘honest’ mistakes (which we have termed  ‘White 
Lies,’ and, ‘Grey Accounting Hocus Pocus’), this does not necessarily hold for ethical 
lapses (Kim, Dirks, Cooper & Ferrin, 2006). When malicious intent is clearly present 
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(which we termed ‘Purple Delusion,’ and, ‘Black Magic Fraud’), admitting blame 
might do little to restore trust and could even damage trust further. When judging 
integrity, people attach particular importance to negative behaviours. In other words, 
we generally consider one highly unethical act (such as fraud), as sufficient grounds 
to regard a person (or company) as unethical, no matter how ethical the person’s 
other acts are. While blame taking might be perceived as a morally right behaviour 
in itself, it might not be enough to counter the influence of the preceding unethical 
behaviour. However, when a company facing a restatement can also convince 
stakeholders that it will do everything necessary to avoid repeating its mistakes (e.g. 
by replacing executives and taking appropriate corporate governance measures), it 
seems likely that an apology acknowledging some responsibility will enhance trust, 
rather than decrease it. Such a forgiving reaction by stakeholders also makes sense 
from a utilitarian perspective. 
Research in game theory has demonstrated that long-term success in a ‘prisoner’s-
dilemma situation’ is determined largely by the degree to which a player can 
forgive occasional non-cooperative (defecting) behaviour from the opponent. For 
example, in Axelrod’s research (1984), the most successful strategy was ‘tit for tat,’ 
a strategy in which a player mirrors all of the opponent’s actions – defecting when 
the opponent defects, but cooperating again as soon as the opponent cooperates. 
Refusing all further cooperation after one ‘malicious’ (non-cooperative) act is likely to 
be detrimental for both parties. 
Finally, blame taking could also be the best strategy from a legal perspective. While 
it is true that admitting responsibility could be used against a company or person as 
evidence for guilt in a court case, it could also positively influence the outcome of the 
case (Patel & Healy, 2003).
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2.6 Conclusions and Discussion
In addition to highlighting the types of remedial actions that are effective in resolving 
restatement crises, our findings from the qualitative content coding study indirectly 
confirm that market participants recognize the two dimensions of our proposed 
typology of restatements. Open and confirmation coding, which accounted for 
some 35 per cent of all codes assigned, can be seen as supportive evidence for the 
significance of the information distortion dimension of restatements. Similarly, 
Governance and Norm Conformity coding also accounted for some 35 per cent of all 
codes that, in turn, confirm the importance of information on the more qualitative 
dimension of restatement situations.
On the ‘negative’ side of the coding scheme, only the ‘closed’ communication code 
averaged a 12 per cent score, which again supports the assertion that factors increasing 
uncertainty about the precise nature of the restatement tend to weigh heavily in 
judging the information-distortion dimension. Seen over time, the coding exercise 
shows that in the period immediately following the restatement announcement, 
uncertainties on both dimensions lead to more ‘negative’ codes being applied. This 
confirms our proposition that the five issues which we identified as ‘reputation risk 
enhancing’ factors play an important role in determining the perceptions of analysts. 
Communicating openly and the confirming codes provide support for the notion that 
such underlying corporate responses help alleviate information uncertainties, hence 
remediating the reputation risks of both a company and its executives.
Because of the complexity of each of the restatement situations, we have been 
unable to draw firm conclusions about a causal link between company actions and 
the impact of a restatement. While our conclusions are consistent with previous 
literature, the conditions surrounding the different restatements that we studied 
differ in many more ways than can be accounted for by the issues and managerial 
responses that we have described. For example, the restatements took place in 
different industries, different countries, and in different periods. All of these factors 
may have had an influence on the damage triggered by the restatement. Therefore, 
further research is needed to investigate the degree to which the different actions a 
company undertakes following a restatement can truly be helpful in limiting damage. 
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In spite of such limitation, our study is among the first to discuss the set of issues and 
managerial responses surrounding financial restatements, and provide guidelines 
for dealing with this complex problem.
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Chapter 3
Study 2: Analysts’ Perceptions of CEO Behaviour in Restatement 
Situations
3.1 Introduction
Our second study focuses on analyst perceptions of CEO 
behaviour in restatement situations. Analysts rate companies 
on asset management and portfolio attributes, and they 
are required to estimate, amongst other factors, the future 
earnings of the companies they follow. Analysts also issue 
buy/sell recommendations and target share prices for the 
companies they follow. There is extensive evidence that 
analysts’ stock recommendations have a material impact in 
stock trading behaviour and stock market implied valuations 
(Ryan & Taffler, 2006; Womack, 1996). Regulation FD (which 
became effective in August 2000), and many other corporate 
governance regulations, made these conference calls public 
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domain  – all investors have access to these conference calls 
(for example, through services such as the web-based FD Wire). 
In addition, analysts’ assessments of corporate and executive 
performance (the analysts’ reports), are readily accessible to 
participants in the capital markets. Hence, analysts play a key 
role in the functioning of capital markets. 
A large body of literature documents that analyst forecasts provide the best proxy 
for investors’ earnings expectations, and tend to outperform the time-series models 
(Brown & Rozeff, 1978; Fried & Givoly, 1982; Givoly & Lakonishok 1984; Conroy & 
Harris, 1987; Brown, Hagerman, Griffin & Zmijewski, 1987; O’Brien 1988; Kross, Ro 
& Schroeder 1990). Also, analysts’ stock recommendations and the corresponding 
effect on stock prices affect a firm’s general reputation and influence its ability to 
raise capital, how it sets its compensations policies and the career prospects of that 
firm’s executives. Therefore, analysts’ judgment and decision making is very relevant 
for CEOs (Fombrun, 1996) as analysts become an important external constituent of 
a firm. 
Consequently, analysts are expected to have a professional interest in recognizing 
restatement warning signs (red flags) and/or predicting forthcoming restatements 
as these restatements will effect share prices and future earnings potential. There 
is mixed evidence regarding the ability of analysts and/or other market participants 
(internal or external) to predict restatements. Papers by Efendi et al. (2005) and Desai 
et al. (2006) show that short-sellers and insiders predict restatements; Griffin (2003) 
reveals that analysts do not anticipate and/or predict restatements. Griffin also finds 
that in a few instances, analysts downgrade companies before the restatement 
announcement, however, the biggest revision by far occurs the month after the 
restatement announcement, thereby suggesting that many analysts simply react 
to the bad news. Griffin examines how analysts and other ‘insiders’ react to those 
corrective restatements that lead to securities fraud. 
Until the end of 2001, restatement companies had smaller revenues than the average 
revenues of around 9,000 companies contained in ratings agency Standard & Poor’s 
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Compustat database. However, starting in 2002, the average assets of restatement 
companies were higher than the average, peaking in 2005 with average assets of US 
$7 billion (compared to the Compustat average of US $5.2 billion), and documented 
in a 2008 report to the U.S. Treasury (see Figure 3.1). If there is an increased likelihood 
of encountering restatements for larger companies, a reasonable expectation 
would be that analysts develop some kind of ‘radar’ function, signaling to them 
suspect corporate situations. However, empirical evidence shows that analysts 
ignored many red flags that without the benefit of hindsight could be identified 
in pre-restatement periods. Excessive executive remuneration packages, earnings 
management pressures, dominant and often narcissist CEOs, audit committees with 
insufficient financial expertise, the ever-increasing complexity of accounting rules, 
and gatekeepers with substantial conflicts of interest are all among those red flags.
Figure 3.1 average assets For restatiNg aNd compustat compaNies ($b)
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Generally, analysts have a bad track record when it comes to seeing these early 
warning signs that could signal an impending financial restatement. There are only a 
small number of instances in which analysts, based on the information obtained from 
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their ‘traditional’ company research – management contacts (conference calls) and 
data gathering – were able to anticipate and disclose earnings management, which 
ultimately resulted in a financial restatement1. Considering the strong increases over 
the last 10 years in the number of restatements, this inability to accurately anticipate 
the need for a restatement begs the question as to whether or not the traditional 
‘analyst forecasting model’ will ever be able to identify restatement situations in a 
timely manner.
1  For example, the Government Accountability Office’s 2006 database only mentions two instances (out of some 1,400), in which the media 
prompted for the restatement and some 15 other which fell under the category of ‘other’ prompters.
136
136
3.2 Theoretical Framework and Previous Studies on Analysts’ Decision-
Making
Ronen and Yaari (2008) discuss the literature on the role of analysts in earnings 
management. They focus on two key questions:
• Do analysts take into account the financial information released by firms, 
and if they do, do they discount reports that are suspected of being inflated 
by earnings management?
• Do analysts have incentives to collude with management in an attempt to 
manage earnings rather than to issue unbiased reports; or do they provide 
countervailing power to management's earnings management?
In the following paragraphs, we shall consider the literature on both these 
issues in more detail, particularly as they apply to the role of analysts in earnings 
management.  
3.2.1	analysts'	decision	Processes
The following research focuses on the question of what information affects the 
development of analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations. 
In a content analysis study of analyst reports issued between 1987 and 1992, Previts, 
Bricker, Robinson and Young (1994), conclude that analysts place significant weight 
on earnings-related information, trying to ‘normalize’ results, often excluding non-
recurring or unusual items in the process. Additionally, analysts rely on management 
to a great extent for information that is not included in the annual and/or quarterly 
financial statements. Previts et al. (1994), note that analysts prefer to follow companies 
with effective earnings management tools, thus creating a low-risk environment for 
forecasting. This finding suggests an interesting dilemma in analysts’ choice of which 
companies to follow – companies managing earnings create a ‘stable’ prediction 
environment, however, once the earnings management is discovered and acted 
upon, often through an earnings restatement, analysts are then blamed for missing 
the red flags indicative of reporting fraud.
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Ramnath et al. (2008) look at Previts et al.’s observation in the context of the present 
day, noting that while analysts prefer to follow firms with effective strategies for 
presenting smooth earnings streams, it would be interesting to know whether 
analysts have the same preferences after the SEC’s Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD). 
Future archival research might consider the relationship between analysts’ following 
decisions (their preferences as to which companies to follow), and the ability of 
managers to consistently meet earnings expectations before and after FD.
Rogers and Grant (1997) evaluate company annual reports through a content-coding 
study to determine how analysts use those reports to write their own research 
reports. They find that sell-side analyst reports rely primarily on the narrative 
portions of annual reports, with the management discussion and analysis section 
proving to be the largest single source of information. Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
find that the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts declines with higher quality annual 
report disclosures, and better investor relations. They also find that a higher quality 
of corporate communications and investor relations improves the analysts’ forecast 
accuracy. Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) also find that quality and candidness in 
the management discussion section of the annual report are key factors valued by 
analysts. Their research results are consistent with disclosure model predictions, 
wherein expanded disclosure leads investors to revise upward valuations of a sample 
firms’ stocks, increase stock liquidity, and create additional institutional and analyst 
interest in those stocks. Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto (2002) find that information 
provided during conference calls improves analysts’ forecast accuracy and reduces 
the analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion. The study also finds that conference calls 
help ‘level the playing field’ when it comes to analyst earnings forecast dispersion. 
3.2.2	nature	oF	analysts’	exPertise
Studies exploring the nature of analysts’ expertise mainly deal with issues such as 
firm-specific expertise, industry focus, the number of firms followed by analysts, and 
analyst years of experience, linking past performance to current and future forecast 
accuracy. 
Understanding the nature of an analyst’s expertise is important because it can help 
explain why some analysts perform better than others. This is relevant for analysts 
themselves (considering their rewards and bonuses), but is also important for their 
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employers and anyone who uses analysts’ research and recommendations to make 
investment decisions. Analysts who follow a particular company longer produce 
more accurate forecasts (Clement, Koonce & Lopez, 2007). Learning from past 
experience seems to be an important part of forecasting, particularly when task-
specific experience is considered. Clement et al. (2007) found that analysts who 
obtained experience with corporate downsizing and restructuring issues increased 
their forecast accuracy by some 8 per cent annually for every year of experience on 
companies they follow. 
In their article ‘Who Herds?’, Bernhardt et al. (2006) define herding bias as part of a 
broader context, writing that (p. 658):
A forecast is unbiased if it corresponds to the analyst’s best estimate of 
earnings given all available information, i.e., if it corresponds to the mean 
or median of the analyst’s posterior distribution over earnings. In its most 
basic form, herding amounts to biasing a forecast away from an analyst’s 
best estimate, toward the consensus forecast of earlier analysts; while anti-
herding amounts to biasing a forecast away from that consensus.
It is very possible that analysts do herd, in the sense that they may ignore their own 
private knowledge/information to follow the rest of the pack. A number of archival 
studies, often using mathematical models, provide insight into analyst herding 
behaviour. And various studies show that confident analysts are more likely to issue 
bold forecasts (Ramnath et al. 2008). Hirshleifer notes, ‘Investors and managers are 
often accused of irrationally converging in their actions and beliefs, perhaps because 
of a ‘herd instinct’ or from a contagious emotional response to stressful events’ 
(Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2001). In particular, this last reference to stressful events is 
interesting in the context of our research.2 
Investors may herd (converge in behaviour), or cascade (ignore their private 
information signals), in deciding whether to participate in the market, what securities 
to trade, and whether to buy or sell. Both analysts as well as investors may herd 
when deciding what securities to invest in. Analysts may also herd in their forecasts 
2  See, for example, Business Week (1998) on ‘Why Investors Stampede: And why the potential for damage is greater than ever,’ or the 
advertisement by Scudder Investments in Forbes (10/29/01) with the heading, ‘MILLIONS of very fast, slightly MISINFORMED sheep. Now that’s 
opportunity.’
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of future earnings levels of companies they cover. An individual is said to be in an 
informational cascade if, based upon his observation of others (e.g. their actions, 
outcomes, or words), his chosen action does not depend on his private information 
signal (see Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; Banerjee, 1992; Devenow & 
Welch, 1996). 
3.2.3	analysts’	beHavioural	biases,	incentives	and	reciProcity
Biases are consistent errors made in decision making under uncertainty. To reduce 
human information-processing demands, people develop rules of thumb, or 
heuristics – cognitive tools to simplify decision-making. Cognitive bias occurs when 
inappropriate heuristics are applied in decision-making, or when persons have an 
over-reliance on these judgmental rules of thumb. The concept of heuristics was 
first used by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) to explain departures from normative 
models. 
Over the past 40 years, research in the field of decision making has revealed 
that there are many different biases. Currently, a unifying concept has yet to be 
discovered. However, some order has been created in this great variety of departures 
from normative models. Baron, in his book Thinking and Deciding (2008), develops 
a model in which the biases are linked to the normative models they violate and 
provide a possible explanation. Bazerman and Chugh (2006) summarize 13 important 
biases into three groupings: biases emanating from the availability heuristic; 
biases emanating from the representativeness heuristic; and finally, those beyond 
availability and representativeness. The following four biases are considered relevant 
for our research and will be considered below in further detail:
• Overconfidence
• Optimistic/Pessimistic Bias
• Confirmation Bias
• Commitment Bias
Overconfidence
In their 2007 article, ‘Arrogance can be a virtue: Overconfidence, information 
acquisition, and market efficiency,’ Ko and Huang (2007) argue that overconfident 
investors will invest resources in finding information not yet available in the 
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marketplace. Contrary to other researchers, who believe overconfidence generates 
security mispricing, they believe that overconfident investors can cause stock prices to 
move closer to their true values. The incentive for overconfident investors to acquire 
information is a possible countervailing effect that makes prices more informative 
and efficient. Rubinstein (2001) also mentioned this possibility as an argument for 
efficient markets (also quoted by Ko & Huang, 2007: 530):
While overconfidence can express itself in other ways, surely it causes 
many investors to spend too much on research. As a result, there is a sense 
in which asset prices become hyper-rational; that is, they reflect not only 
the information that was cost-effective to impound into prices but also 
information that was not worthwhile to gather and impound. Overspending 
on research is not in one’s self-interest, but it does create a positive externality 
for passive investors who now find that prices embed more information and 
markets are deeper than they should be.
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1997) develop a behavioural model based 
on the assumption that investors display overconfidence and self-attribution bias 
with respect to private information concerning stock returns. Overconfidence causes 
investors to attach excessive weight to private information, oftentimes discounting 
public information in the process. Self-attribution bias refers to the tendency to 
attribute success to skill, and conversely, to attribute failure to misfortune, thus 
accentuating the effect of overconfidence in the short term.  
Optimistic/Pessimistic Bias – Overreaction and Under-Reaction
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) mention that four decades of research into the biases 
of analysts’ forecasts have produced conflicting evidence, and that the literature as a 
whole still fails to deliver a definitive answer as to why and how analysts are biased. 
The main focus of the work they refer to attempts to analyse the bias of analysts solely 
in terms of whether the analysts themselves are either overly optimistic or overly 
pessimistic, and how that disposition plays out in their earnings forecast errors.
A similar set of studies, exploring the degree of analyst reaction to information that 
contradicts earlier business economics expectations (earnings estimates, cash flow 
estimates, etcetera), found corresponding analyst overreaction to bad news, and vice 
versa, analyst under-reaction to good news, with respect to these variables. Further, 
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a wealth of behavioural finance literature has reported that there exist behavioural 
tendencies in both analysts’ and investors’ reactions to unexpected earnings 
information. In the context of reactions to earnings information, such behavioural 
tendencies of analysts and investors have been characterized as overreaction, under-
reaction, or optimism. 
Amir and Ganzach (1998) argue that these over- and under-reactions in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts are linked to the following heuristics applied in analysts’ decision 
making –anchoring, representativeness, and leniency. Bradshaw (2000) and Hunton, 
McEwan and Bhattacharjee (2001) also find that analysts over-extrapolate growth 
and earnings, in applying heuristics to determine stock recommendations.
Commitment Bias
Going a step further, because previously-announced earnings and previously-made 
forecasts can serve as anchors, Amir and Ganzach (1998) suggest that a previous 
forecast is a more powerful anchor than previous earnings. People tend to have a 
strong commitment to staying on a course of action once a choice is made, judgment 
is expressed, or a forecast is communicated – the so-called commitment bias (Staw, 
1976). 
Confirmation Bias
In addition to overconfidence, Friesen and Weller (2006) consider another bias 
extensively documented in the psychology literature, that of cognitive dissonance.3 
An individual who is overconfident overestimates the precision of his private 
information. Cognitive dissonance can be characterized by the proposition that 
individuals tend to acquire or perceive information to conform to a set of desired 
beliefs – and neglect or disregard information to the contrary.4 As the authors write:
Thus, if an analyst issues an optimistic earnings forecast on the basis 
of favourable private information, he will have a tendency to interpret 
subsequent information in such a way as to support or conform to the prior 
belief.
3  The theory was first expounded by Festinger (1957). It has been described as one of the most influential theories in social psychology  and has 
been the stimulus for a great number of experimental studies.
4  The theory of cognitive dissonance has been applied in an economic context in Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and in a financial context in 
Goetzmann and Peles (1997).
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Stracca (2004: 383) notes:
A similar need to protect self-esteem may lead agents to belief perseverance 
and confirmatory bias: as there is an emotional cost associated to the 
recognition of having been wrong, agents tend to look for additional 
support for initial hypotheses (Rabin & Schrag, 1999) and to exaggerate 
correlations which might be due to chance, interpreting them in the light of 
a preconceived theory.
Reciprocity
Next to the above biases, analysts are also sensitive as to how their relationship with 
the CEO develops. Further, an important objective for executives is to maintain support 
from their external constituents. This is particularly true for the relationship between 
the CEO and analysts, as analysts can strongly influence a CEO’s relationship with 
the stakeholders of the company, in particular its shareholders. Earlier studies have 
noted that social exchange and favour rendering are more pervasive in relationships 
with repeated interactions (Axelrod, 1984) – these frequent interactions are indeed 
applicable to CEO-analysts contacts. Executives can render the following favours to 
security analysts – provide critical information on industry developments (not the 
company in particular); organize contacts with supplier firms; meet with analysts’ 
clients (institutional investors); recommend them for jobs and get them into 
‘exclusive’ high-prestige clubs. When a CEO expects, or is confronted with negative 
information about the company, it can be expected that the CEO may use favour 
rendering to influence analysts’ decision processes. 
Westphal and Clement (2008) find strong supportive evidence that executives 
render personal and professional favours to analysts when they expect to announce 
negative financial information, such as an earnings surprise. This is of relevance 
to our study, as in many cases restatements result in a downward adjustment of 
revenues, and in a reduction of net profit and shareholders’ equity. Possibly, this will 
have an impact on analysts’ blame giving behaviour and their assessment of CEO 
characteristics such as integrity.
Next to this body of literature, cognitive psychologists have also studied biases and 
boundedness, and a number of studies are relevant to this research.
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3.2.4	conclusions	and	current	limitations	in	analysts’	researcH	literature
Research on the role of financial analysts in capital markets is mainly based on either 
archival studies or on experiments. The number of studies in which analysts are polled 
directly is very limited (see Ramnath et al., 2008). Recently, the literature on financial 
analyst forecasting has paid more attention to the investigation of the incentives and 
decision processes that influence analysts’ measures of company performance (their 
buy/sell recommendations, and/or earnings estimates). Included in these studies is 
the role of heuristics, which might better explain analysts’ decisions about how to 
weigh the factors, used in determining a company’s value.
Academic research on analysts does not pay attention to some crucial (and 
observable) factors that could impact analysts’ assessment of a firm’s (and its CEO’s) 
performance and financial-reporting integrity. However, some of these factors are 
being independently studied by academics in isolation (as unrelated topics), even 
though they are mostly not considered within the context of analysts’ judgment and 
decision making. These factors include:
• CEO Competence: Implicitly assumed by analysts; however, financial 
reporting skills prove essential for creating trust with stakeholders and 
investors – no measures or indicators currently exist for objectively assessing 
this CEO attribute.
• CEO Task Challenges: Extremely high job demands can lead to extreme 
executive behaviours (acquisitions for the sake of size and power, 
reorganizations, etcetera) and/or to engage in aggressive accounting 
practices. Highly pressured executives do take shortcuts in decision making 
(Prahalad, 2004; Hambrick et al. 2005a; Gangster, 2005), but analysts often 
do not notice or critique such 'blinded' behaviour, which oftentimes leads to 
inferior performance by companies.
• CEO Integrity and Openness: Corporate governance failures of the last 50 
years, including the recent corporate reporting scandals, show that CEO 
integrity is a primary component in protecting the interests of shareholders 
in an environment where ownership is separated from management (the 
agency problem). Analysts seem to ignore these CEO attributes.
• Governance: Proper governance measures should act as countervailing 
powers.
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In determining financial reporting integrity, these four factors warrant assessment 
by analysts. We will argue that considerable academic studies now exist, supporting 
our assertion that there are ‘observable clues,’ for anticipating executives engaging 
in financial reporting fraud, other than the traditional archive-study-based indicators 
(explored after the fact). The study of the perceptions of analysts as to the causes of 
earnings management and/or reporting fraud are important, as it can help to identify 
whether or not analysts are able to identify red flags, or warning signs which could 
hint at a forthcoming restatement. 
If we hold the view that the function of evidence is to disprove incorrect theories, 
then judged against the classical ‘analyst decision model,’ we can conclude that we 
have found evidence that the model fails. The old analyst’s judgment paradigm and 
decision model needs calibration and re-balancing. But we then face shaping a new 
alternative model, which includes assessment of CEO intangibles. The evidence above, 
that analysts are biased and bounded, amounts to a vast collection of independent 
pieces of research, but these do not painlessly assemble themselves into a new theory 
for explaining analysts’ perceptions of executives in crisis situations.
145
145Chapter 3 – Study 2: Analysts’ Perceptions of CEO Behaviour in Restatement Situations
3.3 Development of Hypotheses
Two steps are needed before we can develop a model that will explain perceptions 
by analysts of the behaviour of a CEO during a restatement crisis. In the first step, we 
shall investigate the focus of research in financial analyst forecasting literature, with 
the aim of identifying those studies that have addressed analysts’ judgment and 
decision-making processes in the context of earnings management, CEO perceptions 
and/or reporting fraud. This literature tackles issues impacting analysts’ forecasting 
and ability to spot earnings management, their ability to anticipate or predict 
forthcoming restatements and/or reporting fraud, and finally, the factors analysts 
use to gauge CEO characteristics.
In the second step, we will analyse what is missing from the current forecasting 
model, and what tangible and intangible indicators may help analysts evaluate 
a CEO’s behaviour during a restatement crisis. On the basis of the work that has 
been researched to date, we will develop a number of hypotheses about the drivers 
of analyst perceptions of CEO behaviour. The constructs we develop should help 
explain analysts’ behaviour in restatement situations, including rationale or logic for 
earnings estimates and analysts’ recommendations. This analysis includes comments 
on analysts’ dominant logic, cognitive dissonance, and a variety of other significant 
biases.
Our objective will be to develop and test a model of how perceived pressures on 
CEOs to commit earnings management and/or reporting fraud are associated with 
perceived CEO behaviour in restatement situations. These perceptions by analysts on 
causes (CEO pressures), and effects (CEO behaviours), in restatement situations are 
expected to be influenced by analysts’ biases and incentives. During the last 15 years, 
research on the role of financial analysts has evolved from mainly descriptive studies 
on the statistical inputs and outputs of analyst forecasting, to in-depth studies of the 
decision processes underlying analyst forecasting. 
In Figure 3.2, we display the basic research model that we test in this study. With 
respect to the antecedents of analyst perceptions of CEO behaviour, we focus on 
the perceived pressure on the CEO to manage earnings on the one hand, and on the 
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other, the degree to which analysts feel regret. In addition, we include a number of 
other antecedents of perceived CEO behaviour as control variables. With respect to 
CEO behaviour, we take the dimensions that we have identified in Chapter 2 as a 
starting point. However, because some of these dimensions are rather similar, we 
regroup them based on the two main dimensions of restatement severity that we 
have identified. We have argued that openness and confirming behaviour mainly 
serve to reduce the amount of perceived distortion that is present, while governance 
and compliance serve to reduce the amount of perceived intent. Finally blame taking 
helps to reduce the severity on both dimensions. Therefore, we focus on the following 
three dimensions of CEO behaviour: (1) openness/confirming, (2) governance/
compliance and (3) blame taking. In addition, we include a fourth dimension that is 
likely to be influential on analysts’ judgment of the CEO, namely, the degree to which 
they perceive the CEO as behaving with integrity.
Figure 3.2 research model study 2
Earnings
Management
Pressures &
Job Demands
Analyst Regret
Other factors:
• CEO Dominance
• Gatekeeper Latitude
• Internal Gatekeeper Competence
• Analyst Competence
• Pressure for Positive Behaviour
• CEO Competence
CEO Behaviour Before Restatement
CEO Behaviour During Restatement Crisis
There are two important arguments why analysts need a clear view as to the integrity 
of executives:
• Research shows that there is an association between integrity and 
transformational leadership. Further, perceived integrity also positively 
correlates with leadership and organizational effectiveness. Therefore, high 
integrity and firm performance are associated. Analysts should be aware 
of firm-value-enhancing factors. In the reputation remediation period, 
openness and integrity of the CEO (and their gatekeepers), is expected to 
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accelerate recovery from the damage caused by the restatement. 
• If integrity is low, or executives are unethical (and/or narcissistic), research 
has shown that firms managed by such executives have greater risk and 
occurrence of financial reporting fraud. Research has shown that companies 
which restate as a result of management fraud suffer a greater negative 
stock price effect.
Regarding the first argument, Joyner, Payne and Raiborn (2002) note that, 'There 
is growing recognition that good ethics can have a positive economic impact on 
the performance of firms. Many statistics support the premise that ethics, values, 
integrity and responsibility are required in the modern workplace.' Brown, Trevino 
and Harrison (2005) also found that leader cognitive moral development is positively 
related to transformational leadership, and unrelated to transactional leadership 
style. 
Integrity in leadership is becoming of increasing concern within business and 
organizations (Kanungo and Mendonca, 1996). Many organizational theorists and 
practitioners now believe that leadership without integrity may ultimately place the 
organization at risk (Mowday, Porter & Steers, 1982; Parry, 1998; Posner & Schmidt, 
1984). Gottlieb and Sanzgiri (1996) highlight that leaders with integrity always 
encourage open and honest communication, particularly in discussions concerning 
decision making.
Parry and Proctor-Thomson (2002: 15) note:
Perceived integrity was found to correlate significantly and positively with a 
range of effectiveness measures, but specifically leader integrity correlated 
most strongly with rater satisfaction and rater perceptions of leadership 
effectiveness. Perhaps one could say that no longer is ethical conduct simply 
a desirable 'feel good' quality of organizational functioning, but rather it is 
becoming recognized as an essential component of success.
It is argued that leaders with more comprehensive moral reasoning are more likely 
to value goals that go beyond immediate self-interest, rather serving the collective 
good.
148
148
Conversely, regarding the second argument, there are a number of studies which 
show a strong association between management intent in committing financial 
reporting fraud, and negative stock price effects. Palmrose et al. (2004) report that 
the market reaction to restatement announcements related to fraud (i.e. deliberate 
misreporting), is negative 20 per cent, but is only negative 6 per cent for non-fraud 
example restatements.
3.3.1	HyPotHeses	earnings	management	Pressures
Following the corporate failures and significant restatements of 2001-02, scholars 
have placed heavy emphasis on investigating the structure of companies’ reward 
and bonus systems, and exploring the relationship of those systems to earnings 
management and fraudulent financial reporting (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Jensen, 
Murphy & Wruck, 2004). Agency theory5 suggests that incentive pay aligns the 
interests of executives and shareholders, and that incentive pay is intended to motivate 
executives to behave and take actions that maximize shareholder value (Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2003). However, the conclusion of Devers et al. (2007) is that corporate goal 
misalignment might be one of the more reliable outcomes of executive pay. Devers et 
al. illustrate this conclusion on the basis of studies into a more recent phenomenon, 
that of stock option backdating and the opportunistic release of information by 
executives around scheduled award dates. The goal misalignment conclusion is also 
supported by a number of recent articles quoted by Devers et al., all dealing with 
earnings management studies and studies focusing on the relationship between 
executive reward systems and restatements. Devers et al. conclude that, ‘Evidence to 
date strongly supports the conclusion that executives use incentive compensation in 
ways that benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders.’
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) confirm and extend 
the findings of Beneish and Vargus (2002), that highly-incentivized executives appear 
more likely to manipulate reported measures of corporate financial performance. 
More incentivized CEOs (those whose overall compensation is more sensitive to 
company share price), lead companies with higher levels of earnings management. In 
5  Agency theory research is typically directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship. As defined by Eisenhardt (1989), the agency relationship is 
one in which one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that work. Agency theory is concerned with resolving 
two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal 
and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principle to verify what the agent is actually doing. The second is the problem of risk 
sharing that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk.
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addition, Burns and Kedia (2006) found that higher incentives from stock options are 
not only associated with a higher propensity to misreport, but are also associated with 
higher magnitudes of misreporting. Interesting for our study is another conclusion 
they were able to draw with respect to market reactions – that large option exercises 
in periods of alleged misreporting are associated with a greater market reaction at 
the time of the restatement announcement (Burns & Kedia, 2006). This knowledge 
of the extent of prior option exercises (in the misreporting period), can therefore be 
considered essential information for analysts who need to predict future market/
target prices for the shares that they follow.
Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002) argue that options entice managers to extract 
‘rents’ (wealth), from their remuneration contracts at the expense of other 
shareholders. Holding option positions causes executive wealth to become a convex 
function of the stock price – while increasing stock prices benefits holders of options, 
the magnitude of option losses are limited in the event of a decline in stock price. This 
asymmetric feature of options on shares may cause executives to focus on short-term 
period results. The focus on short-term profits is further enhanced by the bias with 
respect to time-value of money and other measures of value. Bebchuck et al. found 
that misreporting, as measured by the incidence of restatements, is more likely to 
occur when the convexity is greater. What the trio of researchers did not uncover 
was evidence to support their hypothesis that offerings of long-term incentive plans 
(LTIPs) and restricted stock reduced the propensity of companies to misreport.
Managers with larger stock and option holdings are more likely to engage in earnings 
management – a prediction confirmed in articles by Beneish and Vargus (2002), 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Burns and Kedia (2006) and Bartov and Mohanram 
(2004).  In all of those studies, the data reveals that during the misreported period, 
CEOs exercised a significantly higher fraction of their exercisable options than the 
CEOs of comparable firms.
One final point in this area made by Burns and Kedia (2008) was that the sensitivity 
of compensation from options, as measured by the change in value of the option for 
a percentage change in stock price (delta), is greater in restated firm years than in 
non-restated firm years. This provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
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incentives from option compensation encourage misreporting, and that misreporting 
results in a restatement.
The above research shows that CEO rewards, and in particular, stock options, are 
associated with earnings management. Those rewards, in many cases, result in the 
consequential restatement of financial statements. Our research focuses on analysts’ 
perceptions of CEO behaviour in restatement situations, both during the period 
leading up to the restatement announcement, and the restatement adjustment 
period. The perceptions and knowledge of analysts on CEO rewards schemes are 
relevant because research shows that the involvement of senior management, and 
in particular the CEO, in earnings management and the implied reporting fraud, 
has a significantly higher negative effect on the downward stock price adjustment 
following a restatement announcement (Palmrose et al. 2004). The research also 
shows that CEO stock options schemes are associated with a higher propensity of 
reporting fraud alongside more material adjustments to the financial statements. 
Essentially, more significant misstatements of the financial position have a greater 
impact on the ability of analysts to predict future earnings and share price targets. Or, 
in other words, stock options schemes should work as an important warning sign (red 
flag) for analysts when assessing the risk of a company and its senior management, 
being involved in earnings management or reporting fraud. 
On the other hand, research in decision making suggests that individuals often do 
not ‘see’ accessible and perceivable information during the decision-making process, 
a phenomenon which Chugh and Bazerman (2007) dubbed ‘bounded awareness.’ 
This type of change blindness illustrates the ‘slippery slope’ theory of unethical 
behaviour (Schrand & Zechman, 2008), which predicts that individuals are more 
likely to engage in unethical behaviour that occurs in small increments than in 
unethical behaviour that occurs suddenly. One last note on this subject is that in an 
international comparison of how analysts use information to predict future earnings, 
Moyes, Saadouni, Simon and Williams (2001) found that analysts in the United 
Kingdom and analysts in the United States used the same kind of data; however, US 
analysts appeared to utilize management guidance more than other analysts. This 
shows that analysts differ in the degree to which they use different types of available 
information to form an opinion about a company.
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In addition to executive remuneration, other pressures on the CEO can be instrumental 
for the practice of earnings management. Hambrick et al. (2005a) have discussed the 
role of pressures on executives to achieve objectives they have set for themselves 
and their firms on their behaviour. Hambrick et al. argue that these pressures could 
lead to extreme behaviours, which could form the basis for an explanation as to why 
executives engage in aggressive accounting practices.
In the professional accounting literature and/or working practices we can also find 
examples of risk factors relating to misstatements arising from fraudulent financial 
reporting:
Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or 
expectations of third parties due to the following:
Profitability or trend level expectations of investment analysts, •	
institutional investors, significant creditors, or other external parties 
(particularly expectations that are unduly aggressive or unrealistic), 
including expectations created by management in, for example, overly 
optimistic press releases or annual report messages.
Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive •	
– including financing of major research and development or capital 
expenditures.
Marginal ability to meet exchange listing requirements or debt •	
repayment or other debt covenant requirements.
Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor financial results on •	
significant pending transactions, such as business combinations or 
contract awards (AICPA 2007).
Similarly, the standards identify the following fraudulent reporting pressures arising 
from management reward systems; and we mention in particular parts c and d:
c.       Information available indicates that management's or those charged 
with governance's personal financial situation is threatened by the entity's 
financial performance arising from the following:
Significant financial interests in the entity•	
Significant portions of their compensation (for example, bonuses, stock •	
options, and earn-out arrangements) being contingent upon achieving 
aggressive targets for stock price, operating results, financial position, 
or cash flow
Personal guarantees of debts of the entity•	
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d.      There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel 
to meet financial targets set up by those charged with governance or 
management, including sales or profitability incentive goals (AICPA 2007).
These standards underscore the importance of recognizing the factors we identified 
from the academic literature as red flags for potential financial reporting fraud. 
Therefore, we expect to find that both before and after a restatement is announced, 
when analysts perceive CEO rewards and other pressures to stimulate the CEO in 
the direction of earnings management, they will have a more negative opinion on 
the CEO's behaviour before and during the restatement crisis. This culminates in the 
following hypotheses:
H1a:	The	higher	the	degree	of	perceived	pressures	on	the	CEO	to	manage	earnings	
before	 the	 restatement,	 the	 less	 positive	 will	 be	 the	 perceived	 reputation	
management	behaviour	of	the	CEO	before	the	restatement.
H1b:	The	higher	the	degree	of	perceived	pressures	on	the	CEO	to	manage	earnings	
before	 the	 restatement,	 the	 less	 positive	 will	 be	 the	 perceived	 reputational	
remediation	behaviour	of	the	CEO	during	the	restatement	resolution	period.
3.3.2	HyPotHeses	executive	Job	demands
In an Academy of Management Review article, Hambrick et al. (2005a) defined 
executive job demands as, ‘[The] degree to which a given executive experiences his 
or her job as difficult or challenging.’ Hambrick et al. argue that high executive job 
demands could lead to extreme behaviours, such as earnings management. This 
is because high job demands limit executives’ understanding of the situation, and 
hence their ability to judge the appropriateness of their decisions. Therefore, we 
expect analysts to rate a CEO’s behaviour, both before and after the announcement 
of the restatement, as less positive when they believe the CEO’s job demands are 
high. We formulate the following hypotheses:
H2a:	The	higher	the	perceived	job	demands	on	the	CEO,	the	less	positive	will	be	
the	perceived	behaviour	of	the	CEO	before	the	restatement.
H2b:	The	higher	the	perceived	job	demands	on	the	CEO,	the	less	positive	will	be	
the	perceived	behaviour	of	the	CEO	during	the	restatement	resolution	period.
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Hambrick et al. (2005a) also identify three antecedents of executive job demands, 
namely the degree to which the environment of the CEO is challenging (what 
Hambrick et al. call ‘task challenges’), the level of performance that is required from 
the CEO, and the level of CEO aspiration. Challenges from the environment are, for 
example, the complexity of the industry, the resources that the company has at 
its disposal, and the complexity of the organization’s structure. We expect these 
challenges to exert a negative influence on analyst perceptions of CEO behaviour, 
leading to the following hypotheses:
H3a:	 The	 higher	 the	 perceived	 task	 and	 performance	 challenges	 on	 the	 CEO	
before	 the	 restatement,	 the	 less	 positive	 will	 be	 the	 perceived	 reputation	
management	behaviour	of	the	CEO	before	the	restatement.
H3b:	The	higher	the	perceived	task	and	performance	challenges	on	the	CEO	before	
the	restatement,	the	less	positive	will	be	the	perceived	reputation	management	
behaviour	of	the	CEO	during	the	restatement	resolution	period.
3.3.3	HyPotHeses	analyst’s	regret	and/or	disaPPointment
Disappointment and elation are the counterparts of rejoice and regret (Bell, 1985). 
Disappointment and elation involve comparisons of different outcomes caused 
by different states within a single choice. Similarly, rejoice and regret involve 
comparisons caused by different choices within a single state (Baron, 2008). The 
emotion of regret results from a comparison between an actual outcome and a 
better outcome that might have occurred had another option been chosen (choice- 
or behaviour-focused counterfactuals). Conversely, disappointment stems from the 
comparison of an actual outcome with a better outcome that might have resulted 
had events occurred differently (situation-focused counterfactuals) (Van Dijk, Van 
der Pligt & Zeelenberg, 1999). In line with literature on counter-factual thinking we 
expect that analyst’s regret will be associated with their judgment of CEO behaviour 
in the period following the restatement announcement (Period B – the restatement 
remediation period). We therefore formulate the following hypothesis: 
H4:	The	larger	the	analyst’s	disappointment	by,	and	regret	about	the	occurrence	
of	the	restatement,	the	less	positive	will	be	the	perceived	behaviour	of	the	CEO	
during	the	restatement	resolution	period.
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3.3.4	HyPotHeses	ceo	dominance
Academic literature and the popular press attribute strong financial performance 
to CEO power. Daily & Johnson (1997) distinguish a number of power constructs, all 
of which are based on board composition, remuneration packages, founder/owner 
attributes, CEO prestige and CEO participation in other power structures. None of 
these concepts, however, address the more negative associations between CEO 
dominance, narcissistic characteristics and financial statement fraud.
However, the popular press has identified many CEOs involved in financial 
restatements (and fraud) as clearly having dominant and/or narcissistic traits. Hall 
(2006) identifies chronic dishonesty as a key element in the recent financial scandals. 
Hall states that advances in cognitive and social psychology have shown self-serving 
cognitive biases (egocentric or motivational biases) to be fundamental to human 
behaviour.6
In the literature on fraud and its accompanying warning indicators, the presence 
of a dominant top management team (and/or CEO) is considered to be a leading 
indicator of financial statement fraud (Rezaee, 2005). As Rezaee notes, an aggressive 
managerial attitude to meeting unrealistic corporate goals is an important precedent 
for fraud and he identifies the following organizational characteristics as red flags for 
financial statement fraud:
• A highly domineering top management team;
• An ineffective, illiterate, and incompetent audit committee;
• Management override; and,
• Autocratic management.
Similar results were obtained by Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993). In their sample of 
26 computer companies, profitability is negatively related to top management teams 
with dominant CEOs. Earlier, Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) discovered a positive 
association between CEO dominance and firm bankruptcy, finding in a study of 57 
large corporate bankruptcies, that failing companies have more dominant CEOs than 
non-failing companies.
6  See, generally, Fox (2004), Swartz and Watkins (2003), Bryce (2002), McLean and Elkind (2003), Jeter (2003), and Clarke (2003).
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Based on these considerations, we expect analysts to have a less favourable view 
on the CEO's behaviour, both before and after the restatement, when they perceive 
the CEO as having a domineering management style. This leads to the following 
hypotheses:
H5a:	The	higher	the	degree	of	aggressive	(dominant)	behaviour	of	the	CEO	before	
the	restatement,	the	less	positive	will	be	the	perceived	reputation	management	
behaviour	of	the	CEO	before	the	restatement.
H5b:	The	higher	the	degree	of	aggressive	(dominant)	behaviour	of	the	CEO	before	
the	restatement,	the	less	positive	will	be	the	perceived	reputational	remediation	
behaviour	of	the	CEO	during	the	restatement	resolution	period.
3.3.5	otHer	HyPotHeses
In addition to putting pressure on the CEO to manage earnings, or conversely, 
putting pressure on the CEO to engage in proper governance and reporting 
behaviour, gatekeepers can also passively encourage earnings management by 
increasing managerial discretion. Managerial discretion can be defined as the space 
of choices executives face. Such managerial discretion, or latitude of action, typically 
exists when there is an absence of constraints, be they laws, rules, or a predefined 
logic. Hambrick (2007) describes this as follows, 'Discretion exists when there is an 
absence of constraint and when there is a great deal of means-ends ambiguity – 
that is when there are multiple plausible alternatives.' Paredes (2005) argues that by 
virtue of the powers entrusted to a CEO, top executives are far more likely to derive 
overconfidence from their ability to apply discretion in numerous strategic choices 
whose appropriateness is hard to control by most corporate governance measures.
For our study, such managerial discretion is of interest in the context of accounting 
and reporting choices. Accounting manoeuvering space is defined here as the 
alternatives executives have in making accounting choices, all the while staying 
within the ‘boundaries’ of what is permissible under the current Generally Accepting 
Accounting Principle (GAAP) framework. In the field of accounting, many studies 
have been conducted on how and why executives use this ‘discretionary accounting 
space.’ Some studies suggest that executives might use this accounting discretion to 
‘manage earnings.’ 
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Hambrick (2007) notes that this discretion can only be utilized in the absence 
of ‘constraints’ However, the authors do not elaborate on the specifics of these 
constraints. They mention only environmental conditions and organizational factors, 
such as board weakness, or they allude to the possibility that such constraints might 
include so-called ‘board capture’ on the part of the CEO. More simply put, the board 
has its own interests (dependencies), and/or biases preventing it from taking harsh 
actions. 
In developing our overall construct of CEO job demands, we anticipate that the skill 
levels of the CEO, the CFO, and the Audit Committee act as a countervailing power on 
earnings management pressures. However, this countervailing power to keep such 
pressures in check is made all the more difficult by cognitive constraints playing a 
crucial role in the board’s work. The informational financial reporting environment 
is complex, possibly contains manoeuvering space, and is often opaque, all of which 
are contributing factors to board capture. As such, confirmation bias and collective 
egocentric attitudes tend to paralyze corporate boards.
Accounting discretion (and its close relation, manoeuvering space), has been studied 
previously by Ronen and Yaari (2008, Part 4), Healy (1985) and Dechow and Sloan 
(1991), and a number of other prolific accounting theory and practice writers. The 
existing research in the field makes a distinction between non-discretionary accruals, 
most linked to ordinary business transaction cycles, and discretionary accruals. Such 
non-discretionary accruals arise because of the cut-off phenomenon in accounting, 
which is a result of the necessity of drawing up periodic income reporting (hence 
balance sheets). Inter-period allocation is the result of this accrual process.
In addition, discretionary accruals result in accounting areas in which greater 
management judgment and more financial estimations are required. Accounting 
for business combinations (and related purchase price allocations), goodwill 
impairment assessments, valuation of intangibles, complex revenue recognition and 
hedge accounting are just a handful of the areas in which significant management 
judgment is required. 
Based on this reasoning, we expect that when analysts perceived insufficient 
countervailing power by gatekeepers, and abundant manoeuvering space regarding 
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financial reporting, they are likely to see the CEO’s behaviour, both before and after 
the restatement announcement, in a less positive light. Therefore, we hypothesize 
the following:
H6a:	 The	 higher	 the	 degree	 of	 latitude	 of	 gatekeepers	 regarding	 earnings	
management	 before	 the	 restatement,	 the	 less	 positive	will	 be	 the	 perceived	
reputation	management	behaviour	of	the	CEO	before	the	restatement.
H6b:	 The	 higher	 the	 perceived	 latitude	 a	 for	 negative	 CEO	 reputation	
management	 behaviour	 before	 the	 restatement,	 the	 less	 positive	will	 be	 the	
perceived	reputational	remediation	behaviour	of	the	CEO	during	the	restatement	
resolution	period.
H6c:	The	higher	the	degree	of	competence	of	gatekeepers	regarding	earnings	
management	before	the	restatement,	the	more	positive	will	be	the	perceived	
reputation	management	behaviour	of	the	CEO	before	the	restatement.
H6d:	 The	 higher	 the	 perceived	 competence	 a	 for	 negative	 CEO	 reputation	
management	behaviour	before	the	restatement,	the	more	positive	will	be	the	
perceived	reputational	remediation	behaviour	of	the	CEO	during	the	restatement	
resolution	period.
Hypotheses Analyst Competence and Awareness
We expect that analyst judgment of CEO behaviour in restatement situations will be 
influenced by an analyst’s competence in accounting matters, financial analysis and 
probing skills. It seems likely that analysts who are more competent are better able to 
recognize earnings management pressures on the CEO before a restatement occurs, 
because they are less prone to herding behaviour (Graham, 1999). Therefore, they can 
be expected to be more critical of the CEO’s behaviour before the restatement occurs. 
On the other hand, after the announcement of the restatement, more competent 
analysts are likely to be more objective in evaluating the consequences of the 
restatement, and less likely to be influenced by informational cascading and possibly 
panic (Kuran & Sunstein, 1999). Therefore, we formulate the following hypotheses:
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H7a:	The	more	competent	the	analyst	sees	him/herself,	the	less	positive	will	be	
the	perceived	behaviour	of	the	CEO	before	the	restatement.
H7b:	The	more	competent	the	analyst	sees	him/herself,	the	more	positive	will	be	
the	perceived	behaviour	of	the	CEO	during	the	restatement	resolution	period.
Hypotheses Pressures for Governance and Openness
On the flip side of pressures to manage earnings, stakeholders can put pressures 
on a CEO to engage in ‘proper’ governance and reporting behaviour. Our findings 
in Chapter 2 suggested that if analysts would be more probing in their discussions 
with management during conference calls, then they could enhance their role as 
gatekeepers.
When a restatement has been announced, gatekeepers can also put pressure on the 
CEO to disclose information on the consequences of the restatement, and to conduct 
appropriate remedial actions. In addition, firms, and particularly their independent 
boards, are under significant pressures arising from legislation to take prompt and 
robust remedial actions, which often include dismissing senior executives. In 1999, 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued an unpublished memorandum to United 
States Attorneys’ Offices, the so-called Holder Memo, which outlined factors federal 
prosecutors should consider in deciding whether to pursue criminal charges against a 
corporation. Following the corporate scandals in January 2003, the DOJ promulgated 
a revised version of this memorandum. The Thompson Memo, while similar to the 
Holder memo, directs prosecutors to place ‘increased emphasis on and scrutiny of 
the authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation,’ while simultaneously placing greater 
importance on firms’ compliance programs. In the Thompson Memo, nine factors are 
outlined that a prosecutor should consider in deciding whether or not to charge a 
corporation. A few of these factors are very important in the context of our research:
• The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the 
complicity in, or condoning of, the wrongdoing by corporate management;
• The corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and 
its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, 
if necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client and work product 
protection; and,
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• The corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an 
effective compliance program or to improve an existing one, to replace 
responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay 
restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies.
In particular, the second and third points above sometimes created undue pressures 
on boards to take action, warranted or not. These pressures could lead to unfair and/
or unjust treatment of executives, notably waiving rights to attorney-client privilege. 
In many cases, decisions on the dismissals of CEOs and or CFOs were taken well 
before a final and fact-based assessment of the root cause of a restatement was (or 
could be) available. Boards were facing dilemmas – either cooperate with the DOJ 
and avoid the risks of being penalized at the corporate level (including damage to 
their own reputations), or give up executive positions in order to gain the advantage 
of 'cooperation.' To analysts and investors, these deliberations of boards, executives 
and gatekeepers (such as legal counsel and auditors), were often kept in-house, the 
exact opposite behaviours of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's stated goals of promoting 
transparency. Therefore, interpretation by analysts of reputation remedial actions is 
difficult to evaluate or analyse; mechanisms such as framing in press releases (by the 
corporation), reputation cascading and/or herding behaviour of analysts, and firms 
trying to start with a clean slate, can cause irrationality in markets.
Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) studied the removal of firms' top executives following 
a restatement from the perspective of corporate protection, looking for a loss 
of legitimacy that was defined as risks of losing support from key stakeholders. 
In examining the relationship between a firm's material financial restatement 
and changes in key officer and director turnover, the researchers suggest that as 
mentioned above, restatement firms will seek to remove senior executives as a 
preemptive measure to protect against negative legitimacy and reputational effects 
at the corporate level. They also include in their analyses the effects of the severity 
of the restatement, defined on the basis of who prompted the restatement, and 
conclude by suggesting that restatements prompted by external parties represent 
even more serious threats to legitimacy. 
Based on these considerations, we expect analysts to rate the behaviour of the CEO, 
both before and during the restatement crisis, more positively when they perceive a 
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high degree of pressure on the CEO for proper governance and openness. Therefore, 
we formulate the following hypotheses:
H8a:	 The	 higher	 the	 perceived	 pressures	 on	 the	 CEO	 for	 positive	 reputation	
management	behaviour	before	the	restatement,	the	more	positive	will	be	the	
perceived	behaviour	of	the	CEO	before	the	restatement.
H8b:	 The	 higher	 the	 perceived	 pressures	 on	 the	 CEO	 for	 positive	 reputation	
management	behaviour	before	the	restatement,	the	more	positive	will	be	the	
perceived	reputational	remediation	behaviour	of	the	CEO	during	the	restatement	
resolution	period.
H8c:	 The	 higher	 the	 perceived	 pressures	 on	 the	 CEO	 for	 positive	 reputation	
management	 behaviour	 during	 the	 restatement	 resolution	 period,	 the	more	
positive	will	be	 the	perceived	 reputational	 remediation	behaviour	of	 the	CEO	
during	the	restatement	resolution	period.
Hypotheses CEO Competence
Research on the financial expertise of executives mainly focuses on that of the CFO. 
Following the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, attention also concentrated 
on the qualifications of audit committee members (Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal & 
Chadha, 2005). Somewhat ironically, there is little to no literature covering financial 
expertise requirements for a CEO. Interestingly, Aier, Comprix, Gunlock and Lee (2005) 
quote Baruch Lev of New York University as placing the blame of restatements not 
upon the executives ‘managing’ the earnings, but rather on the complexity of GAAP. 
With the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, the financial literacy (or 
expertise) of CEOs has received more attention, both by internal boards and audit 
committees, along with outside gatekeepers. This follows form with the new 
mandatory requirement that both the CFO and the CEO sign off on the quarterly 
financial reports to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Therefore, we can expect analysts to perceive the behaviour of the CEO, both before 
and after the restatement, more favourably when they perceive the financial expertise 
of the CEO to be high. This leads to the following hypotheses:
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H9a:	The	higher	the	perceived	competence	of	the	CEO	in	accounting	matters,	
the	 more	 positive	 will	 be	 the	 perceived	 perceived	 reputation	 management	
behaviour	of	the	CEO	before	the	restatement.
H9b:	The	higher	the	perceived	competence	of	the	CEO	in	accounting	matters,	
the	more	positive	will	be	the	perceived	reputational	remediation	behaviour	of	
the	CEO	during	the	restatement	resolution	period.
Hypotheses Previous CEO Behaviour
In addition to the factors described in the previous sections, the way in which the 
CEO dealt with corporate governance before the restatement is likely to colour to 
a significant degree how analysts perceive the behaviour of the CEO during the 
restatement crisis. Empirical studies consistently confirm that firms with poor 
internal controls tend to (a) restate earnings more often; (b) be the subject of more 
SEC accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs); (c) face more frequent 
SEC enforcement actions; and, (d) be worse financial performers and systematically 
riskier than comparable firms (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Xie, Davidson & DaDalt, 
2003).
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that the probability of a company restating earnings 
is substantially lower in companies whose independent boards or audit committees 
have a member who has financial expertise. Previous studies have examined the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Xie et al., 2003). Agrawal and Chadha conclude their paper 
finding that firms manipulating earnings are: (a) more likely to have boards of 
directors dominated by management; (b) more likely to have a chief executive 
officer who simultaneously serves as chairman of the board; (c) more likely to have a 
chief executive officer who is also the firm’s founder; (d) less likely to have an audit 
committee; and, (e) less likely to have an outside block holder.
Similarly, Dunn (2004) has studied how power arises over top management teams 
(TMT), observing how team members represented in the board exercise control over 
both the TMT and the board of directors, and how this concentration of power in the 
hands of insiders contributes to illegal corporate behaviour and fraudulent financial 
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reporting. Their research extends the concept of CEO duality to include TMT duality. 
TMT duality occurs when members of the top management team also sit on the firm’s 
board of directors. The findings are consistent with Beasley et al. (2000) and Dechow 
et al. (1996), who found that fraudulent firms have a large percentage of insiders 
on their boards and that these insiders tend to have a large ownership interest in 
their firms relative to outside directors on the board. Overall, the results indicate 
that issuing false financial statements is more likely to occur when a small group 
of insiders have structural power over both the TMT and the board. The studies on 
bankruptcy and the pre-crisis removal of executives reveal that boards with greater 
structural independence are more willing to remove non-performing executives. 
However, Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) note that in some instances, executives are 
replaced so quickly that the change only serves to exacerbate a company’s downward 
spiral and increase the crisis situation. 
Of interest is a 2008 study by Akhigbe and Martin on the valuation impacts of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the financial services industry, particularly considering the 
current financial crisis situation. They find that financial services firms benefited 
significantly from adopting the enhanced corporate disclosures and governance 
practices. Akhigbe and Martin (2008) found favourable effects post-Sarbanes-Oxley 
for financial services firms with a greater degree of independence of the board 
and the board committees, a greater motivation and ability of board members to 
monitor the firm, and a greater degree of institutional ownership. They also found 
that financial services firms  (particularly smaller firms), experienced less favourable 
effects with a less independent audit committee, without a financial expert on the 
audit committee, with less financial statement footnote disclosures, and with less 
involved CEOs.
There exist further studies associating Sarbanes-Oxley’s internal control provisions 
with a firm’s market performance. For example, De Franco, Guan and Lu (2005) 
found that the market reacted negatively to corporate reports of internal control 
deficiencies, and that investors who previously did not have access to internal control 
information deemed the information economically significant. Prentice (2007b) 
provides a rundown of the pros and cons of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, concluding that 
the act has restored trust in the U.S. capital markets after the avalanche of corporate 
scandals in 2002.
163
163Chapter 3 – Study 2: Analysts’ Perceptions of CEO Behaviour in Restatement Situations
Based on the considerations above, we expect that analysts will rate the behaviour of 
the CEO after the announcement of the restatement more positively when they have 
a favourable opinion on the CEO’s governance actions before the restatement. This 
translates into the following hypothesis:
H10:	The	more	positive	the	perceived	reputation	management	behaviour	of	the	
CEO	before	the	restatement,	the	more	positive	will	be	the	perceived	reputational	
remediation	behaviour	of	the	CEO	during	the	restatement	resolution	period.	
164
164
3.4 Analysts’ Survey Design and Methods
3.4.1	introduction
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a survey among financial analysts. Most 
research regarding analysts’ judgment and decision making are based on large 
archival data sources such as I/B/E/S and/or the Thomson Financial databases, 
which contain a large collection of analysts’ earnings estimates, recommendations 
and their reports. The Ramnath et al. (2008) overview study of the existing financial 
analyst forecasting literature, confirms that archival data research and content 
coding are the most frequently used methods of research. However, as Graham, 
Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) point out, such data sources are less suitable for testing 
the reasons why events occur. In our case, we aim to provide insight into the way 
analysts perceive the behaviour of the CEO before and during a restatement crisis 
as a reason why some restatements are much more damaging to the company 
and the CEO’s perceived behaviour than others. It would be hard to provide direct 
insight into analysts’ perceptions of CEO behaviour from archival data. Analysts’ 
recommendations and reports, as well as their conversations with the CEO through 
conference calls, generally deal with the prospects of the firm, rather than with the 
behaviour of the CEO.
To get firsthand data from analysts, we developed a survey instrument requiring 
analysts who followed 200 of the largest and more severe (as measured by share 
price movement), restatement companies in the period between 2004 and 2006, 
to assess the way they perceived the behaviour of the CEOs of the company they 
were following. We asked analysts about their perceptions before the restatement 
occurred, and during the restatement resolution period. We focused on the CEO, 
rather than on another top manager (such as the CFO), because the CEO acts as the 
‘figurehead’ of the company, and carries ultimate responsibility for the company’s 
financial situation and its reputation.
3.4.2	samPle	oF	restatements
In deciding which restatements to focus on, we looked at two aspects: (1) the 
degree of management intent in financial misreporting; and, (2) the size of the 
company involved. Previous research has shown that restatements that are related 
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to fraudulent activity cause the greatest stock price declines (Palmrose et al., 2004; 
Wu, 2004; Anderson & Yohn, 2002). On average, larger companies are followed by 
more analysts, as relevance of these companies to the asset management industry 
(the buy side) is greater; also, stock market interest in performance of these ‘larger’ 
companies is evidently greater. Various reports (Scholz, 2008) show that larger 
restating companies tend to have higher incidences of management intent and/
or fraud. The U.S. Treasury study (Scholz, 2008), shows that average revenues for 
restating companies have been around US $ 1.65 billion during the 1997-2006 period 
(median revenues are around US $127 million); average assets for restating companies 
in the same period are US $5.25 billion (median assets are around US $ 177 million). 
Therefore, we target our research on analysts who follow larger restating companies 
and on restatements where there is a greater probability of management intent. 
Conforming to earlier studies, we use the significance of stock price decline following 
the restatement announcement as a proxy for management intent and/or fraud. 
Initially, we based our sample of restatement companies on searching Factiva for 
restatements from public/listed companies with revenues larger than US $1 billion 
for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006 (using the search term ‘restat*’). We excluded 
from our sample restatements which were due to the following ‘regular’ corporate 
accounting and/or structuring events: mergers and/or acquisitions; changes in 
business segment definitions; changes in accounting principles; discontinued 
operations; stock splits; and changes in stock incentive plans. These types of 
restatements do not involve errors, but are merely updates as a result of fundamental 
changes in the business itself, and therefore are less relevant for this study. For 2004 
and 2005, we also used a database compiled by PricewaterhouseCoopers on the 
basis of publicly available information, listing companies with revenue restatements. 
When we started our preliminary company selection efforts, no comprehensive 
publically available restatement databases existed. The database supporting the 
GAO report, which was released in July 2006, was used to check and complete our list 
of 2004-05 restatement companies. In addition, we used the U.S. Presidential Task 
Force Reports on Corporate Fraud (covering some 120 companies with regulatory/
legal actions), as a check on completeness and relevance of our preliminary list of 
the more significant restatement companies which involved fraud. In May 2007, 
Glass, Lewis & Co. (GLC) provided us with their electronic databases of 2005 and 
2006 restatement companies. This enabled us to complete and check our sample 
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of significant restatement companies in terms of revenue size. The GLC databases 
contained the following numbers of restatements with revenues larger than US $1 
billion: 266 out of 1,359 cases for 2005, and 218 out of 1539 cases for 2006, yielding a 
total of 484 cases. 
Next, we used finance.google.com and finance.yahoo.com to view the company stock 
price charts and stock price data to determine the stock price effects for two days 
around (plus/minus) the date on which the restatement was announced. In the past, 
this announcement date was not very reliable, because some companies would issue 
a press release saying that they anticipated issuing a restatement without being 
specific as to the extent of the restatement. This lack of precision made picking a 
date for measuring the effects of a restatement announcement more difficult. 
However, effective August 2004, under new SEC requirements, companies need to 
file a so-called ‘Item 4.02: Non-Reliance on Previously Issued Financial Statements or 
a Related Audit Report or Completed Interim Review,’ which effectively formalized 
procedures around the restatement announcement date.7 If a company concludes 
that its previously issued financial statements should no longer be relied upon due to 
an error in the financial statements, it must disclose the period in question, the facts 
underlying this conclusion, and whether the company has discussed the issue with 
its independent auditors. Similar disclosure is required if the company’s independent 
auditors advise the company to take action to prevent continued reliance on 
previously issued financial statements.
No analysis of the impact of the error is required to be disclosed at the date an Item 
4.02 filing is made. Disclosure with Item 4.02 is only required due to an error in 
the financial statements, not as a result of every other restatement (see above for 
restatements excluded from this research, which are non-error restatements). For 
restatements that occurred in 2005 and 2006, where possible and necessary, we have 
used the Item 4.02 forms as definitive measures of the restatement announcement 
date. However, GLC, in its February 2007 report on restatements, reports that 
application of Item 4.02 is far from perfect. The company reports that in 2006, 600 
out of 1,420 restatements (42 per cent) were so-called ‘Stealth Restatements’ – these 
restatements were either corrected in the next regular company filings, or the 
7  SEC Release Nos. 33-8400; 34-49424. Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date.
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Item 4.02 filing did not take place (for 2005, this figure was 413 out of 1255). These 
stealth restatements, GLC argues, either arise from the ‘four-day loophole’8 (however 
erroneously applied), or from the immateriality argument as applied to the prior 
periods which need to be corrected. However, none of the restatements included in 
our sample could be categorized as ‘stealth restatements’.
3.4.3	selection	oF	analysts	Following	restatements	
For each of the 215 companies that were selected on the basis of the above two 
criteria (company revenues and the severity of the stock price movement), we used 
Thomson One Analytics to identify the analysts following the company (worldwide). 
We also added the 14 companies which were part of the content-coding exercise (see 
Chapter 2) which had restatement dates in 2002 and 2003. For non-U.S. companies 
(which were included on the U.S. stock markets as ADR’s) we identified the analysts 
following the company’s ADR and the analysts of the other countries where the 
company is listed. Through the ‘Contacts Directory’ of Thomson One Analytics, the 
contact information of each analyst was found. As the Thomson Contacts Directory 
contains data only for current analysts following the company, we had to carry out 
a check on whether the analysts found were actually following the restatement 
company at the time of the restatement announcement (including some time 
before, and some months thereafter). This exercise was carried out by contacting the 
Investor Relations Departments of the restatement companies by e-mail, and/or by 
checking the companies’ websites for listings of current/past analysts’ followings. 
For the 215 companies we identified 2,993 analysts. However, this number includes 
analysts following more than one restatement company at the same time (ranging 
from on average 3.7 to 35), and hence, the list of analysts needed to be ‘un-doubled’ 
(each analyst could only be asked to complete one questionnaire). After the ‘un-
doubling’ exercise, 1,517 analysts remained.
Job turnover and job rotation (changing to other accounts and/or more senior 
positions), among financial analysts is typically very high, particularly on the sell-side. 
8  Three months after the SEC issued the new Form 8-K requirements, the commission released a list of 30 frequently asked questions pertaining 
to the amendments of Form 8-K. Question 1 on this list specifically addressed whether a company could report a triggering event in a periodic 
report filed within four days, rather than in a separate Form 8-K. The SEC staff said disclosure of a triggering event can be limited to a periodic 
filing if the event occurs within four days of the filing, except if the events fall under Item 4.01 (auditor changes) or Item 4.02 (non-reliance 
announcements). Therefore, even if a company files a Form 10-Q or a Form 10-K within four days of deciding to warn investors that its previous 
reports are unreliable, the SEC staff clearly indicted the company has to file a separate Form 8-K Item 4.02.
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Therefore, it was to be expected that not all analysts who were following a company 
at the time it experienced a restatement were still doing so at the time this study was 
conducted. Through a trial e-mail with an initial invitation that was sent to check the 
existence of e-mail addresses, we found that some 450 analysts’ e-mail addresses 
produced delivery failures. This problem could have been exacerbated by current fire-
wall protection systems, in particular of financial services companies. An additional 
350 analysts returned an ‘Out of Office’ response, creating potential availability 
issues surrounding the time window in which the questionnaire would be made 
available to the analysts. Further, some 85 analysts indicated upfront that they would 
not participate in the research survey, either because of company policy, lack of time, 
disinterest or otherwise. Nevertheless, beginning in September 2007, an official 
invitation letter was sent to the postal addresses of the original 1,517 analysts; the 
letter was accompanied by a short DVD (Gertsen JF, 2007: www.beam2.nl/fgertsen), 
introducing the research project and the structure of the questionnaire to be made 
available to analysts by e-mail (Interactive Dialogues) towards the end of September 
2007. The letter also contained the restatement company and the (approximate) date 
of the restatement announcement for which the analysts was requested to complete 
the questionnaire. Some 80 letters were ‘Undeliverable,’ either due to the company 
having moved, or due to the analyst no longer working at the postal address.
At the end of September 2007, the first wave of e-mails was sent using the Interactive 
Dialogues web-based survey support system. This system allows for regular feedback 
reporting on which analysts have completed, or started working on the questionnaire. 
In October 2007, at intervals of some two weeks, reminders were sent to analysts 
to encourage their participation. In addition, as for most analysts we had telephone 
data available, five professionals with backgrounds in finance/accounting were 
asked to carry out follow-up calls, again trying to convince analysts to participate. A 
calling protocol was developed and made available to these professionals. The first 
wave of the ID mail resulted in 60 ID questionnaires completed, with an additional 
40 analysts having started the questionnaire, but not completing it fully.
In January 2008, a second wave of emails were sent, now also including some older 
(2004 and 2005) restatements. Again, reminders were sent using the Interactive 
Dialogues feedback system and also using the same calling protocol as for the first 
wave. The Interactive Dialogues system, consistent with the first email efforts to verify 
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existing email addresses (see above) returned some 480 messages as undeliverable. 
In addition, taking into account the ‘Out of Office’ reply mentioned earlier, and the 
evidence of physical address moves, we estimate that the total population of analysts 
having had access to the ID questionnaire amounts to the following: 
 Sent out:   1,517
 Address move  - 120
 Non-participants  -   55
 Non-deliverable  - 480
 Out of Office  - 350
 Incomplete ID (total) -   50
 Net yield base    462
The final sample consisted of 155 analysts (33 per cent) of which 98 were fully 
completed, yielding a response rate of 22 per cent. In order to assess whether response 
bias is likely to affect our findings, we followed the recommendation by Rogelberg 
and Stanton (2007) to use a combination of techniques. First, we checked whether 
respondents differed form non-respondents in terms of archival data. Specifically, we 
looked at the analysts’ nationality and the firm for which they worked. U.S. analysts 
represented 75 per cent of total and 60 per cent of responses; UK analysts totalled 
10 per cent and 7 per cent of responses; Canadian analysts totalled 3 per cent and 
4 per cent of responses. Where analysts worked was divided as ranked into Top 10 
brokerage firms, second next-best league (largest 25), and the rest, with respondents 
breaking down as follows – Top 10 total 30 per cent with responses accounting for 
22 per cent; second next-best league total 40 per cent with responses accounting for 
32 per cent. Second, we tested whether the responses by analysts who responded 
before the initial deadline differed from responses by analysts who responded after 
the deadline, or after being reminded. There were no significant differences noted in 
the ratings of the constructs of our model when comparing the first (non-reminded) 
ratings, with the remainder of the population.
3.4.4	Procedures
A questionnaire was designed which was sent to analysts using Interactive Dialogues, 
which is a web-hosting questionnaire system enabling the intermediate reporting of 
responses. The questionnaire consisted of the following six categories/sections, each 
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covering a part of the model as follows:
• Perceived restatement causes, comprising measures of the constructs 
Earnings Management Pressures, Stakeholder Latitude, and Pressures for 
Proper Behaviour;
• Bounded rationality of the CEO, comprising measures of Task Challenges, 
Overall Job Demands, CEO Competence, and Gatekeeper Competence;
• Bounded rationality of the analyst, comprising measures of Analyst Regret 
and Analyst Competence; and,
• CEO Behaviour, comprising measures of CEO behaviour to manage and/or 
remedy the company’s reputation, both before the restatement and during 
the restatement recovery period.
The questionnaire was tested with a number of analysts in New York and Amsterdam, 
who had experience with restatement situations. In addition, a pilot study of the 
questionnaire was carried out with help of 12 accounting professionals, who were 
asked to take a well known restatement case as example for them filling out the 
questionnaire. Thereafter, a risk management partner and corporate governance 
expert reviewed the questionnaire from the perspective of financial reporting fraud 
cases. Comments by these professionals and practitioners were used to amend the 
questionnaire and were used as input for final editing of the questionnaire. Final 
editing of the questionnaire with the purpose of avoiding potential ambiguity, unclear 
language, suggestivity, and/or jargon, was carried out with help of a retired, English 
native speaking partner of a major accounting firm. Finally, experts of Learning and 
Development, with expertise and hands-on experience in carrying out web-based 
surveys were involved in the final editing procedures. In order to reduce the length of 
the questionnaire, the section on bounded rationality of the CEO was presented to 
one half of the sample (randomly chosen – version A), while the section on bounded 
rationality of the analyst was presented to the other half (version B). The complete 
questionnaire consisted of 114 sub-questions for version A, and 122 questions for 
version B. The time analysts spent on completing the questionnaire (based on the ID 
start/completed time indications) is estimated to be in a range of 30 to 45 minutes. 
The complete version of the Analysts’ Survey can be found in Appendix 3.1.
At the end of the questionnaire, analysts were also asked to provide some data on their 
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personal background that might be of relevance to the restatement, namely their level 
of education, their country of residence, the ranking of their level as analysts, their 
work experience and the number of years they followed the restatement company. 
Some 75 per cent of the analysts rated themselves as senior analyst, 18 per cent as 
intermediate and the remainder of 7 per cent as junior analyst. Expressed in years of 
analyst experience, the population that responded had the following characteristics 
– 60 per cent had more than eight years working experience, 30 per cent had three to 
eight years experience, and some 10 per cent had less than three years experience.
3.4.5 Measures and MeasureMent Validation
Our research addresses both perceived causes of restatements and perceptions of 
CEO behaviour after the restatement announcement date. The perceived causes are 
mostly relevant for the period leading up to the restatement announcement (which 
we label Period A). However, in this study we looked at two types of perceptions 
of causes: (1) the perception that the analysts actually had before the restatement 
occurred; and, (2) the perception of the analysts with hindsight, i.e., how they now 
perceive the situation before the restatement. To be able to measure these two 
types of perceptions, we have formatted a number of ‘cause’ questions both on the 
basis of: without any use of hindsight and with use of hindsight. For the former, the 
analyst is instructed to ignore what they currently know, and is asked to recollect 
their assessment of the company and its CEO both during the restatement, and in 
the period before the restatement announcement took place. Typically, sell-side 
analysts issue analysts’ reports and buy/sell recommendations which document their 
historical views. Thereafter, the analyst is requested to respond to the same question, 
now with the benefit of hindsight. To facilitate understanding, the instruction for 
these questions was accompanied by the diagram shown in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3 PercePtion oF the AnAlyst: Period A with And without hindsight
A
I
B
Perceived CEO behaviour is mainly relevant for the restatement recovery period 
RA
date
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(which we label Period B). However, the more general behaviours, such as openness, 
governance and integrity, were also measured for Period A. For example, attention to 
governance measures plays a role in the period leading up to the restatement as well 
as in the restatement recovery period. Both questions needed to be answered without 
any use of hindsight, so that the original historical views during those two periods 
would be measured. The instruction for this type of questions was accompanied by 
the diagram shown in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4 PercePtion oF the AnAlyst: Period A And B without use oF hindsight
Finally, constructs which specifically deal with the restatement situation, or with the 
way the CEO dealt with the situation, were measured both for the period immediately 
following the restatement announcement (the beginning of Period B), as well as for 
the end of the restatement recovery period (the end of Period B). Again, both questions 
needed to be answered without any use of hindsight. The instruction for this type of 
questions was accompanied by the diagram shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5 PercePtion oF the AnAlyst: Period B (Beginning And end) without use oF hindsight
A
III
B
Instructing respondents to report what their perceptions were at the time before 
the restatement occurred might be complicated by the existence of hindsight bias. 
That is, respondents’ answers about the way they perceived the company and its 
CEO in the past may be coloured by the knowledge they obtained afterwards (see 
e.g. Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991). However, because sell-side analysts 
regularly publish reports and recommendations regarding the company, we think 
RA
date
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that this bias will be less of a problem for them. First, they can use these reports 
and recommendations as a reminder of their own opinion during the period before 
the restatement. Second, because the reports and recommendations are public, the 
respondents might expect that we would check the degree to which some of their 
answers in the questionnaire correspond to the opinions that they published in the 
past.
Some evidence that hindsight bias might not be a serious problem for our study lays in 
the fact that there is a significant positive correlation (r = 0.41, p = 0.04) between the 
degree to which analysts reported in the questionnaire that, before the restatement, 
they felt misled by the CEO on financial statement issues (an item which is part of 
the General Reputation Management Behaviour construct), and their actual ratings 
of the company before the restatement. That is, on average, the more the analysts 
said they thought they were misled, the less positive their actual ratings were. This 
suggests that those analysts who reported that they had some suspicion before the 
restatement actually did have some suspicion at that time.
In addition, there are quite substantial positive correlations between the analysts’ 
answers to the questions about how they perceived the degree of distortion and 
malicious intent involved at the time of the restatement announcement, and the 
actual ratings the analysts issued at the day of the announcement (r = 0.346, p = 
0.098 for distortion; and r = 0.305, p = 0.148 for malicious intent). These correlations 
are only borderline significant, but this is probably due to the small sample size for 
this analysis (n = 24). In addition, there are quite substantial positive correlations 
between the perceptions of distortion and intent at the time of the restatement 
announcement and the actual drop in the company’s share price on the day following 
the restatement announcement (r = 0.238, p = 0.041 for distortion; and r = 0.351, p = 
0.002 for malicious intent, on a sample of n=74). Assuming that in most restatement 
cases, the actual degrees of distortion and malicious intent are not known yet on the 
announcement date (and therefore would not yet be reflected in the company’s stock 
price and the analyst ratings), these correlations suggest that the analysts’ answers 
regarding their perceptions of distortion and intent at the time of the announcement 
are not coloured by the information that they later received regarding the degree of 
distortion and intent.
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A six-point Likert-type scale was used for all questions. We used a scale with an even 
number of response categories to force respondents to express their true opinion. 
We also included a ‘don’t know’ category in each scale. Both of these practices can 
reduce the risk that respondents choose the midpoint of the scale when they have 
no clear idea about some of the aspects they are questioned about (Graeff, 2002). All 
measures are displayed in Table 3.1, ordered by the construct that they are intended 
to measure as well as by the time frames that they refer to (i.e. Format I, II, or III).
The measures refer to perceptions of specific characteristics and behaviours of the 
CEO, rather than overall, abstract perceptions such as trustworthiness or attitude. 
While such overall measures are commonly used in measures of reputation (see 
Chapter 1.4), perceptions by audiences with higher levels of involvement and expertise 
generally are more detailed and complex (Van Riel & Fombrun, 2007). Because 
analysts can be expected to have a relatively high degree of involvement with, and 
expertise in, the companies that they are following, we measured perceptions of 
specific attributes.
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Perceived	restatement	causes
Perceived pressures for proper reputation management behaviour. To measure the 
degree to which analysts thought that CEOs were under pressure to behave in an 
‘appropriate’ way in accounting and reporting matters, we asked questions regarding 
the degree to which different gatekeepers pressured the CEO (1) to be open regarding 
the company’s financial situation; and, (2) to implement appropriate governance 
measures. 
The questions about pressures to be transparent concerned both the restatement 
announcement date and the end of the restatement resolution period (i.e. Format 
III in Figure 3.5). Respondents were asked to rate the degree of pressure by several 
gatekeepers on the CEO to disclose details regarding the restatement. These 
questions were adapted from the content analysis reported in Chapter 2, and among 
the addressed gatekeepers were analysts, regulators, and shareholders. In addition, 
to gain more detailed insight into the degree to which analysts themselves pressured 
the CEO for information, we asked them to rate the importance they attached to 
three different types of information regarding the restatement: (1) the nature 
of the restatement; (2) the number of years affected; and, (3) the total number of 
quarterly results affected. These are important factors determining the severity of a 
restatement (Palmrose & Scholz, 2003; Palmrose et al., 2004).
The questions about pressures for proper governance measures concerned 
governance in general, as well as specific governance measures as a result of the 
restatement. The reason for this is that the latter are more often of a drastic nature 
than governance measures in regular situations, particularly involving dismissal 
of the CEO (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006). We posed the questions about the general 
governance measures both concerning the period before the announcement of the 
restatement, and concerning the period after the restatement (i.e., Format II in Figure 
3.4). These questions concerned the degree of pressure for appropriate governance 
measures from gatekeepers including external auditors, shareholders, and analysts. 
We regard these gatekeepers as the most important external ones for ensuring 
proper governance (Rezaee, 2005). We did not ask for respondents’ perceptions of 
the degree to which internal gatekeepers (such as the independent board) pressured 
the CEO, because analysts normally do not know exactly what the CEO discusses with 
the board. The questions about the governance measures specific to the restatement 
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were posed for the restatement announcement date and for the end of the resolution 
period (i.e. Format III). These questions concerned pressure on the independent board 
to dismiss the CEO as a result of the restatement. 
As a result, we have two measures of perceived pressures for proper reputation 
management behaviour: (1) a measure of perceived pressure for proper governance 
before the restatement; and, (2) a measure of perceived pressure for both proper 
governance and openness during the restatement crisis.
Perceived latitude of external gatekeepers regarding earnings management. The 
concept of stakeholder latitude deals with opportunities for earnings fraud. Therefore, 
in contrast to pressures for positive reputation management behaviour, which is 
relevant both in the period before the restatement and in the restatement resolution 
period; latitude, is mainly relevant for the period before the restatement. Therefore, 
we used Format I (describing the situation before the restatement, with and without 
hindsight) for this concept. The questions relate to the degree to which respondents 
thought that (1) the external auditors had conflicts of interest that reduced their 
independence; and, (2) accounting regulations were too complex to comply with 
completely. We focused on these two gatekeepers to measure the construct of 
latitude, because other external gatekeepers (analysts and shareholders), do not 
have the power to impose a certain course of behaviour upon a company.
Perceived competence of internal gatekeepers. Like external gatekeeper latitude, the 
competence of internal gatekeepers is also related to opportunities for fraudulent 
reporting (Rezaee, 2005). This is reflected in regulations, such as Section 101 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires the members of the independent board (from 
whose members the audit committee is formed) to have sufficient knowledge of 
financial reporting. Therefore, the competence of internal gatekeepers is mainly 
relevant in the period before the restatement occurred. We asked respondents to 
rate the accounting and financial reporting skills of the CFO and the audit committee 
before the restatement, both with and without hindsight (i.e. Format I).
Perceived pressures regarding earnings management. Similar to the concepts 
of stakeholder latitude and internal gatekeeper competence, the concept of 
earnings management pressures concerns management fraud. Where latitude 
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and gatekeeper competence refer to the opportunity to commit fraud, earnings 
management pressures concern the incentives or pressures for fraud. Therefore, this 
concept is also mainly relevant for the pre-restatement period. We used Format I for 
the questions regarding this concept. These questions related to (1) the degree to 
which the company was under pressure to achieve financial results from analysts, 
shareholders, the media, and the independent board; and, (2) the degree to which 
the company’s reward/bonus system stimulated earnings management. These two 
factors are identified by the AICPA (2007) as pressures on management to engage 
in fraudulent financial reporting. In addition, the academic literature on earnings 
management has identified executive compensation as one of the most important 
incentives to engage in such practices (Rezaee, 2005; Paredes, 2005).
Perceived CEO dominance. CEO domineering behaviour also deals with the probability 
of earnings fraud, and is therefore mainly relevant in the period leading up to the 
restatement. The questions, which again used Format I, asked respondents to rate 
the degree to which the CEO’s behaviour before the restatement was dominant (with 
and without hindsight). The professional accounting literature has identified such 
behaviour as one of the attitude-related causes of fraudulent reporting behaviour 
(AICPA, 2007).
Perceived bounded rationality of the CEO and perceived task and performance 
challenges. Task and performance challenges are mainly relevant in the period before 
the restatement, because they relate to the difficulty of the CEO’s task to maintain 
adequate financial performance. Specifically, the questions on task challenges 
concerned the degree to which (1) the industry in which the company operated was 
complex and/or dynamic; (2) organizational resources were sufficient; and, (3) the 
organization’s structure was complex. The questions on performance challenges 
concerned (1) the potential for the company to meet sales growth expectations; (2) 
the potential for the company to meet earnings growth expectations; and, (3) the 
degree to which the organisation’s strategy was demanding. Hambrick et al. (2005a) 
identified these six aspects as the main task and performance challenges which 
increase CEO job demands.
Perceived CEO job demands. Unlike the task and performance challenges confronting 
the CEO, the CEO’s overall job demands are also relevant in the restatement 
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resolution period. Therefore, we used Format II for this construct. Janssen (2001) 
reports an eight-item scale to measure psycho-social job demands. We only used the 
items relating to the degree to which a person had to work hard, and the degree of 
time pressure under which a person had to work, because these aspects are likely to 
be most visible to analysts. 
Perceived CEO competence. The competence of the CEO in accounting and reporting 
matters is relevant both in the period before the restatement and in the restatement 
resolution period. Consistent with our findings in the content analysis reported in 
Chapter 2, the questions concerned both the CEO’s knowledge on accounting and 
reporting matters, and his/her skills in communicating about these matters (using 
Format II).
Bounded	rationality	of	the	analyst
Analyst regret. To measure the degree to which analysts felt disappointed by the 
restatement, we asked respondents to rate the degree to which they regretted the 
recommendations they made about the company before the restatement. This 
item is adapted from a multi-item scale measuring regret developed by Tsiros and 
Mittal (2000). We only used one item because of space constraints and we asked 
this question both for the restatement announcement date, and for the end of the 
restatement period (Format III).
Analyst competence. Like the competence of the CEO, the competence of the 
analysts themselves is relevant both in the period before the restatement and in the 
restatement resolution period. Therefore, we used Format II for this construct. Similar 
to our measure of the perceived competence of the CEO, we asked respondents to 
rate both their knowledge of financial matters, and their communicative skills (i.e. 
skills in asking probing questions). 
Reputation	management	behaviour
General reputation management behaviour. Because our model includes the 
behaviour of the CEO both before and after the announcement of the restatement, 
we used Format II for the items measuring general reputation management 
behaviour, except where indicated. We argued in Chapter 2 that five types of CEO 
behaviour are relevant in a restatement crisis, namely: (1) confirming the problem, 
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(2) communicating openly, (3) taking governance measures, (4) acting in compliance 
with norms and regulations, and (5) blame taking. In addition, at the beginning of 
this chapter we argued that integrity would be another important type of behaviour 
to examine when looking at analyst perceptions.  Because the distinctions between 
confirming and openness, and between governance and compliance, are relatively 
subtle, we aggregate these constructs for the purpose of this study. Therefore, in this 
chapter we examine perceptions of four types of CEO behaviour – (1) integrity, (2) 
openness, (3) governance, and (4) blame taking.
Brown and Trevino wrote extensively on how ethicality is connected with leadership 
styles (2006). To measure perceived integrity, we adapted the ethical leadership 
scale developed by Brown et al. (2005). Because of number of questions and space 
constraints, we used three of the 10 items in the original scale, which consistently 
had high factor loadings in the studies reported by Brown et al. These items ask 
respondents to rate the degree to which the CEO made fair and balanced decisions, 
could be trusted, and set an example in terms of ethics. We also included a question 
about the degree to which the CEO set an ethical ‘tone at the top.’ This question was 
derived from the SEC’s frequent usage of the term ‘tone at the top’ in reference to 
the ethical climate within a company (Barasch, 2005). In addition, we included some 
items which specifically dealt with integrity in accounting and reporting matters. 
These items asked the respondent to rate the degree to which the CEO pressed 
external auditors, the audit committee, and analysts to concur with his/her decisions. 
They concern what the AICPA (2007) labels as ‘domineering management behaviour.’ 
We also asked respondents to rate the complexity of the language used by the CEO 
to explain financial results to analysts. We included this item because research has 
shown that many financial statements use language that is unnecessarily complex, 
hindering a proper information transfer (Courtis 1998; Rutherford, 2003). Finally, 
we asked respondents to rate the degree to which management had attempted to 
mislead them regarding the company’s financial situation. 
The questions about openness concerned the degree to which the CEO provided 
information to analysts regarding three main accounting areas, (1) issues that are 
material to the company’s financial position; (2) accounting manoeuvring space; and, 
(3) accounting policy choices. Because openness regarding the restatement itself can 
be regarded as a separate construct, we also asked respondents to rate the degree 
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to which the CEO provided adequate information on the restatement, both at the 
beginning at the restatement resolution period, and at the end (i.e. Format III). This 
item was based on the content analysis reported in Chapter 2.
The questions about governance in general related to (1) the overall effectiveness 
of the company’s governance and control systems, and (2) the degree to which 
the CEO was committed to ensuring proper governance. In addition, we also 
asked respondents to rate the adequacy of the governance measures undertaken 
to remedy the reputation damage suffered as a result of the restatement, both at 
the restatement announcement date and at the end of the restatement resolution 
period (Format III). The latter item was adapted from the content analysis reported 
in Chapter 2.
We measured the blaming behaviour of the CEO both for the restatement 
announcement date, and for the end of the restatement resolution period (Format 
III). The questions ask respondents to rate the degree to which the CEO assigned 
blame for the restatement to (1) him/herself; (2) the CFO, (3) lower-level managers, (4) 
the external auditors, and (5) the complexity of accounting rules. These items were 
adapted from the content analysis reported in Chapter 2.
Additional	measures
We also include additional measures used to verify some of the measures within the 
model.
Reasons for analyst’s lack of anticipation. To gain additional insight into the degree 
to which the analyst felt regret as a result of the restatement, we asked respondents 
to rate their reasons for not seeing the restatement coming. The following potential 
reasons were (1) being misled by management, (2) the respondent’s analysis not 
giving reason for suspicion, (3) a lack of probing depth in the respondent’s analysis, 
and (4) relying too much on other analysts. We reasoned that the first two causes are 
outside of the analyst’s control and therefore would give rise to less regret than the 
second two causes, which clearly put the blame partly on the analyst.
Perceived restatement severity. As we argued in Chapter 2, an important overall 
driver of analyst reactions to a restatement is the degree to which they perceive 
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the restatement as severe in terms of (1) distortion of the company’s financial 
situation, and (2) malicious intent. Because these dimensions are only relevant in 
the restatement resolution period, we used Format III for this construct. We asked 
respondents to rate the significance of the restatement adjustment and the degree of 
malicious intent, both at the restatement announcement date and at the end of the 
crisis period. These questions provide an additional check on the validity of the survey 
responses, because the answers to these questions should be reflected in the ratings 
the respondents issued during the restatement crisis. Contrary to the other scales 
in the study, we used a 5-point Likert scale (instead of a 6-point scale), to measure 
this construct. The measures of perceived intent and distortion were calculated as 
the average of the perception at the beginning of the restatement period, and the 
perception at the end of the period. To be able to categorize the restatements in the 
four different types of restatements that we distinguished in Chapter 2, we split 
both the measure of perceived intent and the measure of perceived distortion at the 
median, taking values lower than the median as ‘low,’ and values at, or higher than, 
the median as ‘high.’
Measurement Validation
To provide an indication of the construct validity of the scales measuring the different 
constructs (i.e. of the degree to which the scales are related to underlying constructs 
that correspond to constructs identified from theory), we used exploratory factor 
analysis for each cluster of constructs that can be regarded as conceptually closely 
related. If the factor analysis suggests that the number and composition of the 
factors corresponds to the way we have assigned items to constructs, this provides 
support for the construct validity of the scales. Principal component analysis was 
used to extract the factors, and the number of factors was determined by examining 
the scree plot of Eigen values. We used pair-wise deletion of missing values, because 
using list-wise deletion would reduce the sample size too much, especially for the 
constructs related to bounded rationality (which we measured for only half the 
sample). After extracting the factors, they were rotated by the Oblimin procedure, 
which allows the factors to be correlated.9
9  Although we use structural equation modelling to test our hypotheses, it was not possible to validate out measures using confirmatory factor 
analysis. The reason is that we use Partial Least Squares, rather than a Maximum Likelihood-based SEM approach. Traditional goodness-of-fit 
measures, which are necessary for confirmatory factor analysis, are not appropriate for this technique. (See also Section 3.4.5)
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Earnings Management Pressures
The factor analysis of the two constructs that are related to earnings management 
(Earnings Management Pressures and CEO Dominance) suggested that two factors 
underlie the data. After rotation, these three factors could be interpreted as Earnings 
Management Pressures and CEO Dominance, respectively (see Table 3.2). There were 
some items which deviated from this structure – two items that we had assigned 
to the Earnings Management Pressures construct loaded on the factor representing 
Dominance.
table 3.2 Factor loadiNgs earNiNgs maNagemeNt pressures aNd ceo domiNaNce
Item number Item name
Component
1 2
EM Pressures 1 EM Pressures Board .756  
EM Pressures 2 EM Pressures Board (Hindsight) .749  
EM Pressures 3 Rewards  .566
EM Pressures 4 Rewards  (Hindsight)  .629
EM Pressures 5 EM Pressures Analysts .684  
EM Pressures 6 EM Pressures Shareholders .812  
EM Pressures 7 EM Pressures Media .702  
EM Pressures 8 EM Pressures Analysts (Hindsight) .768  
EM Pressures 9 EM Pressures Shareholders (Hindsight) .805  
EM Pressures 10 EM Pressures Media (Hindsight) .734  
Dominance 1 Dominant behaviour  .674
Dominance 2 Dominant behaviour (Hindsight)  .697
Dominance 3 Using manoeuvring space  .778
Dominance 4 Using manoeuvring space (Hindsight)  .840
Pressures for Proper Behaviour and Latitude
The perceived pressures on the CEO for ‘proper’ accounting and reporting behaviour 
are also conceptualized as a higher-order factor consisting of openness pressures 
and governance pressures. To verify this higher-order structure we first conducted 
an exploratory factor analysis on the two Pressures scales together with the Latitude 
scale. We included the Latitude scale because it can be regarded as the mirror image 
of pressures for proper behaviour, and because including only two factors would make 
it impossible to do a second-order exploratory factor analysis. The exploratory factor 
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analysis showed three underlying factors which, after rotation, could be interpreted 
as openness pressures, governance pressures, and latitude (see Table 3.3). 
table 3.3 Factor loadiNgs opeNNess/goverNaNce pressures aNd latitude
Item number Item name
Component
1 2 3
Openness Pressure 1 Analyst openness Pressure (Beginning) 0.712  
Openness Pressure 2 Regulator openness Pressure (Beginning) 0.688  
Openness Pressure 3 Shareholder openness Pressure (beginning) 0.694  
Openness Pressure 4 Analyst openness Pressure (End) 0.702   
Openness Pressure 5 Regulator openness Pressure (End) 0.744   
Openness Pressure 6 Shareholder openness Pressure (End) 0.788   
Governance Pressure 1 Auditor governance Pressure (Before)  -0.632
Governance Pressure 2 Shareholder governance Pressure (Before)  -0.781
Governance Pressure 3 Analyst governance Pressure (Before)  -0.791
Governance Pressure 4 Auditor governance pressure (During)  -0.641
Governance Pressure 5 Shareholder governance Pressure (During)  -0.793
Governance Pressure 6 Analyst governance Pressure (During)  -0.727
Governance Pressure 7 Pressure to dismiss CEO (Beginning) 0.588  
Governance Pressure 8 Pressure to dismiss CEO (End) 0.666  
Latitude 1 Auditor conflicts of interest 0.291  
Latitude 2 Auditor conflicts of interest (Hindsight) 0.438  
Latitude 3 Complexity of accounting rules   0.664
Latitude 4 Complexity of accounting rules (Hindsight)   0.729
Latitude 5 Scope for manoeuvring   -0.445*
Latitude 6 Scope for manoeuvring (Hindsight)   -0.588
Again, there were some items which deviated from our predetermined structure, 
in that two of the items which belong to the Governance Pressures construct 
loaded highly on the factor representing Openness Pressure. In addition, the items 
measuring Governance Pressure before the restatement announcement loaded on 
the same factor as the items measuring Governance Pressure after the restatement 
* The loadings of the items Latitude 5 and Latitude 6 are opposite to those of the other indicators of this construct. When looking at the content 
of these two items, they seem to be related to the propensity of the CEO to conduct earnings management fraud, while the indicators having 
positive loadings relate more to the susceptibility for errors. Because of this, the construct of latitude should be interpreted as relating to the 
latitude for errors versus irregularities, with higher values implying a higher latitude for errors and a lower latitude for irregularities. We also 
tested our hypotheses while omitting these two reversed items. This did not change the significance of the effect of latitude.
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announcement. Nevertheless, we believe that overall, the factor structure corresponds 
reasonably with the way we had assigned the items to the constructs.
A second-order factor analysis showed that two factors seemed to underlie the three 
first-order factors, with the two Pressures factors loading on the first higher-order 
factor and the factor representing Latitude loading on the second higher-order 
factor.
table 3.4 Factor loadiNgs bouNded ratioNality ceo
Item number Item name
Component
1 2
Task Challenges 1 Complex Industry .509  
Task Challenges 2 Potential for sales growth .796  
Task Challenges 3 Potential for earnings growth .828  
Task Challenges 4 Resources .498  
Task Challenges 5 Demanding strategy .742  
Task Challenges 6 Complex structure .617  
Task Challenges 7 Complex Industry (Hindsight) .623  
Task Challenges 8 Potential for sales growth (Hindsight) .835  
Task Challenges 9 Potential for earnings growth (Hindsight) .862  
Task Challenges 10 Resources (Hindsight) -.192
Task Challenges 11 Demanding strategy (Hindsight) .856  
Task Challenges 12 Complex structure (Hindsight) .519  
Job Demands 1 Lack of resources (Before)  .828
Job Demands 2 Company politics (Before)  .844
Job Demands 3 Workaholic (Before)  .738
Job Demands 4 Time pressure (Before)  .827
Job Demands 5 Lack of resources (During)  .742
Job Demands 6 Company politics (During)  .803
Job Demands 7 Workaholic (During)  .776
Job Demands 8 Time pressure (During)  .768
Bounded Rationality CEO
Factor analysis of the items related to the three constructs related to CEO bounded 
rationality (Task Challenges, Overall Job Demands, and CEO Competence), could not 
be performed because the correlation matrix was not positively definite. 
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This was likely caused by the application of pair-wise deletion of missing values. 
Because CEO competence was measured for the complete sample, but the other two 
constructs for only about half of the sample, this would lead to large differences in 
sample size between individual correlations. Therefore, we decided to conduct the 
factor analysis only for the constructs that were measured for half the sample (Task 
Challenges and Overall Job Demands). The scree plot showed that two factors underlie 
the data, and after rotation, these factors could be interpreted as Task Challenges 
and Overall Job Demands, respectively (see Table 3.4). There were no cross-loadings 
of items. The only deviation from the pre-determined structure was one item from 
the Task Challenges construct that did not load significantly on either factor. This 
item is related to the sufficiency of the organization’s resources.
Bounded Rationality Analyst
The factor analysis of the two constructs related to bounded rationality of the analyst 
(Analyst Regret and Analyst Competence) showed that three factors, rather than two, 
seem to underlie the data. After rotation, these three factors could be interpreted as 
‘Analyst Regret, ‘General Analyst Competence’ and ‘Analyst Competence in Foreseeing 
the Restatement’ (see Table 3.5).
To provide an additional validation of the scale measuring analyst regret, we 
correlated it to the items asking respondents for the reasons why they did not see the 
restatement coming. The construct had strong and significant positive correlations 
both with the item about being misled by management (r = 0.59, p < 0.01), and with 
the item about relying too much on other analysts (r = 0.44, p < 0.01). It had lower 
correlations with the items about an analyst’s own analysis not causing any suspicion 
(r = 0.39, p = 0.01), and about an analyst’s own analysis not being probing enough (r 
= 0.26, p = 0.08).
CEO Behaviour
Before the restatement crisis. The perceived behaviours of the CEO before the 
announcement of the restatement were also conceptualized as a higher-order 
construct. To test whether such treatment is justified, we first conducted an 
exploratory factor analysis. 
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table 3.5 Factor loadiNgs bouNded ratioNality aNalyst 
Item number Item name
Component
1 2 3
Regret 1 Regret (Beginning)   .896
Regret 2 Regret (End)   .627
Analyst Competence 1 Probing skills (Before)  .878  
Analyst Competence 2 Probing skills (During)  .863  
Analyst Competence 3 Knowledge (Before)  .862  
Analyst Competence 4 Knowledge (During)  .862  
Analyst Competence 5 Misled (Before)   -.904
Analyst Competence 6 Misled (During)   -.634
Analyst Competence 7 Analysis caused no suspicion (Before) .855   
Analyst Competence 8 Analysis caused no suspicion (During) .790   
Analyst Competence 9 Analysis not probing enough (Before)  -.746
Analyst Competence 10 Analysis not probing enough (During) .608   
Analyst Competence 11 Herding (Before) .865   
Analyst Competence 12 Herding (During) .804   
This analysis showed that three factors appeared to underlie the data. After rotation, 
these three factors could be interpreted as perceived Openness precedent, perceived 
Governance precedent, and perceived Integrity precedent (see Table 3.6). Again, some 
deviations were present. Particularly, some of the items of the Governance precedent 
construct loaded on the factor representing Integrity precedent. Overall however, the 
factor structure reasonably corresponds to our categorization of the items. A factor 
analysis on these three factors showed that one factor underlies them, on which all 
three factors loaded highly.
During the restatement crisis. The factor analysis for the items measuring the different 
types of reputational remediation behaviour suggested that four factors underlie the 
variables. After rotating these four factors, they could be interpreted as Openness, 
Governance, Integrity, Blame Taking, Blame Giving to Internal Gatekeepers, and 
Blame Giving to External Gatekeepers (see Table 3.7).There were some cross-loadings 
of individual items. Particularly, some items from the Openness and Integrity 
constructs loaded on the factor representing Governance. Overall, however, the 
factor structure corresponds reasonably with the way we originally assigned the 
items to the constructs. 
193
193Chapter 3 – Study 2: Analysts’ Perceptions of CEO Behaviour in Restatement Situations
* The items Integrity Before 5 through 9 load on a different factor than the other indicators of the Integrity construct. These two factors are 
negatively correlated with each other (r = -0.091). However, as can be seen in Table 3.6, the meaning of these items is opposite to that of the 
other items, with higher scores indicating lower integrity. 
table 3.6 Factor loadiNgs ceo behaviour beFore the restatemeNt
Item number Item name
Component
1 2 3
Integrity Before 1 Fair decisions .833   
Integrity Before 2 Trustworthy .850   
Integrity Before 3 Example .852   
Integrity Before 4 Tone at the top .844   
Integrity Before 5 Pressure on auditors  .930  
Integrity Before 6 Pressure on Audit Committee  .895  
Integrity Before 7 Pressure on analysts  .583  
Integrity Before 8 Complex language  .343*  
Integrity Before 9 Misleading  .569  
Openness Before 1 Information on materiality   .673
Openness Before 2 Discussion of manoeuvring space   .934
Openness Before 3 Discussion of accounting policy   .941
Governance Before 1 Managing fraud risk .715   
Governance Before 2 Managing fraud risk (Hindsight) .410   
Governance Before 3 Overall governance effectiveness .810   
Governance Before 4 Commitment to governance .735   
Next, we assessed whether the three factors related to Openness, Governance, and 
Integrity could in turn be represented by one second-order factor, and the factors 
related to blaming by another second-order factor. To do this we conducted a 
second factor analysis on the matrix of correlations between the factors obtained 
in the first analysis (Kim & Mueller, 1978). The scree plot obtained from this analysis 
showed that two factors appeared to underlie the data, with the factors representing 
Openness, Governance, and Integrity loading highly on the first factor, and the factors 
representing the different types of blaming behaviour loading highly on the second 
factor. There were no significant cross-loadings.
Conclusion on Construct Measurement Validation
Overall, the results of the measurement validation process show that the 
measurement scales that we used have satisfactory construct validity. Most of the 
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items loaded on the factors representing the constructs that they were intended to 
measure, rather than on factors representing closely related but distinct constructs.
table 3.7 Factor loadiNgs ceo behaviour duriNg the restatemeNt crisis
Item number Item name
Component
1 2 3 4 5 6
Openness During 1 Information on materiality      .830
Openness During 2 Discussion of manoeuvring space      .977
Openness During 3 Discussion of accounting policy      .971
Openness During 4 Adequacy of information (Beginning) .686      
Openness During 5 Adequacy of information (End) .668      
Governance During 1 Overall governance effectiveness .743      
Governance During 2 Commitment to governance .541      
Governance During 3
Initial governance effectiveness 
(Beginning)
 .373      
Governance During 4 Initial governance effectiveness (End) .607      
Integrity During 1 Fair decisions .515      
Integrity During 2 Trustworthy .401   -.434   
Integrity During 3 Example .402   -.407   
Integrity During 4 Tone at the top    -.406   
Integrity During 5 Pressure on auditors    .851   
Integrity During 6 Pressure on Audit Committee    .918   
Integrity During 7 Pressure on analysts    .581   
Integrity During 8 Complex language .419   .479*   
Integrity During 9 Misleading    .506   
Blame Taking 1 Blame Taking (Beginning)  -.942     
Blame Taking 2 Blame Taking (End)  -.896     
Blame Giving 1 Blaming CFO (Beginning)  .704   .456  
Blame Giving 2 Blaming lower managers (Beginning)     .878  
Blame Giving 3 Blaming auditors (Beginning)   .568    
Blame Giving 4 Blaming accounting rules (Beginning)   .910    
Blame Giving 5 Blaming CFO (Beginning)  .697   .444  
Blame Giving 6 Blaming lower managers (End)     .841  
Blame Giving 7 Blaming auditors (End)   .681    
Blame Giving 8 Blaming accounting rules (End)   .890    
*  The loadings of the items Integrity During 5 through 9 are opposite to the loadings of the other indicators of the Integrity construct. However, 
as can be seen in Table 3.7, the meaning of these items is also opposite to that of the other items, with higher scores indicating lower integrity.
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However, it should be noted that all these factor analyses were exploratory, because 
of the lack of established measures for most of the constructs, and because using 
confirmatory factor analysis was not feasible due to a restricted sample size. In 
order to provide some confirmation of these exploratory analyses, we examined the 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for each construct, as obtained from the Partial 
Least Squares structural equation modeling analysis. AVE provides an indication 
of the percentage of the variance in each of the items that is explained by the 
corresponding construct (Chin, 1998; Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The AVEs for each of 
the constructs that were included in the PLS model are shown in Table 3.8 Fornell 
and Larcker (1981) recommend that AVE should be at least 0.50 to conclude that 
the validity of the construct is sufficient. It can be seen that the AVE is above 0.50 
for most, but not all of our constructs. Particularly, for perceived CEO behaviour 
before and during the crisis, stakeholder latitude, and pressure during the crisis, only 
between 30 and 40% of the variance in the items is explained by the construct. This 
suggests that some of our measures will need to be validated in further research. 
Given that the estimated composite reliabilities were sufficient for all measures, and 
that AVE is relatively conservative (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), we think it is justified that 
our measures are sufficiently valid for our current purpose.
table 3.8 average variaNce extracted For coNstructs iNcluded iN the pls model
Construct AVE
EM Pressures 0.543
CEO Dominance 0.617
Latitude 0.378
Pressure Before Restatement 0.752
Pressure During Restatement Crisis 0.379
CEO Competence 0.524
Severity 0.853
CEO Behaviour Before Restatement 0.368
CEO Behaviour During Restatement Crisis 0.363
Blame taking 0.909
Blame giving 0.454
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3.5 Analysis of Survey Results
We tested our model through a Partial Least Squares (PLS) structural equation 
model. We used PLS, rather than maximum likelihood-based structural equation 
modelling (e.g. LISREL), because research has shown that such approaches often lead 
to identification problems when applied to samples smaller than 200 (Boomsma & 
Hoogland, 2001). In contrast, PLS requires less large samples for model identification 
(Chin, Marcolin, & Newsted, 2003). We separately tested the models for the influence 
of severity on the other constructs, for the antecedents of perceived Reputational 
Remediation Behaviour, and for the antecedents of Blame Giving. We used list-wise 
deletion of missing values at the construct level to test the relationships between the 
constructs. Research has shown that list-wise deletion is more accurate when data 
are not missing at random, i.e. when the reason why a value is missing is correlated 
with the true value of the variables under consideration (Kromrey & Hines, 1994). This 
holds for our study because the only missing values are the ‘don’t know’ answers, 
which likely are related to the true value of the variables we want to measure (for 
example, some people who answer ‘don’t know’ might in reality have an opinion, 
which might be more favourable than that of those who do give an answer). For the 
item level, i.e. the measurement model which links each item to one of the constructs, 
we used pair-wise deletion, as using list-wise deletion here would reduce the sample 
size too much. This is also the standard algorithm used in PLS (Tenenhaus, Vinzi, 
Chatelin, & Lauro, 2005).
To incorporate the higher-order constructs, we followed standard practice in PLS 
path modelling by estimating the higher-order factors as factors containing all the 
items of the lower-order factors (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). In the case of blame taking 
behaviour, both blame taking behaviour and blame giving behaviour had positive 
loadings on the higher-order factor. For this reason, this higher-order factor could not 
be interpreted as the degree to which the CEO assigned blame to himself as opposed 
to other gatekeepers. Therefore, we decided to treat blame taking and blame giving 
as separate factors in testing the PLS model. Following Tenenhaus et al. (2005), 
we computed the significance of the paths by importing the latent variable score 
estimated in PLS into SPSS and running ordinary least squares regressions.
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Because the questions about task challenges, job demands, and analyst disappointment 
were only posed to about half of the sample, using PLS structural equation modelling 
for these constructs yielded not enough statistical power. According to Chin et al. 
(2003), a good rule of thumb for PLS using reflective indicators is to have at least 10 
times as many observations as the largest number of paths leading to any of the 
constructs. In our models involving factors related to bounded rationality, we have 
at least six paths leading to the reputational remediation construct, and only about 
40 to 45 observations. Therefore, we tested our hypotheses related to bounded 
rationality (H2-4) using ordinary least squares regression and with the averaged 
items corresponding to each construct as the variables. To examine the effects of the 
‘bounding factors’ on blaming behaviour, we first aggregated perceived blame taking 
and perceived blame giving behaviour. Blame giving behaviour was reverse coded, 
implying that the resulting construct can be interpreted as the degree to which the 
CEO blamed himself, rather than one of the gatekeepers.
Because some analysts in our sample rated the same restatement case, this creates 
a multi-level structure in our data. To check whether it would be necessary to take 
this structure into account in our analyses, we calculated the intra-class correlation 
coefficients for those firms that were rated by more than one analyst.10 The coefficient 
was negative 0.049 for perceived CEO behaviour before the restatement and negative 
0.169 for perceived CEO behaviour after the restatement crisis. These correlations are 
sufficiently small to warrant not taking the multi-level nature into account in the 
analyses (cf. Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).
3.5.1	descriPtive	statistics
Tables 3.9-3.11 display means and standard deviations for each of our items in the 
two different time frames for which question was posed. These provide an indication 
of the degree to which changes occurred in analysts’ perceptions with hindsight 
compared to their perceptions without hindsight (Format I); and in their perceptions 
during the restatement crisis compared to their perceptions before the restatement 
(Format II); and in their perceptions at the end of the restatement crisis compared 
to their perceptions at the beginning of the crisis (Format III). Table 3.12 displays the 
correlations of the overall constructs as estimated through PLS.
10  These coefficients were calculated from ANOVAs using the firm as the independent variable and perceived CEO behaviour before the restate-
ment and during the restatement crisis as the dependent variables (cf. Shrout & Fleiss, 1979).
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In Table 3.9, it can be seen that the means for all ‘positive’ perceptions (gatekeeper 
competence and CEO pre-restatement behaviour), decrease when comparing 
perceptions with hindsight to perceptions without hindsight. In contrast, the means 
for all ‘negative’ perceptions (Earnings Management Pressures, CEO Dominance, 
Gatekeeper Latitude, and Task/Performance Challenges) increase. In addition, all 
standard deviations become larger when comparing perceptions with hindsight to 
those without hindsight. This pattern is consistent with the idea that (1) analysts 
generally do not see restatements coming (hence the decrease in the favourability 
of perceptions with hindsight); and, (2) restatements vary considerably in terms of 
their severity (hence the increase in the standard deviations of perceptions with 
hindsight).
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table 3.12 correlatioNs oF coNstructs (as estimated through partial least squares)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1. EM Pressures
2. CEO Dominance 0.60
3. Pressure 0.50 0.24
4. Latitude 0.33 0.34 0.03
5. CEO Competence -0.13 -0.22 0.14 -0.08
6. Behaviour Before -0.01 -0.31 0.22 -0.01 0.57
7. Behaviour After -0.23 -0.44 0.05 -0.13 0.68 0.56
8. Blame Taking 0.07 -0.08 0.23 0.01 0.16 0.18 0.11
9. Blame Giving 0.38 0.28 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.09 -0.08 0.34
In Table 3.10, we can see that the pressures for positive reputation management 
behaviour on the CEO basically increased in the restatement period when compared 
to the period before. This is not surprising, assuming that stakeholders demand a 
resolution for the crisis caused by the restatement. Perceptions of CEO competence 
and behaviour deteriorated when comparing the pre-restatement period to the 
restatement period. Likewise, analyst assessments of the CEO’s overall job demands 
increased. Surprisingly, analyst perceptions of their own competence increased in 
the restatement period when compared to the period before. Apparently analysts 
saw their skills and knowledge regarding accounting issues in the crisis situation as 
better than in the situation before the crisis. This could be an indication of a desire by 
analysts to obtain detailed knowledge as to the causes of the restatement. 
When comparing analyst perceptions at the beginning of the restatement 
crisis to their perceptions at the end of the crisis (Table 3.11), we do not see many 
substantial changes. The only exception is the perceived malicious intent involved 
in the restatement, which on average increased during the restatement crisis. This 
seems to be a reflection of the fact that fraud is often only clear after extensive 
investigations.
3.5.2	correlations	oF	Pressures	on	and	beHaviour	oF	ceos
The correlations between the constructs (as estimated through PLS) in Table 3.12, 
show that all hypothesized antecedents of perceived CEO behaviour, except latitude, 
have quite substantial correlations with at least one type of behaviour (either overall 
behaviour before the restatement, overall behaviour during the restatement crisis, 
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blame taking behaviour, or blame giving behaviour). Furthermore, there are no 
extreme correlations between the antecedents, so multico-linearity is unlikely to be 
a problem.
Influence of ‘pressures’  on perceived CEO behaviour before the restatement
Our results (Figure 3.6 and Table 3.13) show that there is a significant direct 
relationship between the degree of perceived pressure on the CEO to manage 
earnings and the degree to which the CEO is perceived as demonstrating positive 
reputation management behaviour prior to the restatement. However, contrary to 
our predictions (H1a), this relationship is positive, rather than negative. That is, the 
more the CEO is perceived as being under pressure to manage earnings, the more 
positive his pre-restatement behaviour is seen. On the other hand, in addition to 
this direct effect, the degree of perceived pressure on the CEO to manage earnings 
is also indirectly related to perceived reputation management behaviour, through 
its effect on the degree to which the CEO engaged in domineering behaviour. This 
indirect effect is negative. This suggests that, on the one hand, perceived earnings 
management pressures by themselves are perceived positively by analysts before 
a restatement has occurred, but on the other hand, these indirect pressures also 
negatively affect analyst perceptions because they lead to more aggressive CEO 
behaviour, which is perceived negatively by analysts. The CEO’s overall job demands 
do not have a significant effect on pre-restatement behaviour (contrary to H2a). The 
influence of task challenges is also opposite to what we expected (H3a) – the more 
demanding the task environment of the CEO appears, the more positive his pre-
restatement behaviour appears. These findings could be an indication that before 
the restatement occurred, the analysts did not see pressure on the CEO to manage 
earnings as something negative in itself.
The degree to which the CEO was perceived as domineering has a strong negative 
effect on the way the CEO’s behaviour was perceived (confirming H5a). The perceived 
latitude of gatekeepers does not have a positive effect on pre-restatement behaviour 
(contrary to H6a), while their perceived competence does (consistent with H6c). 
On the other hand, the analysts’ own perceived competence, both in general, and 
regarding the restatement (contrary to H7a), does not have a significant effect. The 
perceived pressures by gatekeepers for proper governance behaviour do have a 
significant positive effect (consistent with H8a), just like the perceived competence 
of the CEO (consistent with H9a). 
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table 3.13 aNtecedeNts oF reputatioN maNagemeNt behaviour beFore the restatemeNt 
Basic Model
With Task 
Challenges
With Job 
Demands
With Analyst 
Competence
With gatekeeper 
Competence
 B
Partial 
corr.
B
Partial 
corr.
B
Partial 
corr
B
Partial 
corr.
B
Partial 
corr.
Earnings 
Management 
Pressures
0.16† 0.19 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.12
Job Demands 
Before
-0.05 -0.12
Task challenges 0.19† 0.29
CEO Dominance -0.47** -0.48 -0.26* -0.46 -0.23* -0.41 -0.23* -0.38 -0.21** -0.37
Latitude 0.003 0.004 -0.08 -0.13 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.04 0.08
Analyst 
Competence 
(General)
0.14 0.23
Analyst 
Competence 
(Restatement)
-0.01 -0.02
Governance 
Pressures before 
restatement
0.17† 0.23 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.11 0.21
CEO 
Competence
0.53** 0.60 0.35** 0.50 0.36** 0.49 0.34** 0.47 0.21* 0.31
Gatekeeper 
Competence
0.26** 0.43
Influence of’ pressures’ on perceived CEO behaviour during the restatement crisis
The perceived pressure on the CEO to manage earnings does not have a significant 
direct effect on perceived behaviour during the restatement crisis (contrary to H1b), 
but it does have a strong positive influence on the perceived aggressive behaviour of 
the CEO, which in turn has a strong negative influence on perceived behaviour (see 
Appendix 3.3). Therefore, perceived pressure on the CEO to manage earnings has a 
strong negative indirect effect on perceived reputational remediation behaviour. We 
also see that the challenges posed upon the CEO by the task environment have a 
negative effect on perceived remedial behaviour after the restatement announcement 
(confirming H3b). The more challenging analysts believed the task environment of 
the CEO to be before the restatement, the less positive they were about the CEO’s 
remedial behaviour after the restatement announcement.
This negative effect contrasts with the positive effect of task challenges on the 
perceived reputation management behaviour of the CEO before the restatement 
was announced (see H3a). On the other hand, the overall perceived job demands of 
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the CEO do not have a significant relationship with remediation behaviour (contrary 
to H2b). In addition, the more disappointed analysts were by the restatement, the 
less positive they were about the reputational remediation behaviours after the 
restatement, confirming H4. 
As expected, the degree to which analysts perceived the CEO as behaving aggressively 
to manage earnings before the restatement (CEO Dominance) (H5b), has a negative 
relationship with analyst opinion on the CEO’s reputational remediation behaviour 
after the announcement of the restatement (see Appendix 3.3 and Table 3.16). 
table 3.14 aNtecedeNts oF reputatioN maNagemeNt behaviour duriNg the restatemeNt crisis
Basic Model
With Task 
Challenges
With Job 
Demands
With Analyst 
Regret/
Competence
With gatekeeper 
Competence
B
Partial 
corr.
B
Partial 
corr.
B
Partial 
corr.
B
Partial 
corr.
B
Partial 
corr.
(Constant) N/A 1.99† 1.67 1.59 1.86
Earnings 
Management 
Pressures
-0.05 -0.06 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
Job Demands 0.08 0.18
Task challenges -0.17† -0.23
Analyst Regret -0.11† -0.31
CEO 
Dominance
-0.32** -0.33 -0.16 -0.24 -0.19† -0.30 -# -0.22 -0.34
Latitude -0.05 -0.08 0.04 0.061 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
Analyst 
Competence 
(General) ##
-0.23* -0.33
Governance 
Pressure before 
restatement
-0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.048 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02
Governance/
openness 
pressure during 
restatement
-0.004 -0.01 -0.04 -0.049 -0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05
CEO 
Competence
0.43** 0.47 0.39** 0.45 0.41** 0.46 0.36** 0.43 0.38** 0.42
Behaviour 
before 
restatement
0.23† 0.24 0.30* 0.26 0.23* 0.22 0.43* 0.41 0.15 0.12
Gatekeeper 
Competence
0.10 0.12
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Contrary to our expectations, the perceived latitude of gatekeepers for earnings 
management, the perceived competence of these gatekeepers, and the perceived 
pressures that these gatekeepers put on the CEO for proper reputation management 
behaviour (H6b, H6d, and H8b), do not have a positive effect on perceived reputational 
remediation behaviour. The degree to which the analysts perceived themselves as 
competent is negatively related to their perception of the CEO’s remedial behaviour, 
contrary to our expectation (H7b). The perceived competence of the CEO in accounting 
matters has a positive influence on perceived remedial behaviour (in accordance 
with H9b), and the degree to which the CEO is perceived as demonstrating adequate 
reputation management behaviour before the restatement has a positive effect 
(confirming H10). 
The degree to which the CEO was perceived as aggressive does not have a significant 
impact on the degree to which analysts perceived the CEO as blaming himself instead 
of others (contrary to H5b). Positive behaviour before the restatement is positively 
related to blame taking behaviour, but also to blame giving behaviour (partially 
confirming H10). Pressures on the CEO for proper governance before the restatement 
has a negative effect on blame giving behaviour (consistent with H8b).
table 3.15 aNtecedeNts oF perceived blame takiNg aNd blame-giviNg behaviour duriNg the restatemeNt crisis
Blame taking Blame giving
B Partial correlation B Partial correlation
Earnings Management Pressures 0.168 0.134 0.345* 0.280
CEO Dominance -0.029 -0.021 0.140 0.114
Governance Pressure before restatement -0.113 -0.106 -0.175† -0.175
Behaviour before restatement 0.263* 0.220 0.221† 0.198
# When CEO Dominance was included in the model, the effect of Analyst Regret was no longer significant (b = -0.079, p = 0.221). A likely reason 
is that this variable is relatively highly correlated with CEO Dominance (r = 0.45). Given our relatively small sample and modest effect sizes, 
multicollinearity problems could be expected with correlations of this magnitude (Mason & Perreault, 1991). In addition, the effect of CEO 
Dominance was insignificant (b = -0.146, p = 0.177). Therefore, we omitted CEO Dominance in this model.
##  When we also included Analyst Competence (Restatement), the coefficient for Analyst Regret became non-significant. This seemed to be 
because of the high correlation between Analyst Competence (Restatement) and Analyst Regret (-0.61). Given our relatively small sample size 
and modest effect sizes in this analysis, a correlation of this magnitude is likely to lead to multico-linearity problems (Mason & Perreault, 1991). 
Because the coefficient for Analyst Competence (Restatement) was also insignificant (b = 0.112, p = 0.337), we think it is safe to exclude it from 
the model.
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Influence of restatement severity
In addition to testing our hypotheses, we also tested to what degree the perceived 
severity of the restatement (in terms of both distortion and malicious intent), affects 
the constructs in our model. We did this through a second PLS structural equation 
model. The results of this model (Figure 3.6) show that the perceived severity of the 
restatement is significantly related to all variables in our model. A higher perceived 
severity is related to higher perceived latitude, a higher perceived pressure to manage 
earnings, and a lower perceived CEO competence.  
table 3.16 iNFlueNce oF ‘bouNdiNg Factors’ oN perceived blamiNg behaviour
Task Challenges Job Demands
Analyst Disappointment/
Competence
B
Partial 
correlation
B
Partial 
correlation
B
Partial 
correlation
(Constant) 5.142** 6.342** 3.717**
Earnings Management Pressures -0.369* -0.372 -0.277† -0.309 -0.094 -0.0813
Task Challenges 0.300* 0.309
Job Demands -0.269* -0.395
Analyst Regret -0.303** -0.483
CEO Dominance -0.190 -0.213 -0.174 -0.206 0.157 0.193
Analyst Competence (General) -0.102 -0.127
Analyst Competence (Restatement) 0.189 0.237
Governance Pressure before 
restatement
0.120 0.144 0.110 0.138
Behaviour before restatement -0.287 -0.203 -0.203 -0.156
Similarly, it is related to a less favourable perception of reputation management 
behaviour, both before and after the restatement. The positive relationship with 
perceived behaviour before the restatement might suggest that hindsight bias 
is at work here. However, an alternative explanation can be that for more severe 
restatements, analysts already lowered their assessments of the company before 
the restatement. Some support for this explanation is provided by the fact that 
the items measuring severity are all positively correlated with the analysts’ ratings 
three months before the restatement, indicating that analysts who described the 
restatement as more severe tended to give lower ratings before the restatement 
was announced. On the other hand, none of these correlations were significant, 
with only one approaching significance using a one-tailed alpha of 10 per cent (r 
= 0.26, p =0.23). Finally, a higher perceived severity is related to a higher perceived 
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pressure for appropriate reputation management behaviour after the restatement 
announcement, but to a lower perceived pressure for appropriate behaviour 
before the restatement announcement. This seems logical, as too-low pressure for 
appropriate governance would be more likely to lead to a more severe restatement, 
whereas a more severe restatement would lead to more pressure for appropriate 
behaviour to remedy the restatement.
Figure 3.6 partial least squares model oF the iNFlueNce oF severity
0.136
0.176
0.019
0.043
0.081
0.037
0.103
0.063
0.184
0.284
-0.139
0.368
0.428
-0.321
0.192
-0.208
-0.419
0.084
0.251
0.934
1.321
0.007
Distortion
EM Pressure
Remedial Behaviour After
Pressure Before
Remedial Behaviour Before
Pressure After
Latitude
CEO Competence
Blame giving
Dominance
Blame taking
0.000
Intent Severity
To determine how the constructs in our model differ across the categories in which 
we classified each restatement according to its severity, we calculated the means 
of all constructs for each of the categories, which are shown in Table 3.17. Here we 
also include the means for the constructs related to bounded rationality of the CEO 
and the analysts (which were omitted from the PLS model). In this table we can see 
that most of the ‘negative’ antecedents (like latitude and earnings management 
pressures) move up as the restatement is in a more ‘serious’ quadrant, while 
the ‘positive antecedents’ (like CEO competence), and the perceived reputation 
management behaviours move down.
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table 3.17 meaNs oF coNstructs sorted per severity category 
In
te
nt
H
ig
h
‘Purple Delusion’ ‘Black Magic’
Latitude 3.93 Latitude 3.78
Governance Pressure before restatement 4.26 Governance Pressure before restatement 4.03
Governance/openness Pressure during 
restatement
4.75
Governance/openness Pressure during 
restatement
4.89
Earnings Management Pressure 4.48 Earnings Management Pressure 4.46
CEO Competence 4.17 CEO Competence 3.79
Analyst Disappointment 1.67 Analyst Disappointment 3.38
Analyst Competence General 3.75 Analyst Competence General 4.21
Analyst Competence Restatement 4.96 Analyst Competence Restatement 3.26
Task Challenges 3.94 Task Challenges 4.02
Job Demands 2.58 Job Demands 3.18
Reputation Management Behaviour (Before) 3.72
Reputation Management Behaviour 
(Before)
3.53
Reputational Remediation Behaviour 3.65 Reputational Remediation Behaviour 3.33
Blame Taking 3.63 Blame Taking 3.18
Lo
w
‘White Lies’ ‘grey Accounting Hocus Pocus’
Latitude 3.63 Latitude 3.74
Governance Pressure before restatement 4.07 Governance Pressure before restatement 3.33
Governance/openness Pressure during 
restatement
4.33
Governance/openness Pressure during 
restatement
4.58
Earnings Management Pressure 3.71 Earnings Management Pressure 3.45
CEO Competence 4.10 CEO Competence 4.03
Analyst Disappointment 1.65 Analyst Disappointment 1.75
Analyst Competence General 4.38 Analyst Competence General 3.83
Analyst Competence Restatement 4.42 Analyst Competence Restatement 3.86
Task Challenges 3.53 Task Challenges 3.30
Job Demands 2.36 Job Demands 3.42
Reputation Management Behaviour (Before) 3.81
Reputation Management Behaviour 
(Before)
3.59
Reputational Remediation Behaviour 3.82 Reputational Remediation Behaviour 3.77
Blame Taking 3.64 Blame Taking 3.15
Distortion
Low High
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3.6 Conclusions and Discussion
Our results provide detailed insights into the factors that influence analysts’ 
evaluations of CEO behaviour, of a company they follow, both before and during 
a restatement crisis occurs. An overview of our findings is provided in Table 3.18. 
First, the results show that earnings management pressures, job demands, and 
task challenges - factors which we hypothesized would negatively influence 
analyst judgments of CEO behaviour - did not significantly negatively affect such 
judgments before a restatement occurred. On the contrary, perceived pressures to 
manage earnings and perceived task challenges actually had a positive effect on 
perceived CEO behaviour before the restatement crisis. After a restatement was 
announced, perceived task challenges did negatively affect perceived behaviour, 
and perceived job demands negatively affected the degree to which the CEO was 
seen as taking the blame for the restatement. In addition, after the restatement 
was announced, the degree to which analysts regretted the recommendations they 
made before the restatement negatively influenced their perception of the CEO’s 
behaviour during the restatement crisis.
Overall, our findings show that perceived pressures on the CEO to manage earnings, 
as well as the degree of task challenges posed to him, and contrary to our hypotheses, 
seem not to be regarded as negative by analysts before a restatement. However, once 
the restatement crisis hits, analysts do regard these pressures as having a negative 
effect on CEO behaviour. This pattern is illustrated in Figures 3.7 and 3.8, which show 
the effects of earnings management pressures and task challenges on the different 
types of CEO behaviour. Furthermore, when analysts are strongly disappointed by 
the restatement and regret their own previous recommendations, their perceptions 
of the CEO’s attempts to remedy a company’s situation after a restatement is 
announced suffers, even when other factors are kept constant, such as the degree of 
pressure on the CEO. Both these effects suggest some influence of a certain degree 
of irrationality (or bias) on the part of the analysts. Such an ‘irrational’ situation is 
more likely when the analysts perceive more distortion and malicious intent to be 
present in the restatement crisis. This is because analyst disappointment, perceived 
earnings management pressures and perceived task challenges all increase when 
the restatement moves to the upper right-hand quadrant of the intent/distortion 
matrix.
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table 3.18 overview oF hypotheses – results summary
hypothesis relatioNship predicted observed hypothesis coNFirmed?
Behaviour
Blame 
taking
Behaviour
Blame 
taking
1a EM Pressures > Behaviour 
Before
– + n/a Opposite n/a
1b EM Pressures > Behaviour 
During
– n.s.* + No Opposite
2a Job Demands > Behaviour 
Before
– n.s. n/a No n/a
2b Job Demands > Behaviour 
During
– n.s. – No Yes
3a Task Challenges > Behaviour 
Before
– + n/a Opposite n/a
3b Task Challenges > Behaviour 
During
– – + Yes Opposite
4 Analyst Regret > Behaviour 
During
– – – Yes Yes
5a CEO Dominance > Behaviour 
Before
– – n/a Yes n/a
5b CEO Dominance > Behaviour 
During
– – n.s. Yes No
6a Gatekeeper Latitude > 
Behaviour Before
– n.s. n/a No n/a
6b Gatekeeper Latitude > 
Behaviour During
– n.s. n/a No n/a
6c Gatekeeper Competence > 
Behaviour Before
+ + n/a Yes n/a
6d Gatekeeper Competence > 
Behaviour During
+ n.s. n/a No n/a
7a Analyst Competence  > 
Behaviour Before
– n.s. n/a No n/a
7b Analyst Competence  > 
Behaviour During
+ – n.s. Opposite No
8a
Pressure for Positive Behaviour 
Before > Behaviour Before
+ + n/a Yes n/a
8b
Pressure for Positive Behaviour 
Before > Behaviour During
+ – n.s. Opposite No
8c
Pressure for Positive Behaviour 
During > Behaviour During
+ – n/a Opposite n/a
9a CEO Competence > Behaviour 
Before
+ + n/a Yes n/a
9b CEO Competence > Behaviour 
During
+ + n/a Yes n/a
10 Behaviour Before > Behaviour 
During
+ + n.s. Yes No
*  However, there was a strong indirect effect of EM Pressure on Behaviour During, due to the influence of on EM Pressure on CE Dominance.
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Figure 3.7 iNFlueNce oF earNiNgs maNagemeNt pressures For diFFereNt ceo behaviours
Figure 3.8 iNFlueNce oF task challeNges For diFFereNt ceo behaviours
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Regarding the other factors that we proposed would affect perceived CEO behaviour, 
we see that the perceived dominance of the CEO has a negative effect on CEO 
behaviour before the restatement crisis, and that gatekeeper competence, CEO 
competence, and pressure for positive behaviour have a positive effect on perceived 
CEO behaviour before the restatement. Perceived dominance also has a significant 
negative impact on perceived behaviour during the restatement crisis, while CEO 
competence and perceived behaviour before the restatement have a significant 
positive impact on perceived behaviour during the restatement crisis.
In sum, most of the other factors that we identified in our hypotheses development 
section as likely influencing the perceived behaviour of the CEO did indeed have such 
an influence, with a few exceptions. First, there was no significant influence of the 
latitude given by gatekeepers regarding earnings management on the perceived 
behaviour of the CEO, either before or during the restatement crisis. One explanation 
might lie in our measure for this construct, which seemed to contain items with 
divergent meanings. However, after deleting the problematic items, the effects of the 
construct were still not significant. Perhaps analysts do not see the degree to which 
gatekeepers passively leave room for earnings management as relevant, looking only 
at active encouragement or discouragement.
Second, the influence of the analysts’ own perceived competence on perceived CEO 
behaviour during the restatement crisis was negative, rather than positive. We had 
expected that analysts who are more competent would be less susceptible to ‘panic’ 
during a restatement crisis and would therefore perceive the CEO’s behaviour more 
favourably than less-competent analysts. However, this reasoning assumes that 
analysts who perceive themselves as more competent are, in fact, more competent. 
If this assumption is not justified (which seems conceivable), this could provide an 
explanation for our finding. For example, it could be that less-competent analysts 
would actually think of themselves as more competent than the analysts who 
actually are more competent (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu & Bazerman, 2006). In that case, 
one could expect these analysts to be more susceptible to panic and provide lower 
evaluations of the CEO’s behaviour.
Third, effects of perceived pressures by stakeholders for positive CEO behaviour 
(both before and during the restatement crisis) on the CEO’s perceived behaviour 
215
215Chapter 3 – Study 2: Analysts’ Perceptions of CEO Behaviour in Restatement Situations
during the crisis were not significant, though these perceived pressures did have a 
significant positive effect on the CEO’s perceived behaviour before the restatement. 
One reason for this lack of significance may in fact be that our questions about the 
CEO’s behaviour during the restatement period mainly dealt with the CEO who was 
in charge when the restatement was announced, while some of the questions in the 
Pressures construct dealt with pressure to remove the CEO. It seems natural that, 
when pressures to remove the CEO are higher, the perceptions of the behaviour of 
the CEO in charge at the time of the restatement would be more negative. However, 
when we removed these items from the scale, the results for Pressures remained 
non-significant. It might be that respondents also interpreted the other questions 
regarding this construct in a negative light. For example, the statement, ‘I believed 
that the degree of pressure on the CEO to disclose more detailed information 
regarding the restatement was as follows…,’ might be interpreted as meaning that 
the CEO did not do enough to inform analysts about the restatement, and hence was 
put under pressure to do more.
As is clear from the discussion above, this study has some limitations (see also Chapter 
5). First, our method does not allow us to distinguish perceptions from objective 
facts. In future research this could be solved to some degree by using objective 
indicators of, for example, analyst expertise to validate the perceptions reported in 
the questionnaire. Second, several of our measures involved asking analysts about 
their perceptions of past events without using hindsight. However, hindsight bias 
might be difficult, if not impossible, for respondents to completely eliminate from 
their answers. As noted above, we have some indication that hindsight bias might 
not be that much of a problem from the correlation between the degree to which 
analysts reported in the questionnaire that they felt – before the restatement – 
that they were misled by management, and the actual ratings they issued before 
the restatement. Nevertheless, the size of this correlation (0.40) was not such that 
it could remove any doubts about hindsight bias, and it only provides information 
on this particular question. A third limitation is that the statistical relationships 
between the different perceptions that we observed could be partially due to the 
fact that these perceptions were measured in the same questionnaire. This might 
have led respondents to fill out the questions based on an implicit theory about 
why these different perceptions should be related, or based on a general positive or 
negative feeling about the CEO or the company. Such artificial relationships due to 
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measurement by the same instrument are known as common method bias (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003). One way to deal with common method bias is to 
validate the model through a method which is less susceptible to this type of bias, 
e.g. an archival study or field interviews (Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven, 2006). 
For this reason, we decided to conduct a number of in-depth interviews with analysts 
to see if these would corroborate our findings in the current study. These interviews 
are described in detail in the next chapter on Study 3. 
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Chapter 4
Study 3: Interviews with Analysts
Financial Analysts’ Assessments of CEO Pressures and Qualities: 
Endogenous Factors, Exogenous Pressures, and Countervailing 
Powers – a Qualitative Study Corroborating Findings of Study 
1 and 2.
4.1 Introduction and Sub-Research Question
Where Study 2 focused on analysts’ perceptions surrounding 
CEO pressures to manage earnings before a restatement, and 
their reputation remedial actions thereafter, we will now look 
at analysts’ perceptions in more depth through qualitative 
interviewing. We are interested in both validating the results 
from the analyst survey in Study 2, as well as deepening our 
understanding of how analyst perceptions and biases affect 
their judgment of CEO behaviour in restatement situations.
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In-depth interviews with prior respondents to the survey and other analysts who 
followed companies in our restatement sample are designed to solicit detailed 
information about analysts’ perceptions to complement and enrich the results from 
the analysts’ survey. The results and conclusions from these interviews should be 
considered as an extension and corroboration of the findings of our previous studies, 
and should not be considered as a fully independent third study, standing on its 
own. The results are presented as a separate Chapter, mainly for presentation and 
formatting purposes.
We aim to answer the following research questions:
1. Do analysts assess CEO endogenous factors (Integrity, Dominance, 
Confidence etc.) in restatement situations and does it impact their 
assessment of the role of the CEO before and after the restatement?
2. Do analysts recognize and assess exogenous factors (Earnings Management 
Pressures and Executive Job Demands) in restatement situations, and 
do these factors impact analysts judgment and decision making of CEO 
behaviour both before and after the restatement?
3. Do analysts consider which constituents failed in their gatekeeper role?
4. Do the interviews corroborate or contradict findings of Study 2 (other than 
the above)?
The endogenous factors we aim to discuss are typical characteristics of CEOs which 
we expect to be assessed by analysts in their analysis of companies’ value drivers, 
regardless of whether a restatement situation exists. Research shows that analysts 
tend to focus on arithmetical data which helps them to predict and assess a company’s 
short-term financial performance – the next quarterly results. Our interest lies in 
discovering whether these more intangible factors influence analyst assessments of 
CEO’s roles prior and after restatements. In fact, we want to answer the question 
whether typical CEO characteristics and behaviours are valued by analysts positively or 
negatively, and whether these characteristics prejudice analysts in their assessments 
of CEO behaviour in restatements.
Similarly, we test for exogenous factors and whether analysts consider these in 
their assessment of CEO behaviour. These factors are more related to the executive 
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functioning of a CEO. We will consider earnings management pressures and executive 
job demands which we studied and modelled quantitatively in Study 2. 
Next, we were interested in other corporate players and their roles in restatement 
situations as perceived by analysts. We interviewed analysts who acted as 
countervailing power to the CEO and/or failed in their gatekeeper role. In addition, 
we queried analysts on whether the company and the CEO took appropriate and 
timely reputation remediation actions, including governance measures, internal 
control improvements, and compliance actions. Analysts were also questioned as to 
whom they believe should be blamed for the restatement. 
After content analysis of the interview transcripts, we paired the main findings to the 
quantitative study in an attempt to see whether they corroborated or contradicted 
those findings. 
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4.2 Theoretical Framework
In Study 2, we assessed ‘analyst’ perceptions regarding CEO pressures and behaviours 
and related factors in restatement situations. We assessed a range of pressures on 
pre-restatement behaviour of CEOs, including earnings management pressures, 
governance pressures, and perceived task challenges. Further, we looked at analysts’ 
perceptions of CEO behaviour (dominance), and the latitude of gatekeepers. We 
hypothesized that these pressures would have an impact on the perceived reputation 
management behaviour of the CEO before the restatement. All were hypothesized to 
have a negative effect other than the pressures for proper governance, which was 
expected to have a positive effect on perceived reputation management behaviour. 
These pressures were also thought to influence the perceived reputational 
remediation behaviour of the CEO during the restatement resolution period.
Study 2 findings show that perceived pressures on the CEO to manage earnings, as 
well as the degree of task challenges posed to him, resulted in positive CEO behaviour 
perceptions by analysts before the restatement, while such pressures were regarded 
as negative after a restatement was announced. This significant – and surprising – 
finding will be put to the test in the in-depth analyst interviews.
A primary purpose of the structured interviews is to corroborate the quantitative 
findings of Study 2 with respect to earnings management pressures and executive 
job demands. In addition, we will try to obtain a preliminary explanation as to what 
causes analysts to flip-flop their views of these two important CEO restatement 
drivers. Academic literature on CEO characteristics suggests some interesting 
links between CEO characteristics, such as over-confidence, integrity, dominance 
and charisma, and the likelihood of CEOs committing earnings management and 
reporting fraud. Therefore, we interviewed analysts on perceived endogenous CEO 
characteristics to obtain information that may explain the judgment shift on CEO 
behaviour as noted above.
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We split the factors for this in-depth qualitative study into endogenous and exogenous 
factors.  As endogenous factors, we take the following eight CEO characteristics:
• Integrity;
• Openness;
• Charisma;
• Ambition;
• Dominance;
• Social responsibility;
• Industry knowledge;
• Financial accounting and reporting skills; and,
• Confidence level.
We believe that analysts rate these (and other) CEO attributes in their work either 
directly or indirectly as part of their evaluation, and that their perceptions of these 
characteristics will change during a restatement situation. 
The exogenous characteristics we make subject of the interviews and test are:
• Pressure to exceed financial expectations; 
• A highly demanding strategy aimed at increasing market share;
• External developments implying the necessity to improve corporate 
reputation;
• Lack of resources; and,
• Negative developments in the industry.
In addition to gathering analyst perceptions surrounding these endogenous and 
exogenous factors, we will also explore gatekeepers and their roles in restatement 
situations. Next, we will test the general analyst perceptions of the CEO's role as a 
control variable to the other factors.
We will be looking for consensus on these issues across all the analysts interviewed, 
while isolating deviations. The interviews are designed to uncover other related issues 
that may be of interest and were not on our radar screen during the analysts' survey 
design. Because we have not discussed the concept of CEO confidence in detail in 
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the previous chapters, we will also provide an overview of available literature on the 
topic.
In a recent Administrative Science Quarterly article, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2006) 
provide more background on the characteristics of narcissistic CEOs and the 
resulting implications on firm financial strategy. Similarly, a Strategic Management 
Journal article by Hayward et al., (2004), places CEO celebrity in the context of media 
interaction and adulation, exploring the interaction of top executives with journalists 
– an approach that can also be taken with respect to interaction between analysts 
and charismatic CEOs. Another study strongly considers CEO celebrity in connection 
with analysts’ ratings and/or assessment (Fanelli & Misangyi, 2006), raising the 
question of whether such interaction between analysts and CEOs can have the effect 
of blinding analysts to a company’s bottom-line problems. Fanelli and Misangyi ask 
whether analysts lack the ability to draw the parallels between over-confidence 
and over-optimism with possibly aggressive accounting practices. The researchers 
conclude: 
As the results of the study show, analysts who attend to the charismatic 
language of the CEO to craft their recommendations do not derive from 
it an increased earnings forecast accuracy. Thus, paying attention to CEO 
charisma might be a less than desirable strategy for analysts. For investors, 
a charismatic CEO might not necessarily correspond to a ‘proven talent’ 
(Fanelli et al. 2004: 6).
Similarly, Davis, Piger and Segor (2008), find that optimistic or pessimistic words 
in earnings press releases are positively or negatively, respectively, associated with 
future firm performance. In their view, this suggests that press releases contain 
credible information about future firm performance. Evidently, this reasoning falls 
apart when a restatement hits, and analysts are disappointed that they were misled 
by management. In another study, Sedor (2002), finds  that when information to 
analysts is framed or structured in a manner which creates a plausible future scenario, 
analysts tend to issue more optimistic earnings forecasts, compared to when the 
same information is just listed plainly. These findings were also reported earlier by 
Barton and Mercer (2005) – in an experiment with analysts, they established that a 
plausible explanation of poor financial performance was treated more favourably by 
analysts, compared to an explanation based on incoherent external factors. Hong 
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and Kubik (2003) find that job separation for analysts covering stocks underwritten 
by their firm depends less on forecast accuracy, and more on optimism expressed in 
their earnings estimates and recommendations. 
Taking a step back to look at the bigger picture, DeBondt and Thaler (1994) have 
noted that, ‘Perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment and 
decision making is that people are overconfident.’ In particular, for CEOs who have 
been able to fight themselves to the top of the corporate ladder and deal with high 
job demands as a matter of course, it might be a natural result that on average, 
they are more overconfident and believe strongly that they are in control (Moore & 
Healy, 2008). Accordingly, this concentration of control in the hands of a CEO leads to 
humble submission and respect by gatekeepers, which in turn only serves to further 
bolster CEO overconfidence (Paredes 2005). The higher the executive job demands, 
the greater this respect – and the less countervailing power that exists.
In a working paper titled ‘Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to 
Fraud,’ Schrand and Zechman (2008) find that companies with higher executive 
job demands attract and/or employ more overconfident managers. They write, ‘The 
sample demonstrates industry clustering in risky, dynamic, high-growth industries 
that face significant idiosyncratic risk. Such industries are attractive to overconfident 
executives according to locus of control theories.’ From this literature, it becomes 
further evident that CEO (over)confidence can be an important red flag for analysts 
in their assessment of whether firms, and/or their CEOs, will engage in financial 
reporting fraud. It is the quantifying of such overconfidence that remains the key.
Langevoort (2004: 286), in ‘Resetting the Corporate Thermostat,’ recalls a directorial 
observation from the 2003 documentary about the downfall of Enron, The Smartest 
Guys in the Room:
McLean and Elkind’s observation about Enron’s corporate culture hints 
that there was an intense psychological dynamic at work in which ego, 
hubris, narcissism, rationalization and self-deception were strong forces 
at both the individual and organizational levels. While that may just be 
journalistic imagination, an important bit of supporting evidence is the 
palpable weakness of efforts within Enron to hide the machinations from 
scrutiny. In fact, most all the general features of what are now assumed 
to be manipulations were left in plain view – only the details and precise 
strategies were obscured.
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This possibly hints at the concept of ‘bounded awareness,’ which has been discussed 
earlier in Chapter 3. The over-confidence of celebrity CEOs appears to have a blinding 
effect on gatekeepers, including analysts. Paredes (2005: 711) states that: 
CEO overconfidence exacerbates the expectations game and the distortions 
and inefficiencies it can lead to. Overconfident CEOs have unrealistic 
expectations for the business, which in turn become the standard by which 
the market judges the company’s performance. Management, then, is under 
even greater pressure to meet the overly optimistic expectations it shapes.
Paredes argues that CEO overconfidence is a result of common corporate governance 
practices, and of the power the CEO is bound to extract from those structures. 
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4.3 Methods
The 23 in-depth interviews were held by telephone using a pre-designed questionnaire 
and script. On average, they took 17 minutes to conduct. Output was transcribed and 
results collated in a spreadsheet for content analysis. Those analysts that agreed to 
participate offered useful insights, and were interested in the project itself.
4.3.1	analysts’	samPling
We aimed to complete 20 analyst interviews for this part of the study with a 50/50 
split between European and North American respondents. Initially, e-mails were sent 
to the 61 analysts in Europe and North America who had completed the online survey, 
asking them whether they would be willing to be interviewed in more depth. Five 
days after sending this e-mail 11 refusals and 12 bounced e-mails were received. The 
remaining 48 analysts were contacted by telephone to attempt to set up or conduct 
interviews. This process resulted in only five completed interviews. Many phone 
numbers were wrong, or analysts were not available. Therefore, we decided to widen 
the target population to include 204 analysts in Europe and 601 in the United States 
who had not completed the online survey. An e-mail shot was sent to these analysts. 
After filtering out bounced e-mails, calls were initiated to secure at least 10 European 
and 10 American interviews. Calls were made at strategic times, such as during lunch 
hours or right after market closure. This process resulted in 23 completed interviews. 
It should be noted that approximately 50 per cent of the American and 35 per cent 
of the European secondary contact data was deemed obsolete due to bounced 
e-mails and telephone calls uncovered further obsolete details. Due to the emerging 
credit crunch and ensuing financial crisis, during the research period there had 
been significant analyst layoffs. This no doubt influenced the difficulty in securing 
interviewees. A total of 94 phone calls were made to potential American analysts, 
and 65 to Europeans, in order to reach the target sample size. In some cases, the 
analyst requested to set up a time for a call-back to conduct the survey. In others, the 
questions were requested by e-mail in advance of a conversation.
The decision to include analysts who did not complete the online survey will allow for 
a mixed representative data set. We will be able to directly compare results with the 
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online survey as well as work from a wider respondent base for the in-depth results. 
The table below shows the breakdown of the 23 respondents by the company they 
follow. Bolded results in the table denote analysts who completed the online survey 
(9). 
table 4.1 overview oF iNterview restatemeNt compaNies
compaNy restatemeNt time Frame regioN couNtry
Friends Provident Nov-07 Europe UK
Tomkins May-06 Europe UK
Reuters Feb-06 Europe UK
Siemens Q2 2007 Europe UK
Mediaset Jan-07 Europe UK
Altran 2003-4 Fiscal Year Europe France
Ahold Feb-03 Europe UK
Delhaize Apr-07 Europe France
CIBA Chemicals Q1/Q2 2004 Europe germany
Reuters Feb-06 Europe UK
Fairfax Aug-06 North America USA
Patterson UTI Dec-05 north America USA
Patterson UTI Dec-05 north America USA
CIE Entertainment Q1 2007 North America Mexico
Key Energy Q1 2004 north America USA
BP Jun-06 north America USA
BearingPoint Jan-06 north America USA
Cablevision Systems Corp Apr-06 North America USA
Coherent Incorporated Apr-05 North America USA
Cadence Design Systems Nov-08 North America USA
First Data Corp Sep-06 North America USA
Flowserve Feb-06 north America USA
Nortel Nov-07 North America USA
In three cases, the analyst claimed not to have followed the company we had on file 
for them based on the database sourcing (see Chapter 3). In these cases, the analysts 
were able to recall another restatement case for a company they followed and we 
conducted the interview on that case.
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4.3.2	Procedures	and	interview	Protocol
Although it was difficult to secure participation amongst the analysts targeted, once 
in the process of being interviewed, all were very helpful and open. There was a clear 
interest in the topic and a desire to elaborate on their responses. The respondents 
took part with the understanding that their response would not be attributable to 
them, and that this was a part of academic research. In some cases, they expressed 
an interest in the final results of the research project. For those participants we will 
send a summary of the results. All respondents were sent a thank-you note following 
their interview. 
Also of note is that for every successful interview, the paper’s author made a donation 
to a micro-credit fund (similar to an enticement used to complete the survey in Study 
2), which helped to secure analysts’ willingness to participate. We reserved the explicit 
mention of this on the phone to those cases requiring a slight ‘nudge’ to participate. 
The main reason for not participating was lack of time. Many e-mails were received 
citing the market instability, and ensuing lack of time as a reason to not participate 
in the interview. It took continual phone calls over two weeks to secure the desired 
response set.
Based on the theoretical framework described above, an interview guide was 
designed to solicit the analyst perceptions. This was designed to function as a script 
from which the interviewer could veer slightly to keep up a lively conversation. On the 
whole, all the respondents were happy to answer all the questions. Two ‘ice breaker,’ 
or introductory questions, were asked referring to the analyst’s views about the main 
cause of the restatement and the general importance of the CEO in trying to exceed 
expectations. This last question would lead to discussion of one of the exogenous 
restatement factors which we hoped to uncover.
To further map analyst perceptions regarding the CEO’s role, we asked them how 
they evaluated this role both before and after the restatement. Most importantly in 
this regard, we devised a list of CEO characteristics that we thought might impact the 
analyst evaluations of the CEO’s role both before and after the restatement, namely 
(as mentioned previously) integrity, openness, charisma, ambition, dominance, social 
responsibility, industry knowledge, financial accounting and reporting skills and 
confidence level.
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Also as previously noted, in terms of the exogenous factors, we tested analyst 
perceptions regarding the following pressures and whether they impacted the CEO 
before the restatement:
• Pressure to exceed financial expectations
• A highly demanding strategy aimed at increasing market share
• External developments implying the necessity to improve 
corporate reputation
• Lack of resources
• Negative developments in the industry
Further questions were set to gain deeper insight into these areas as well as to assess 
the influence of 'countervailing powers,' such as gatekeepers and their failure. In 
particular, we are interested in how analysts perceive the role of various gatekeepers 
and their responsibilities in mitigating risk. We also discussed the effectiveness 
of CEO communications surrounding the restatement, and ended with a general 
question about how to minimize restatements – what do analysts believe can be 
done to avoid the restatement phenomena in the future?
The online survey used in Study 2 was designed with Likert scale questions and a few 
other closed-answer questions. This in-depth interview questionnaire was meant to 
look further into those results and to see whether the analysts could elaborate on this 
topic. The questionnaire was designed to serve as a checklist of essential topics that 
were meant to be covered – further elaboration was attempted where time allowed. 
This yielded some interesting conversations and results. One memorable respondent 
explained at length his view about the problems surrounding the credit crunch, 
and elaborated on who was to blame for much of the current financial malaise. His 
personal view was that CEOs often simply play the part carved out for them, and are 
rarely to blame directly for restatement issues. At times there are cases of fraud, but 
on the whole senior executives run businesses to the best of their ability within given 
constraints. This and other results are discussed in-depth in the next section. The 
questionnaire script is reproduced below:
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You were involved with the (Company X – see database) case. We would like to ask you some questions about your 
assessment of that company, and its CEO BEFORE and AFTER the announcement of the restatement (date – see database).
1) What was the main cause of the restatement in your opinion?
2)
In general, how important did you consider the contributions of the CEO in trying to exceed 
(financial) performance expectations before the restatement? How did you evaluate the 
role of the CEO in general at the company? (without and with hindsight)
3) How did you evaluate the role of the CEO BEFORE the restatement? 
4) How did you evaluate the role of the CEO AFTER the announcement of the restatement?
5)
How did the following qualities (or lack of qualities) of the CEO impact your evaluation of his 
role? (before and after the restatement)
a. Integrity
b. Openness
c. Charisma
d. Ambition
e. Dominance
f. Social responsibility
g. Industry knowledge
h. Financial Accounting & Reporting skills 
i. Confidence level 
6)
In your opinion, how did the following pressures impact the CEO of the company  BEFORE the 
restatement (low---high impact, why? – both without and with hindsight) 
a. Pressure to exceed financial expectations 
b. A highly demanding strategy aimed at increasing market share
c. External developments implying the necessity to improve corporate reputation
d. Lack of resources
e. Negative developments in the industry
7) Which constituents failed in their gatekeeping role, and why?
a. Independent Board
b. Audit Committee
c. Legal counsel
d. CFO
e. Regulators
f. Independent auditors
g. Financial analysts
8) Were you surprised about this restatement? Why?
9)
 How did this surprise affect your assessments of the Company and the CEO after the 
restatement?
10)
Did the CEO take adequate governance initiatives to remediate the crisis situation? If yes – how? 
Which governance initiatives were most effective? If not, what should he have done?
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11) Did the CEO communicate open and honestly on the problem? Please elaborate.
12)
To what degree did the CEO put the blame for the crisis situation on others? In your opinion, can 
the CEO’s blaming be justified?
13) In hindsight, why didn’t you report ‘red flags’ before the statement?
a. Insufficient information
b. Assessed growth targets as realistic at that moment (not critical enough)
c. I completely relied on the trustworthiness of the CEO
14)
In general, what should be done to avoid the restatement phenomenon in the future? (Make 
financial reporting easier; reduce complexity of GAAP; have stricter regulation; invent a 
new super gatekeeper? etc)
During and after each interview, the interviewer transcribed all the comments 
verbatim under each relevant section. Once the data was transcribed and collated 
in a database, it was subjected to content analysis.  This was performed by two data 
analysts. One analyst was the interviewer of all the interviews, and the other was 
an independent analyst with no prior exposure to the project. This double-content 
analysis was designed to minimize the subjectivity of the coding procedure and 
analysis of themes. The independent analyst was asked to go through each subject 
area across all responses, and to code the content by grouping the most relevant 
themes before tallying the frequency of mention of each theme. The output from 
the independent analyst was then compared to the interviewer’s analysis to arrive 
at a final result. In some cases, minor tweaks and nuances were necessary based 
on this two-pronged approach, but no radical differences emerged between the 
two analyses due to the straightforward nature of the results. For each theme or 
coded answer type, a descriptive quote was selected from the verbatim transcripts to 
demonstrate that answer category. The results can thus be viewed on an answer-by-
answer basis, with frequencies of mentions and relevant quotes. In the next section 
we will describe the results in detail.
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4.4 Data Analysis and Empirical Findings
For each question, we coded the commentary into prevalent themes or topics. 
The frequency of mention of each response category gave some indication of the 
importance of certain themes for the analysts and allowed for the results of the 
other sub-studies to be validated. The use of two independent analysts in coding the 
analysts’ commentaries allowed for non-biased objective results.
4.4.1	endogenous	Factors
Just over 39 per cent of respondents cited fraudulent behaviour as the main cause 
of the restatements under consideration. This is the highest ranking cause amongst 
interviewees. The second most often mentioned cause of restatements in the eyes of 
analysts was internal error, such as accounting and control issues (21.7 per cent). The 
rest of the reasons were attributed to changes in strategy, procedure or structure (21.7 
per cent), and external conditions (17.4 per cent). This shows the relative importance 
of factors endogenous to senior executive behaviour and the way companies are run. 
However, CEOs are rarely mentioned as part of the main cause of the restatements. 
More often the fraud involves a CFO, other executives or employees, but, according 
to analysts, the CEO is not directly implicated. Indirectly of course, analysts recognize 
that the CEO has final responsibility for the corporate activities, and by allowing a 
certain culture to flourish (high pressure to deliver, corner-cutting, etcetera), the 
‘tone-at-the-top’ can often play a key role in making corporate misbehaviour socially 
acceptable within firms.
The interviews showed that analysts’ overall evaluation of the CEOs under 
consideration dropped significantly after restatements. Interviewees mostly held 
favourable assessments of the CEOs prior to the restatement; and these dropped 
significantly even though CEOs were not directly implicated. This again points to 
the fact that CEOs directly, or indirectly, are seen as playing a role in restatement 
situations. Analyst evaluations of their behaviour are assessed. and largely become 
more negative, as a result of the restatement. There were just a few cases where 
analysts’ positive perceptions about the CEO were reinforced due to the positive 
way in which a restatement was handled, but these are less prevalent (out of the six 
that remained positive about the CEO, only two can be ascribed directly to the CEO’s 
handling of the restatement).
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On the other hand, almost all the analysts interviewed recognized that positive steps 
were taken (not necessarily by the outgoing CEO), such as governance overhaul and 
enhanced internal controls and compliance measures as a result of the restatement. 
Any clear findings of CEO’s self-blaming behaviour in Study 2 are absent; in the 
interviews the analysts provide credit to the CEO for shouldering their share of the 
blame and not pointing fingers. Furthermore, the CEO in more than half the cases 
was seen as a good communicator throughout the restatement episode.
In order to further test for the relevance of endogenous factors, interviewees were 
asked whether a certain set of qualities was used to evaluate the CEO’s role before and 
after the restatement. Integrity, ambition, industry knowledge and CEO confidence 
were the three highest-scoring evaluation criteria used by the analysts prior to the 
restatement. CEO confidence showed the largest drop in analysts’ assessment in the 
post-restatement period.
4.4.2	exogenous	Factors
When asked directly how important the analyst considered pressures on the CEO 
to exceed (financial) performance expectations before the restatement, 57.1 per 
cent thought that such pressures were important or very important. Therefore, 
this particular exogenous factor is indeed important. This was ranked as the 
most important pressure on the CEO. Other high pressures included ‘negative 
developments in the industry,’ and, ‘a highly demanding strategy aimed at increasing 
market share.’ This confirms findings from Study 2. Earnings management pressures 
are also recognized by analysts in the pre-restatement period.
Gatekeepers
CFOs are seen, by far, as the key constituent who failed in their gatekeeper role in 
relation to the restatements. Regulators, on the other hand, are not seen as having 
failed in their role. Implementing regulation changes is not expected by analysts to 
have any impact on decreasing the occurrence of restatements. Better standards 
and rules, and simpler, more transparent financial reporting would all work better 
towards preventing restatements, according to the interviewees.
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4.4.3	interview	results	and	tables	–	illustrative	comments
table 4.2 iNterview results aNd illustrative commeNts
Main causes of restatements
 (Q1 What was the main cause of the restatement in your opinion?)
Rank Theme Freq. Sample comments
1 Fraudulent behaviour 9
•  ‘The CFO embezzled $70 million. from the company’
•  ‘They were advancing booking expenses, because they were running 
ahead of plans.  The head of the business unit was attempting to get 
a head start on the following year’s budget. Had been doing it for a 
number of years in a row. Triggered FCC investigation into the company.’
2
Accounting / control 
error or other internal 
failure
5
•  ‘Poor internal controls had a disaster on fixed assets and pretty much 
everything needed to be revised. Failure across the company.’
3
Change in strategy, 
procedure or structure
5
•  ‘The main cause was a change in strategy away from rapid growth; they 
then ran out of money to sustain this and thus focused upon reshaping 
the business.’
•  ‘Change in accountancy procedures, fairly routine change.’
4 External conditions 4
•  ‘A change in the law of their business, in the gaming sector, a new tax 
law was introduced by the government.’
Importance of CEO’s role
(Q2a In general, how important did you consider the contributions of the CEO in trying to exceed 
(financial) performance expectations before the restatement?
Rank Theme Freq. Sample comments
1 Very important 10
•   ‘Extremely important, CEO trying exceed targets, this restatement 
helped them to do that.’ 
‘He was key to a micro-credit fund; it was his decision to rapidly to 
grow the business.’
2 Not a relevant factor 7
•  ‘Simply a function of the company going through changes, rather 
than an oversight on their part.’
3 Important 2
4 Indirectly some impact 2
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general evaluation of CEO
(Q2b How did you evaluate the role of the CEO in general at the company?)
Theme Freq. Sample comments
Positive 3
•  ‘Pretty good, he inherited a basket-case. Tried to turn it around. Simply a function 
of the company going through changes, rather than an oversight on their part.’
Neutral 2
•  ‘My initial impressions of the CEO was that he was very good and very good for the 
company, when you hit the middle of 2007 opinion changed and I felt that he had 
done all he could do and he was beginning to be detrimental.’
Negative 7
•  ‘The CEO guaranteed growth and he had a tremendous pressure on his 
organisation everyone from top to bottom was advancing revenue to try and make 
an extra week.’
Evaluation of CEO before the restatement
(Q3 How did you evaluate the role of the CEO BEFORE the restatement?)
Theme Freq. Sample comments
Positive 7 •  ‘Very positive, he is a man with a lot of pragmatism, culturally right for this company.’
Quite positive 1 •  ‘Fairly positively, faced a difficult challenge.’
Neutral 5
•  ‘Fairly positive opinion as an overall manager and a leader, perception weaker from an 
accounting standpoint.’
Slightly 
negative
4
•  ‘Concern, with the CEO, very charismatic, got impression numbers were not 
properly audited. Weaker on auditing, organisation decentralised with relatively 
light infrastructure. Easier for local manager to improve performance without being 
detected.’
Negative 5 •  ‘Arrogant and complacent, strategy in terms of group structure was wrong.’
Evaluation of CEO after the restatement
(Q4 How did you evaluate the role of the CEO AFTER the restatement?)
Theme Freq. Sample comments
Negative 12
•  ‘Continued to feel strengths were still the same, but had weakened my perception of 
his accounting and underwriting perspective.’
•  ‘At the time news broke, he and four other execs were removed. My view has 
plummeted as it looked suspicious.’
No change in 
perception
8
•  ‘Reinforced positive perception of him, although it was mainly the CFO who organised 
this move.’
•  ‘Didn’t change very much, some obvious disappointment with the fact they didn’t have 
internal controls to catch something like this sooner.’
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CEO Qualities
(Q5 How did the following qualities (or lack of qualities) of the CEO impact your evaluation of his role? 
(before and after the restatement))
Key: 5 - Very High; 4 - High; 3 - Moderate; 2 - Low; 1 - Very Low; 0 - None
Attribute
Mean 
before
Mean 
after
Change
Change 
Rank
Sample comments
Confidence 3.35 2.50 -0.85 1
•  ‘CEO’s confidence, probably weakened after the 
restatement somewhat. My perception certainly 
weakened. I remember thinking afterwards that it was 
partly his confidence had led to too much recklessness.’
•  ‘They had a lot of confidence going into the 
restatement, post that you could see the confidence 
being shattered. You could see he was losing control. His 
overconfidence led to detrimental oversights.’
•  ‘This [restatement] made me reconsider whether the 
top executives’ high levels of confidence were really such 
a good thing.’
Openness 3.33 2.81 -0.52 2
•  ‘Definitely good, restatement reinforced this area.’
•  ‘Initially very open, but became clear he was a liar.’
Integrity 3.71 3.33 -0.38 3
•  ‘This is one of the top 3 indicators of CEO success. The 
perception of Nortel’s CEO on this score rapidly declined 
during restatement.’
Financial 
Accounting 
and Reporting 
Skills
2.86 2.48 -0.38 4
•  ‘Suffered directly from restatement, perception of being 
average declined to below average skills.’
•  ‘More industry-based, rather than finance based, 
medium. Post the restatement has attempted to focus 
more on this area.’
Charisma 3.25 2.90 -0.35 5
•  ‘Mixed view, there were investors that liked him and 
those that disliked him. Bar bell on the charisma. 
Afterwards, there was a migration towards not 
liking him. I was more on negative side from the very 
beginning.’
Ambition 3.71 3.38 -0.33 6
•  ‘Dented. Although reality check from restatement 
perversely made the subsequent strategy stronger.’
•  ‘His over-ambition fuelled by the earnings management 
culture led to this situation. Initially I thought it was a 
good thing that he was extremely driven, but afterwards 
I realised he went way too far.’
Dominance 3.28 3.00 -0.28 7
•  ‘At the beginning he was a dominating figure, almost 
intimidating. After restatement as he started to lose 
grace and he declined. I didn’t mind his dominance 
before, because it led to good results.’
•  ‘Has suffered, before very dominant, afterwards more 
average in his running of the business.’
Social 
Responsibility
3.00 2.84 -0.16 8 •  ‘High to low, socially irresponsible actions.’
Industry 
Knowledge
3.61 3.47 -0.14 9
•  ‘Has suffered: Before it was normal, afterwards it was 
perceived to be below average.’
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Pressures on CEO
(Q 6 In your opinion, how did the following pressures impact the CEO of the company before the 
restatement)
Key: 5 - Very High; 4 - High; 3 - Moderate; 2 - Low; 1 - Very Low; 0 - None
Pressure Mean Key Remarks
Pressure to exceed financial expectations 3.30
•  ‘High, under pressure to get the company back to where 
it was; big demand to raise cash flow.’
•  ‘High. In the summer of 2007 there was a Wall Street 
article that the company was likely to be sold to a private 
equity firm. The deal then fell apart. Subsequently stock 
collapsed leading to pretty high pressure on the CEO to 
right the ship to recapture huge lost opportunity.’
Negative developments in the industry 3.04
•  ‘Industry was weakening from a position of strength, 
somewhat important but not as important as pressure 
to exceed financial expectations.’
•  ‘Yes, the advertising market was under pressure, the 
restatement demonstrated that the pressures were even 
more acute.’
A highly demanding strategy aimed at 
increasing market share
2.70
•  ‘Yes, high. Essentially all out to seize the top line, happy 
to turn a blind eye to most things.’
External developments implying the 
necessity to improve corporate reputation
1.33
Lack of resources 1.20
•  ‘Not perceived to be a problem prior to the restatement. 
However, after the restatement it became clear that 
there was a problem in the accounting department.’
Failure of gatekeepers
(Q 7 Which constituents failed in their gatekeeping role, and why?)
Key: 5 – Definitely failed; 4 -Failed; 3 –May have failed; 2 – Did not necessarily fail; 1 – Did not fail
gatekeeper Mean Key Remarks
CFO 3.71
•  ‘Key responsibility outside of CEO. The CFO knew a lot of information and chose 
either to hold it back or held it back because the CEO said no.’
•  ‘He had an active role and was for sure the gatekeeper. Key responsibility.’
Audit Committee 2.75
•  ‘Failed completely, internal checks were inadequate.’
•  ‘Yes, revenue recognition is a complex issue but you’ve got three fail-safes, one 
of which is this.’
Independent Board 2.62
•  ‘Failed. They did not execute their responsibilities. Their job is to be an outside 
monitor.’
•  ‘Independent for a reason, meant to apply an impartial viewpoint. Failed.’
Independent 
Auditors
2.55 •  ‘They failed to detect this when they could have done far earlier.’
Legal Counsel 1.70
•  ‘Came too late to prevent crisis.’
•  ‘Invisible, but didn’t necessarily fail. Did their job and were ignored, raised 
internal warning flags.’
Financial Analysts 1.53
•  ‘The company was very aggressive in making claims of how well they were 
doing, analysts were suspicious.’
•  ‘Little chance, the numbers had been audited through proper procedures as far 
as could be seen.’
Regulators 1.45 •  ‘Before it became public, difficult to say whether they should have stepped in.’
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Surprised about restatement
(Q 8 Were you surprised about this restatement? Why?)
Why Freq. Key Remarks
Yes
Insufficient or inaccurate 
information
9
•  ‘I was surprised, it was a complex transaction, but I guess I had 
always understand it to have been accounted for correctly and 
in the various analyses that I had done of it I had reached the 
conclusion that it was probably done correctly. Somewhat surprised 
that it wasn’t.’
•  ‘Yes, completely taken off kilter by this. Shocked. Although the risk 
was growing prior to the restatement it was simply impossible to 
foresee this.’
Scale of restatement 4
•  ‘Yes, surprised by the size. Something more or less unavoidable 
given the economic climate, but the scale was enormous.’
Timing 3
•  ‘I had expected something to happen in terms of refinancing, but 
rather a positive surprise, since they chose to refinance sooner 
rather than later. Few analysts anticipated that they would take 
such a long term view largely with 2011 in mind.’
•  ‘Surprised at the timing, in the sense of only six weeks before 
restatement was issued, which marked such a sharp contrast.’
Lack of experience 1
•  ‘Yes, I was new to the industry; I was lacking the necessary 
experience in hindsight.’
Other 1
No
Widely Anticipated 4
•  ‘No, it was widely anticipated. Change in make-up of business 
after they sold the business unit in question. Not uncommon for a 
company to dispose of a business then change reporting structure.’
Issued Alerts 1
•  ‘No, issued alert. Surprised they got so quickly where they were, 
although outcome was expected in the end.’
Effect on assessments
(Q How did this surprise affect your assessments of the Company and the CEO after the restatement?)
Effect Freq. Key Remarks
very negative 4
•  ‘Significantly reduced the book value of the company, my valuation of it from 
there on was proportionally lower.’
•  ‘Tarnished views on the company, people still raise it today. Reputation very 
damaged across the market as a result.’
negative 12
•  ‘Because they got it wrong, it undermined their credibility, simply due to the 
conflicting information given before and after the restatement.’
unchanged / neutral 3
•  ‘Since it wasn’t a surprise, it did not substantially affect my assessments of the 
company and CEO.’
positive 1 •  ‘Positive and reinforced good perceptions.’
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CEO governance initiatives
(Q 10 Did the CEO take adequate governance initiatives to remediate the crisis situation? If yes – how? 
Which governance initiatives were most effective? If not, what should he have done?)
Initiatives Freq. Key Remarks
Yes
Overhauled internal 
procedures and 
controls
12
•  ‘Internal controls were beefed up and internal accounting improved. They 
hired outside consultants and accounting personnel, went through and 
re-scrubbed a lot of the data.’
•  ‘Internal procedures were completely overhauled, new internal procedures 
and risk management were implemented.’
CEO Replaced - New 
CEO took correct steps
5
•  ‘Yes. Replacement CEO was brought into preside over the restatement 
that became more or less driving force of the company.’
Entire Executive Board 
Replaced - New team 
took correct steps
2 •  ‘Yes, changed whole board, changed other people too.’
Reduced Costs 1
•  ‘They issued a lot of redundancy in an effort to control expenditures. This 
was relatively effective as they brought costs to heel.’
CEO refused to quit 1
•  ‘Under extreme pressure eventually chose to leave the company, which 
happened later than it should have done.’
No
Insufficient internal 
reforms
1
•  ‘He implemented a strategic review, but has failed to sell any of the 
businesses.’
CEO communication
(Q 11 Did the CEO communicate open and honestly on the problem? Please elaborate.)
Quality of 
communication
Freq. Key Remarks
Well 13
•  ‘Yes, very clear on being triggered by rationalisation. Briefings of analysts, phone 
conversations. They very much lead the way in communicating the changes in an 
open and honest fashion.’
Eventually well 4
•  ‘Not immediately, but became impossible to hide given the scale of the company. 
Afterwards relatively clear communication.’
Neutral 1
•  ‘Fired shortly prior to its announcement. The company did communicate 
honestly, but not necessarily that openly. They were protective in terms of the 
amount of the information they were willing to divulge.’
Poor 2
•  ‘They were vague and showed them with a very specific agenda, portrayed 
change in necessary light which wasn’t accurate. Never fully clarified.’
•  ‘Originally it broke through the press, not via CEO. Once the story was out there, 
the communication was poor throughout the initial period because they didn’t 
know themselves. Afterwards it improved.’
Blame
(Q 12 To what degree did the CEO put the blame for the crisis situation on others? In your opinion, can 
the CEO’s blaming be justified?)
Blame taking / sharing Freq. Key Remarks
Took brunt of blame 9 •  ‘Not very much, took the blame himself. Correct call.’
Shared blame 1
•  ‘He blamed 20 per cent of it on himself and 80 per cent on others. He has 
not blamed himself enough, and worsened my perception of him directly as a 
result.’
Took no blame 5 •  ‘Didn’t [blame others], but he also denies any personal responsibility.’
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Red flags
(Q 13 In hindsight, why didn’t you report ‘red flags’ before the statement happened?)
Rank Reason Mean Key Remarks
1 Insufficient Information 3.65
•  ‘We depend on the company to report reasonably accurate 
statements and depend on auditors to catch them if they don’t – in 
this case people missed.’
•  ‘It was impossible to see the level of corruption.’
2
Assessed growth targets 
as realistic at that moment 
(not critical enough)
2.29
•  ‘Secondary factor. Under the belief they were realistic, because the 
growth targets were not excessive targets. Growth targets were 
probably somewhere around 15 per cent earnings growth, probably 
in reality it should have been closer to 12 per cent.’
3
Over-reliance on the 
trustworthiness of the CEO
2.06
•  ‘Also over relied on trustworthiness of CEO, and hoped he would 
have at least sent us signals prior to making the change. However, 
this was a lesser factor.’
Preventing restatements
(Q14 In general, what should be done to avoid the restatement phenomenon in the future?)
Rank Reason Freq. Key Remarks
1
Simpler and 
more transparent 
financial 
reporting
6
•  ‘Would like to see companies providing greater information, more 
granularities, some of the broader impacts into how they are arriving into 
numbers. The more information available the more people are able to pick up 
on things.’
1
Accounting 
standards and 
rules
6
•  ‘Moving to more of a fair value approach, then you would be dealing with 
things being updated more regularly. Everything gets marked to market 
at some point during the year, test of that on every asset effectively in the 
business regularly would be beneficial.’
2
Auditor 
independence / 
Audit process
4
•  ‘Things should be tougher from an independent standpoint; independent 
auditors and boards should be fully independent. Independent auditors 
should have better incentive to look at the books fully.’
3 Governance 3
•  ‘Financial Accounting Standards Boards: need to make them more motivated, 
instil continuous improvement and more checks. Make more resources 
available, make them a valid cop.’
4 Internal culture 2
•  ‘Internal cultural issue, people put such a pressure on themselves or their 
subordinates so people will go to great lengths to hide the bad news. If you 
are in this kind of culture you should have a very strong internal audit.’
•  ‘Internal thing companies which just have to cope with, no real need for 
greater external regulation.’
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4.5 Results summary
The results of this study show that analysts do assess a range of endogenous factors, 
such as CEO behaviour and character traits, in their assessments of companies. In 
the context of restatement situations it seems that analysts pay extra attention 
to the qualities of the CEO and other senior executives regardless of whether they 
are directly implicated in fraudulent actions. The characteristics of confidence and 
openness show the steepest declines in analyst evaluations of CEOs as a result of the 
restatement.
In addition, the study shows that analysts do recognize and assess a range of exogenous 
factors in restatement situations. According to the analysts, Earnings Management 
Pressures have the most impact on CEO behaviour before the restatement. This high 
score is followed by relatively high pressure scores for: ‘Negative developments in the 
industry,’ and, ‘a highly demanding strategy aimed at increasing market share.’
Analysts also confirm that they do consider various constituents’ roles and cite 
CFOs as the main culprit – the CFO is considered primarily responsible for financial 
reporting irregularities. Overall, the results of the quantitative study are supported 
by those of the interviews.
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4.6 Conclusions and Discussion
The interview results confirm that CEO behaviour and characteristics clearly play a 
role in analysts’ perceptions related to financial restatements. Although, according 
to the analysts, the main causes of the restatements under consideration rarely 
involved the CEO directly, analysts’ perceptions of CEOs radically declined after the 
restatement announcement. The most prevalent cause of restatements in which 
the CEO was blamed involved some sort of fraudulent behaviour. In these cases, the 
CEO is always under intense scrutiny for allowing such activities to take place, even 
if no direct blame lies with the CEO. The CEO is still considered by respondents to be 
responsible, even if indirectly, for fostering a culture, strategy and structure in which 
malicious or error-prone behaviour can take place. Indeed, the CEO’s pressures to 
exceed financial expectations were deemed by more than 60 per cent of respondents 
to play a role in the financial restatement (50 per cent found it to be a very important 
cause).
CEO qualities such as integrity, dominance, charisma, confidence and ambition were 
perceived in a different light by respondents after the restatements, than those 
qualities were before restatements. This was particularly the case for CEO confidence. 
This attribute suffered the largest decline in perception rating amongst respondents – 
while it was considered a positive characteristic, and one necessary to be a successful 
CEO before a restatement; after the restatement, the ratings of confidence, ambition 
etcetera usually declined. A minority of respondents even used words such as ‘over-
ambitious’ and ‘arrogant’ to describe the CEO in light of the restatement.
Despite the changing perceptions, many CEOs were seen as handling the restatement 
situation well, both in terms of communications and structural changes. Those 
companies that initiated structural changes in governance and internal controls 
were seen as handling the situation well. However, often a lag-time existed before 
adequate action was undertaken.
Most respondents felt that sharpening regulation would not be the answer to 
minimizing the occurrence of restatements. Rather, they mentioned simpler and 
more transparent financial reporting, and simplifying accounting standards and 
rules as the main two ways to avoid restatements. Particularly, mark-to-market 
accounting was mentioned as an accounting practice that will lead to restatements 
taking place. There is also a large role for the CEO to play in ceasing to submit to the 
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pressures pushing them to play the earnings game. The so-called ‘number’s game’ 
has resulted in a culture of just meeting or beating the analysts earnings estimates, 
and has perpetrated a short-term view amongst capital market participants.
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Chapter 5
Overall Conclusions and Discussions
5.1 Introduction
The central research question of this thesis focuses on 
whether ‘blinders’ in restatement situations affect gatekeeper 
perceptions and potentially tarnish corporate reputation. 
More specifically, we formulated the following questions:
• Which factors obscure communication on restatements, 
thereby affecting perceived severity of the restatement 
and corporate reputation?
• Which factors blur analysts’ views (as gatekeepers) of 
CEO behaviour, before and after a restatement?
• Do these ‘blinders’ explain gatekeeper failure and why 
restatements often come as ‘predictable surprises’? 
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A secondary and derivative research objective is to understand how gatekeeper 
perceptions and biases influence some of the monitoring functions of the firm, in 
particular those of the independent board. Next, to what extent do these biases 
affect the executives in utilizing monitoring functions to increase firm value and 
reputation? If gatekeepers, like all humans, have weak spots in ‘complying’ with the 
rational choice model (Kahneman & Tversky, 2003);  (Simon, 1997) and (Marnet, 2007), 
can we make suggestions for improving monitoring effectiveness of independent 
boards in crisis situations – to the benefit of both the firm and its executives? As 
Coffee writes, ‘All boards of directors are prisoners of their gatekeepers!’ (Coffee Jr., 
2006, p1). 
Central is the question whether we can use our research findings to recommend how 
firms and gatekeepers should cooperate to ‘release’ directors from this confinement, 
thereby enhancing the value of their monitoring function to the firm. Interest in 
this secondary research question has been heightened recently, due to the on-going 
global credit crisis and a variety of other high-profile financial scandals in numerous 
industries, alongside the alleged repeated failure of gatekeepers, including regulators 
(Marnet, 2007; Stracca, 2004).
Before we enter into more detailed conclusions and discussions, we will first 
summarize the three central studies, explore how they connect with one another, 
and provide answers to the above overall research questions. 
5.1.1	overview	oF	tHree	studies
Following a grounded-theory approach, our first study provides a conceptual 
framework for classifying the severity of restatements, and discusses factors clouding 
a clear view around the causes and consequences of financial misreporting. The study 
aims to identify forces (in particular observable pressures on the company and its 
CEO) which could potentially obscure the perceptions of capital market participants. 
Awareness of these forces at both executive level and gatekeeper level is relevant, 
as this can lead to more effective crisis remediation and improved governance. 
These forces include perceived non-alignment of management and gatekeepers, 
discrediting of management, paralysis in communication, the ‘tip-of-the-iceberg’ 
effect, and comprehension gaps. A final part of Study 1 is to make recommendations 
on how to improve corporate communications in restatement situations and 
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avoid reputation damage, both at the firm level as well as at the executive level. 
We concluded that communication should focus on confirming the nature of the 
problem, taking the blame for it, providing openness, demonstrating compliance 
with rules and regulations, and showing that appropriate governance measures are 
taken.
Having peeled away some of the blinders that affect the public’s, and more in particular, 
analysts’ perception of restatements in Study 1, our efforts in Study 2 focused on how 
analysts, following companies with significant restatements, develop their judgment 
and decision making with respect to behaviour of the CEO, both before and after 
a restatement. We developed a model for analysts’ perceptions that associated 
perceived pressures and characteristics of the CEO with analysts’ perceptions of CEO 
reputation behaviour. Perceived pressures mainly consist of earnings management 
pressures, executive job demands and task challenges, and CEO dominance, which 
were all expected to play a role in inducing financial misreporting by the CEO. We 
also include measures of the extent of countervailing powers on the CEO, such 
as governance measures, competence levels of other gatekeepers and pressures 
meant to result in positive CEO behaviour. The question asked was whether it could 
be confirmed that analysts clearly view earnings management pressures and high 
executive job demands as ‘red flags’ for restatements. Next, we asked whether 
analysts exhibit biases in their judgment of CEO behaviour, and whether regret 
and disappointment influence analyst decision making, particularly during the 
restatement remediation period.
In Study 3, we attempted to corroborate findings from our first two studies as 
summarized above. At the same time, we solicited opinions from the analysts that 
could help in interpreting and seeking explanations for the findings of the other 
studies. In particular, we found that some endogenous CEO characteristics, such as 
integrity, dominance and confidence, affected analysts’ judgements. We also found 
that exogenous pressures on the CEO, including earnings management pressures 
and executive job demands, indeed influenced analyst judgements.
5.1.2	answers	on	PrinciPal	researcH	Questions
Our research confirms that ‘blinders’ in restatement situations cloud the perceptions 
of executives, market participants, and gatekeepers. Corporate reputation 
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proves to be clearly at risk if communication on the restatement lacks timeliness, 
comprehensiveness, and accuracy. Firms who pursue a strategy of silencing and 
denial – whether out of governance necessity, or otherwise – are more exposed to 
negativity bias, caused by the informational uncertainties left in the market. Common 
human biases, such as commitment bias, confirmation bias, and overconfidence, 
negatively affect gatekeepers in their monitoring roles. In particular we find that 
executives who understand how these blinders affect gatekeepers, and take ‘positive’ 
communication actions, are more successful in regaining trust and also succeed in 
shortening the restatement recovery period. Their reputation remediation actions 
(governance, compliance and control measures) are perceived to be more effective, 
as illustrated in Study 1, by faster recovery of share prices. Our studies show that once 
a restatement is announced, executives who confirm the nature of the problem, take 
blame for the crisis (by explaining what caused the reporting failure), and prove to 
be open and supply comprehensive information to the markets, achieve much better 
results in repairing tarnished corporate reputation.
A. The studies confirm that analysts have a bounded awareness of pressures 
on the CEO to exceed financial performance expectations. In particular, 
and contrary to our expectations, both earnings management pressures 
and high executive job demands seem to be welcomed by analysts before 
a restatement occurs, blurring analysts’ views of the financial misreporting 
‘riskiness’ of a firm, and its often disastrous reputational consequences. 
B. Our research confirms that the pressures on CEOs to exceed firm 
performance expectations, combined with certain character traits of CEOs 
(most notably, overconfidence), play a significant role in forming analysts’ 
judgments. Blinders –which we identified as having an impact on analysts – 
could well affect other gatekeepers’ monitoring effectiveness (or rather, lack 
of monitoring effectiveness). However, further research will be necessary 
to confirm this. We propose that a combination of gatekeepers’ bounded 
awareness of misstatement pressures, and the apparent existence of 
gatekeeper ‘capture’ by the CEO, in a variety of designs, causes acquiescence 
and silence on the part of gatekeepers – and thereby the potential for failure 
in their assigned role of analyst and monitor. Again, confirmation that 
these biases exist for gatekeepers beyond analysts requires more detailed 
research.
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This chapter will continue as follows. First, we will discuss our key findings and 
conclusions from the three studies in greater detail. Our focus will be on more 
generic conclusions as to why analysts have flaws when ‘exercising diligence and 
thoroughness’ (as per Standard V of the CFA Institute), in their role as gatekeepers in 
restatement situations. Three dimensions will be addressed in particular – probing 
depth, disclosure transparency, and biases and boundedness. Our studies confirm 
that these three dimensions play a key role in gatekeepers’ monitoring effectiveness. 
We will also consider how these three dimensions could provide further insights as to 
how the analyst ‘lens’ can focus on reportable corporate matters, and thereby assist in 
identifying the factors important to their investment analyses and recommendations 
(again, we refer to the CFA Institute’s Standard V). We will also try to explain why this 
lens can become blurred and out-of-focus at times. 
We note that our second and third study mainly consider restatement situations 
and the behaviour of the CEO from the perspective of the analysts. However, we 
also recognize that the analysts’ primary goal is not to detect financial reporting 
fraud – rather, their goal is to analyze a company’s performance potential and 
make investment recommendations. There are other monitors who, based on their 
functions as defined by laws or regulations, may have a greater and more specific 
responsibility in the detection and prevention of financial reporting fraud. To put our 
research findings in perspective, wherever useful we shall make reference to other 
academic research that addresses similar flaws found in the behaviour of other 
gatekeepers. 
Next, we will extrapolate this combination of our findings centred on analysts’ 
judgment and decision-making weaknesses (our primary research findings), and 
where of interest, apply research on other gatekeepers to a slightly higher level of 
abstraction. In these discussions, we will challenge the current adage in corporate 
governance of ‘comply or disclose,’ and propose that – based on our findings and 
other current insights from academic research – the primary and underlying principle 
of firms’ ‘monitors’ should be: ‘Probe (deeper) and disclose (more transparently)’! We 
will also argue that the ever-increasing set of rules and regulations in the area of 
securities and corporate law, accounting and auditing, and corporate governance, 
requires some changes to the current paradigm. Gatekeepers and regulators must 
recognize that the quality and effectiveness of monitoring and oversight largely 
249
249Chapter 5 – Overall Conclusions and Discussion
depends on the behavioural traits and biases embedded in human decision makers.
Figure 5.1 extrapolatioN oF FiNdiNgs aNd other research
              
The definition, according to the Oxford Dictionary, of ‘to monitor’ is, ‘To observe and 
check over a period of time’. However, a monitor is also a screen used to display an 
image – the true and fair reflection of a company’s position. While we recognize 
that monitoring has some subtle downside risks, continuous ‘second-guessing’ 
can demotivate those being monitored and can lead to a risk-aversive culture. We 
propose that deeper probing (and possible verification) by gatekeepers, along with 
engaging in the transparent act of sharing findings through enhanced disclosures, 
could contribute greatly to improved quality of judgment and decision-making by 
gatekeepers, both individually and as a collective.1
Finally, we will discuss some of the limitations in our studies, and make suggestions 
for future research in the domain of behavioural accounting and governance with 
respect to gatekeepers.
1  Note the following definition in the Oxford Dictionary: ’Monitor Lizard:  a large tropical Old World lizard with a long neck and short body, 
believed to warn of the approach of crocodiles’!
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5.2 Key Findings from Our Studies
Lack of deeper probing by analysts on restatement causes and effects
Study 1 confirms that once a restatement crisis hits, investors and analysts are able 
to distinguish between companies that take positive reputation remediation actions, 
and companies which fail to react to the crisis in a timely and open manner. Open 
and timely communication as to the scope and effects of the restatement, combined 
with governance and compliance measures, is clearly appreciated by investors and 
analysts, as it reassures to external audiences that management remains in control. 
However, our second study also confirms that analysts underutilize their probing 
potential, and sometimes show signs of lacking in-depth knowledge or interest of 
accounting rules. 
Lack of probing amongst other gatekeepers
Gibbins, McCracken and Salterio (2005, 2007) find that audit committee members, 
representing the independent board, are frequently not informed of new accounting 
policy choices. As a consequence, only rarely do they engage in in-depth investigations 
of the rationale behind accounting decisions and the business prudence thereof. 
Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Neal (2007) find that even in cases where audit 
committee members can challenge significant accounting decisions, their ability 
to ask challenging questions can be limited by the quality of information provided 
by auditors and management. Pomeroy (2008), Bonner (1990), Bonner and Lewis 
(1990) and Libby and Luft (1993) all find that financially-experienced audit committee 
members have a much greater ability to effectively question and evaluate accounting 
decisions than do members without financial expertise. Recent corporate governance 
changes now require that boards, and in particular the audit committee, should 
include financial experts. However, as our literature studies reveal, board capture 
often prevents board members from probing deep enough to uncover accounting 
irregularities.
Lee and Welker (2004, 2007) have studied the deception detection abilities of auditors. 
Their findings that auditors, like other gatekeepers, are not skilled at detecting 
deception led the duo to suggest additional forensic-skills training for those working 
in the profession. Coffee (2006) also makes mention that at both WorldCom and 
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Enron, the attorneys responsible for securities offerings carried out hardly any due-
diligence work. The recent credit crisis, and subsequent analysis of the credit rating 
agencies, provides abundant evidence of a failure to probe beneath the surface of a 
business model (Coffee Jr., 2009). 
Lack of timely information on restatements exacerbates uncertainty and increases 
perceived severity
Our first study also found that non-alignment of management with gatekeepers – 
those directly involved in remediating the restatement situation (e.g. the independent 
board of directors, regulators and/or auditors) – caused investors and external 
gatekeepers, such as ratings agencies and analysts, to overestimate the restatement 
severity in terms of management intent. Lack of timely information on the causes 
and financial consequences of the restatement leads analysts to speculate on its 
implications, enhancing uncertainty and thereby resulting in negativity bias. Only if 
appropriate governance and compliance measures were taken did analysts soften 
their reactions to the restatement. Similarly, comprehension gaps on what caused 
the restatement typically led to analysts’ overestimation (negative distortion), in 
assessing the materiality of the misstatement. Analysts would only adjust their future 
earnings estimates and company ratings if company communications provided 
details on the precise nature, extent and causes of the restatement. 
 
Other gatekeeper reactions to restatement uncertainties 
As independent boards are largely dependent on information provided by 
executives, Langevoort (2004) suggests that boards may be reluctant to expose a 
company’s financial reporting improprieties to the outside world without having 
a comprehensive and full understanding of the situation and its implications. This 
fear of opening Pandora’s Box and exposing the company to unfathomed depths of 
reputational risks provides yet another ingredient for board capture. Therefore, while 
a lack of information might lead to more negative reactions among analysts after a 
restatement is announced, it seems to lead to more inaction among board members 
before a restatement is announced.
The inability to properly comprehend a restatement crisis and its reputational 
consequences
Our first study showed that when a company announces a restatement, executives 
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and gatekeepers (including analysts), must face up to massive trust issues. Analysts 
need to assess uncertainties, not only with respect to the company’s future financial 
performance and sustainability, but more specifically, they need to judge whether 
executives (particularly the CEO), are left with sufficient powers to lead the company 
out of the crisis. When a restatement happens, the market demands that analysts 
become explicit on their assessment of the CEO’s ability and credibility – the market 
will not merely accept executive excuses of plausible deniability (Walton, 1996: ‘I could 
and did not know’). However, as analysts are unaccustomed to formally and explicitly 
assessing CEO traits (e.g. integrity, confidence, power), as indicators of CEO resistance 
against earnings management pressures, analysts are in limbo when it comes time 
to assess the causes and consequences of a restatement. These uncertainties around 
CEO reputation/trust will lead to potential flaws and biases in analysts’ judgements. 
Our second study provides further insights into these potential biases. 
Analysts’ failure to recognize and ‘read’ the restatement warning signs 
The descriptive statistics within Study 2 reveal that the ‘negative’ perceived pressures 
on CEOs to engage in financial misreporting increase when considered by analysts 
with hindsight (as compared to without hindsight). The reverse is true for ‘positive’ 
factors, such as CEO competence and CEO pre-restatement behaviour. In addition, 
all standard deviations become larger when comparing perceptions with hindsight 
to those without hindsight. This pattern of findings is consistent with the idea that: 
(1) Analysts do not see a restatement coming; and, (2) Analysts’ perceptions vary 
considerably depending on their assessment of the severity of the case at hand (hence 
the increase in standard deviations of perceptions with hindsight). These findings 
are consistent with earlier reports by regulators (GAO, 2004) and academics (Dyck et 
al., 2007), who argued that analysts are ‘weak’ gatekeepers. Note however, analysts 
cannot help but be ‘weak’ gatekeepers in their current incarnation, without greater 
unfiltered access to company records, without better job training, and without the 
empowerment to question polished answers offered to them on conference calls. 
Our findings appear to support the notion made by Roonen and Yaari, who, based 
on a number of studies (Lim, 2001; Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2003), documented that 
analysts seem to succumb to pressure by executives. Such pressures on analysts exist 
in chiefly two forms. First, there is concern that the executives may potentially be 
providers of investment banking business, as summarized by Gilson and Kraakman 
(2003: 36):
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Finally, we were naïve about the role of security analysts, and particularly 
those employed by the investment banks on the sell-side of the market. These 
analysts, it appears, often acted as selling agents for the client-issuers of 
the institutions that employ them. Or, put differently, an investment bank’s 
reputation among issuers is likely to matter more to it than its reputation 
among the lay investors who rely on its analysts’ reports.
Alternatively, pressures on analysts are based on rendering favours out of reciprocity 
(Westphal & Clement, 2008). Our studies seem to support earlier research and the 
notion that analysts do under-react to abstract, but highly relevant information, and 
conversely, they overreact to salient, anecdotal and less relevant information (Odean 
1998). Analysts seem to have an arithmetical focus which favours the filling out of 
their ‘spreadsheet’ models, rather than attempting to obtain a more complete picture 
of the long-term strengths and weaknesses of a company. This arithmetical focus 
prevents them from questioning, probing, and comprehensively assessing the more 
intangible value drivers of a company, such as CEO integrity, strength of corporate 
governance and internal controls, and – last but not least – actively assessing whether 
a well-balanced executive rewards and bonus system exists. Whether this fault lies 
with the analyst, or rather, with the job demands and pressures placed on the analyst 
by their own risk-averse, model-driven employer, is deserving of its own study.
Following Chugh and Bazerman (2007), these findings could suggest that analysts 
have a bounded awareness of the pressures which cause CEOs to commit financial 
reporting manipulation, often leading to misstatements. Analysts seem to ignore 
long-term drivers of firm value and to have succumbed to a state of ‘arithmetical 
capture’ at the hands of their spreadsheet models.
Other gatekeepers’ failure to read warning signs
The academic studies and in-depth reports on the demise of Enron and WorldCom, 
and more recently, the banking failures, have revealed that independent boards 
and their audit committees, as well as corporate legal counsel and internal audit 
departments, failed to recognize numerous red flags when it came to financial 
reporting irregularities (on ABN AMRO (Smit, 2008) on Freddie Mac (OFHEO, 2003), 
on ENRON (Arnold & De Lange, 2004 and Coffee Jr., 2001, 2002 & 2004). Also, the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate (Permanent Subcommittee 
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of Investigations, 2002) and Powers et al. (2002) on Enron, as well as Palepu and Healy 
(2009) on WorldCom, confirm that boards took their monitoring jobs too lightly. 
Langevoort (2004) notes that the limited amount of time board members spend on 
their monitoring job, coupled with the complexities of financial reporting, make it 
extremely difficult for members to recognize data patterns in data which hint at red 
flags and the need for deeper probing. 
Dyck et al., in their study on ‘Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud’ (2007), found 
that those with the weakest incentive to blow the whistle, and the easiest access to 
information (e.g. employees), are the most likely to take action. Those with stronger 
incentives, and lacking verifiable information, appear to trigger fewer investigations 
(e.g. short sellers account for 1 per cent). Dyck et al. also find that gatekeepers who 
are paid and have a professional responsibility in detecting fraud, including auditors, 
regulators and audit committees, only account for identifying some 35 per cent of the 
fraud cases, while the remainder of fraud (65 per cent) is spotted through external 
parties and/or mechanisms that have no direct responsibility for detection. What 
should be noted is that Dyck et al.’s sample is based on published and prosecuted 
frauds. Many potential financial misreporting instances never enter the public 
domain – instead, they are prevented through regular company audit processes 
(internal and external), or through company ‘internal’ (non-public) whistle-blowing. 
This implies that Dyck et al.’s picture needs to be completed with these ‘missing’ 
cases in order to arrive at a more realistic and valid discovery rate of frauds.
Analysts’ judgment on earnings management pressures and executive job demands 
reverses radically after a restatement announcement
Analysts not only fail to recognize the ‘red flags’ hinting at a forthcoming restatement; 
according to our study, in their assessments of a CEO’s job pressures and behaviours, 
they actually seem to prefer executives who are under pressure to exceed financial 
performance expectations, and are being pushed to maximize their strategic and 
organizational goals. In the period leading up to the restatement, we found that 
the greater these pressures, the more favourable an analysts’ assessment of CEO 
behaviour is. This seems to be at odds with rational decision making, as research 
has shown that the likelihood of restatements actually increases when executives 
face higher earnings management pressures and/or higher job demands. Further, 
analysts who follow a company in a particular industry will most likely follow other 
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competing companies operating within that same industry. And colleague analysts, 
both at the analyst’s own firm as well as with other analyst firms, routinely write 
so-called ‘industry reports.’ This accumulation of information – readily available 
to analysts and a critical gatekeepers’ function – should provide analysts with a 
sound basis for making judgments on what the typical benchmark and/or financial 
performance space is for the company they follow. In other words, analysts should 
very well know, within a given industry, whether a company’s financial performance 
targets are aggressive or defensive – the extremes are documented. Therefore, the 
root cause for analysts’ failure to not recognize the misstatement red flags is not 
to be found in the lack of available data. It is in the twisting of such data to their 
own advantage – staying aboard the bandwagon and forecasting often untenable 
earnings forecasts and recommendations – which seem to be driving their reports. 
In the next paragraphs, we will review some of the more intangible factors that we 
believe analysts are exposed to.
As discussed earlier in Study 3, overconfident CEOs are more prone to engage in 
earnings management (Hribar & Yang, 2006). The interview study and theory on CEO 
confidence suggest a possible explanation for the above behaviour. CEO confidence 
levels and the taking of an optimistic tone in conference calls have previously been 
identified as explanation for an unintentional optimism underlying analysts’ earnings 
forecasts (Sedor, 2002). Our first and second studies provide supporting evidence for 
this (over)confidence contagion effect – analysts do have restatement triggering data 
available; however, they seem to be blinded and/or ‘captured’ by both the rhetoric 
and apparent high confidence levels of the same CEOs who aggressively try to meet 
unrealistic earnings targets. Put differently, the question is whether we can truly label 
restatements as ‘predictable surprises’? We believe this to be appropriate, because to 
analysts as well as the market, most restatements come as a surprise, even though, 
objectively speaking, abundant information was available that provided a strong 
collective of evidence that a restatement was forthcoming. 
Recently, behavioural scientists have written extensively on the phenomenon of 
predictable surprises. Bazerman and Watkins (2004: 1) define a predictable surprise 
as:
An event or set of events that take an individual or group by surprise, despite 
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prior awareness of all of the information necessary to anticipate the events 
and their consequences.
Interesting in the context of our research is that the collapse of Enron and the 
apparent failure of auditor independence are considered by Bazerman and Watkins 
to be a primary example of a predictable surprise. We would argue that a primary role 
of all gatekeepers is to prevent predictable surprises. But before we address possible 
solutions to timely recognizing (or prevention), of a forthcoming restatement, let 
us consider some of the common traits of predictable surprises to see whether 
restatements would qualify.
First, there is acknowledgement that a problem exists and that it could not solve 
itself. Our studies confirm that analysts do recognize high earnings management 
pressures and high job demands. They also know, both from earlier restatements and 
from market knowledge, that such pressures make CEOs prone to placing themselves 
in a situation where their ‘success’ leads them to resort to engaging in accounting 
irregularities (thus creating the need for eventual restatement). However, as our 
second study shows, before a restatement occurs, analysts seem to perceive these 
pressures as positive – routinely forecasting that the company and its CEO are 
expected to outperform the market and/or its competitors.
Second, analysts also know that such pressures, if they exist for a longer period of 
time, will only exacerbate the earnings management pressure. Here, the theory of 
embarking down the ‘slippery slope’ provides some possible explanation for analysts’ 
behaviour – relatively small (or larger), but consistently incremental steps create a 
‘lock-in.’ Step-by-step (reporting period-after-reporting period), analysts have shown 
commitment to playing the so-called ‘number’s game’ – effectively allowing CEOs to 
beat analysts’ earnings forecasts by extending the ‘financial reporting threshold,’ or 
integrity benchmark.
A third feature Bazerman and Watkins mention is that of discounting the future. Why 
would analysts spend time and effort shunning the herd mentality of their colleague 
analysts who also follow the same company/industry and have bought into a CEO’s 
hype? By lowering their recommendations and/or earnings forecasts, analysts are 
incurring a significant reputational risk, and one that often has an associated cost, 
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be it job security or business opportunity.  If changing their recommendation has an 
immediate and direct cost, and if the future benefit is highly uncertain and difficult 
to project, then what professional incentive do analysts truly have to go against the 
grain?
Commitment bias, discussed earlier in our theory for Study 2, is a fourth generic 
ingredient for predictable surprises. People tend to maintain status quo. Analysts 
who have taken a position on a company’s future performance are reluctant to 
change their views, in particular when management is able to deliver above-average 
market performance (so far).
The importance of the concept of predictable surprise to gatekeeper failures 
The stock market crash of 1987 proved that the unexpected can indeed happen. 
Thereafter, the financial world has been hit by a range of scandals that stronger 
business acumen may have foreseen: the Dot-Com Crash of 2000; the avalanche 
of accounting irregularities from 2001 onwards (the subject of our research); the 
securities analyst conflict of interest; the rampant stock-option backdating exposed 
in 2006; the global credit crisis that began to be deeply felt in 2007; and finally, the 
large Ponzi-schemes and other more recent discoveries of record-breaking deceit 
and fraud. The history of financial frauds and scandals over the past 50 years alone 
reveals that the ‘innovative’ powers of those with no qualms over engaging in deceit 
in pursuit of the almighty dollar, has increased exponentially alongside advances 
embedded in the complexities of financial products, the markets and the inherent 
associated risks therein.
Many studies in behavioural finance and economics (Gilson & Kraakman, 2003; 
Chugh, Bazerman & Banaji, 2005) have made it abundantly clear that human 
decision-making is ‘rationally bounded’ – constrained by bounded awareness and 
bounded ethicality, and also influenced by biases. These flaws in decision-making 
should be recognized by all parties involved in corporate monitoring functions – the 
executives, their gatekeepers, and the regulators. In order to improve the effectiveness 
of corporate monitoring, we need to obtain a deeper understanding of how biases 
and boundedness play a role in these multilateral relationships, and why legislators 
and regulators need to be placed on the front lines and forthright into owning the 
responsibilities each of those functions are burdened with.
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Legislators and regulators have vigorously reacted to these crises, scandals and 
irregularities. Recent examples include replacing self-regulation of the U.S. auditing 
profession with public oversight through the creation of the PCAOB; the Global 
Settlement by the major investment banks to ascertain independence and integrity 
by analysts; the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006; and the Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation, impacting gatekeeper practices of corporate legal counsel, the independent 
board and audit committees. However, irrespective of all these regulatory attempts 
to improve gatekeeper functioning, new crises still arose, as recent history clearly 
evidences. As a consequence, this has led some observers and academics (Tillman, 
2008), to assert that gatekeepers formed networks of reputational intermediaries’ 
who colluded with corporate executives to add legitimacy to illegal schemes rather 
than prevent their occurrence. Bazerman and his colleagues (Moore et al., 2006; 
Bazerman et al. 2006) wrote extensively on auditors’ failures, which stemmed mainly 
from impaired independence caused by conflicts of interests. Even approaching the 
gatekeeper topic mainly from a legalistic point of view, Coffee (Coffee Jr., 2004) also 
identified that conflicts of interest and associated biases cause auditors, analysts and 
rating agencies to fail in their role as gatekeepers.
Academics have provided the financial world with ample evidence that gatekeepers 
are both actors and/or victims of predictable surprises. Caused by common human 
biases they fail to recognize upcoming crisis situations and hence fail to deliver 
on their role of gatekeepers. In the discussion section, we shall suggest possible 
improvements to the analysts’ gatekeeper role, but more generally, we shall make 
collective recommendations on the current ‘institutionalized’ role of gatekeepers. 
Other gatekeepers’ failure to recognize corporate predictable surprises
Bazerman and Watkins (2004), who also gave Congressional testimony on the topic 
(26 September 2006 and 10 July 2002), document extensively how conflicts of interest 
have caused auditor independence failures: 
Auditors, who believe they are honest, despite being biased, are likely to view 
criminal prosecution as a distant and unlikely possibility. The unconscious 
nature of biases that lead to predictable surprises makes them particularly 
difficult to address and correct.
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In a more recent BusinessWeek article, Michael Watkins (2007), co-author with 
Bazerman of the book Predictable Surprises, provides substantial support for the 
notion that the subprime crisis (which ignited the credit crisis), could also clearly 
be classified as a predictable surprise. Though regulators, risk managers, corporate 
executives and their boards, and the markets generally did not see it coming – 
nevertheless, the information was there. As former U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Chairman William Donaldson mentioned in his presentation to the CFA society of 
Washington (Donaldson, 2008, p.21):
So, if the Fed didn’t blow the whistle, analysts should have taken their 
analytics and documentation to other regulators or legislative committees. I 
don’t mean to sound naive about the way the markets work, but it is hard to 
imagine looking at what was going on in the United States before 2007 and 
not seeing the subprime problem that was building.
Similar to the question of why analysts go along with the overly-optimistic predictions 
of CEOs when it comes to earnings growth, Langevoort (2004) argues) that directors, 
in their role as monitors, will be highly reluctant to interfere with firm and/or CEO 
strategies that they suspect might have a positive pay-off for the firm. Again, as long 
as the CEO is successful, they will increase theirs powers to control the board through 
various capture mechanisms and, as a consequence, the board will more often than 
not relax and submissively rest in its acquiescence. 
Analysts do not blame themselves for not anticipating restatements
The descriptive statistics in Study 2 show that analysts rate their knowledge on 
accounting matters as well as their probing skills during the restatement crisis to 
be between ‘sufficient’ and ‘high.’ In their own view, analysts’ failure to recognize 
restatements is not due to weak analysis or probing on their part – mean scores are 
ranked between ‘little ’ and ‘some ’ for the degree to which they saw these factors 
as reducing their ability to anticipate the restatement. These scores indicate that 
analysts have a self-serving attitude when it comes to admitting failure. This view is 
supported by the analysts’ scores in the extent to which they rely on other analysts to 
arrive at their judgments – the mean score was between ‘very low’ and ‘a little.’ Further, 
their reported regret about having issued a recommendation, again, was on the ‘very 
slight,’ to ‘slight’ level. This behaviour can be explained by the self-serving attribution 
bias in which people tend to assign positive events to their personal involvement, 
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while negative events are attributed to events outside their influence (e.g., Jones 
& Nisbett, 1971). We also found that analysts who rated themselves as competent 
were more negative in their ratings of CEO behaviour during the restatement crisis. 
This could indicate that the ‘smarter’ analysts were more aware of the fraud risks 
of the company and CEO, and therefore, were also more critical of the CEO during 
the restatement resolution. However, as we did not measure analysts’ competence 
ourselves (we only obtained their own perceptions), it is difficult to conclude whether 
these self-assessments also indicate self-serving attitudes. 
Other gatekeepers are also avoiding self blaming and/or apologies 
Blame taking and apologies in the corporate world are fraught with legal liability 
considerations. Patel and Healy (2003) note that corporate attorneys routinely 
recommend against executives apologizing in public. However, in his review of 
‘black letters,’ Patel concludes that in court these apologies hardly result in evidence 
of guilt. The current upheaval and the refusal of bank executives and regulators to 
apologize for the credit crisis once more proves that public apology and blame taking 
remain taboo.
Analysts overreact to restatement announcements and show signs of irrationality in 
their judgment/assessments
Our findings in Study 2 show that the more disappointed analysts were by the 
restatement, the less positive they were about the reputation remediation behaviour 
of the CEO after the restatement. Westphal and Clement (2008) examine how social 
influence and reciprocity shape relations between top executives and securities 
analysts. They argue that in repeated interactions, as is the case in the analyst-
executive relationship, social exchange and reciprocity of favours is more pervasive. 
Westphal and Clement also note that in opposite cases (cases in which injurious 
acts are committed), the motivation to punish harmful actions (a downgrade of a 
company by analysts), may even be stronger and more reliable than the motivation 
to reward helpful behaviour. Westphal and Clement’s research implies that in cases 
where ethicality is in question and ‘downgrades’ are issued by analysts as a result of 
a CEO’s involvement with a restatement, retaliation by executives can be expected. 
A ‘tit-for-tat’ approach by analysts could then lead to a downward spiral, piling onto 
the already-harmed relationship, and perhaps leading analysts to issue pre-emptive 
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negative statements on the CEO’s ethicality and suggest that malicious intent was 
applicable.
Other gatekeepers’ overreaction to crisis announcements 
Theories on herding behaviour (Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2001) provide evidence that 
investors also show over-reactions. They arise because uncertainties in publicly-
available information result in information cascading. Theories of counterfactual 
thinking (Roese & Olson, 1996 & 1997) and on regret (Lin, Huang & Zeelenberg 2006), 
also contribute to explanations for the overreactions of investors and the media to 
corporate financial crisis announcements.
Analysts primarily focus on short-term quantitative financial performance factors, 
ignoring longer-term, qualitative drivers of company value such as quality and 
integrity of leadership team
Our first study not only found that analysts can improve on their probing skills when 
it comes to uncovering the truth and seem to ignore ‘red flags,’ but it also made clear 
that discourse between analysts and executives primarily focuses on short-term 
results and quarterly estimates. A report issued in March 2007 (Commission on the 
Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century, 2007) by the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce quotes research (Graham et al., 2005) that found that executives admit 
that pressures from investors can lead companies to focus too much on short-term 
earnings, at the detriment of long-term growth. Based on a series of survey studies 
with executives and on archival data, the commission proposed an elimination of the 
practice of the issuance of quarterly earnings guidance. Major considerations were 
the earlier mentioned short-term focus, the considerable cost of quarterly guidance, 
and the often-irrational behaviour of markets following a company’s failure to 
achieve quarterly-earnings expectations. Members of the CFA (Chartered Financial 
Analysts Institute) substantially support these recommendations and also proposed 
that companies should provide additional information on the long-term drivers of 
business performance (CFA Institute, 2006). 
Recommendations by the CFA Institute on Communications and Transparency 
included:
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1. Encourage companies to provide more meaningful, and potentially more 
frequent, communications about strategy and long-term vision, including 
more transparent financial reporting that reflects a company’s operations.
2. Encourage greater use of plain language communications instead of the 
current communications dominated by accounting and legal language.
3. Endorse the use of corporate long-term investment statements to 
shareowners that will clearly explain – beyond the requirements that are 
now an accepted practice – the company’s operating model.
4. Improve the integration of the investor relations and legal functions for 
all corporate disclosure processes in order to alleviate the current bifurcated 
communications that confuse, rather than inform, investors and analysts.
5. Encourage institutional investors to make long-term investment 
statements to their beneficiaries similar to the statement the Panel is asking 
companies to make to their shareowners.
We also refer to earlier work on developing a framework for value-reporting 
developed by Eccles in cooperation with PricewaterhouseCoopers (Eccles, Herz, 
Keegan & Phillis, 2001). He develops a framework for voluntary corporate disclosures 
focusing the longer-term value drivers of a business. Healy and Palepu (2001), in their 
comprehensive review of the corporate disclosure literature, also provide a number 
of motives for firms and their executives to employ voluntary disclosures to improve 
the firm’s position in the eyes of capital market participants; additional disclosures 
diminish information asymmetry further and improve transparency.
263
263Chapter 5 – Overall Conclusions and Discussion
5.3 Summary of Findings
Our research finds that corporate executives underestimate the reputational 
consequences of restatements. Often, they fail to act timely in supplying comprehensive 
information as to the causes and consequences of the reporting failure. Executives, 
who are proactive in taking governance and reputation remediation actions, clearly 
outperform executives who are passive in their communication efforts. Further, the 
above research findings strongly suggest that analysts in restatement crises are not 
performing as well as they could as gatekeepers. Their probing activities, both in the 
period before the restatement and in the period following the announcement, do not 
focus enough on the warning signs caused by earnings management pressures and/
or high executive job demands – they mainly attend to routine questions on financial 
position developments. Next, their disclosures on company performance and of 
a company’s CEO before a restatement, mainly follow the information that their 
professional ‘dominant logic’ requires them to report on – analysts do not address or 
communicate on the more intangible drivers, or destructors, of company value, such 
as (1) corporate governance, control strengths, top team power distribution, and (2) 
perceived levels of CEO integrity, aggressiveness, dominance and/or narcissism. Our 
findings also support earlier research findings that analysts, both before and after 
a restatement, are biased in their views and decision making (e.g. overly optimistic 
before, overly pessimistic during a restatement crisis; under reacting to good news, 
overreacting to bad news). We also find, however, that other gatekeepers, including 
independent board members, exhibit the same behavioural ‘weaknesses,’ and are 
exposed to similar biases and boundedness. 
In our view, particularly in crisis situations, probing depth and straightforward, 
comprehensive disclosure are two key dimensions on which we could ‘measure’ or 
model, gatekeeper performance and ability. A third dimension consists of the degree 
to which biases and/or boundedness influence analysts’ perceptions, and hence their 
ratings, of corporate performance indicators. If we would apply these dimensions 
to the overall findings of our studies on how analysts perform as gatekeepers both 
before and after a restatement crisis, the following pictures arise:
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Figure 5.2 aNalysts oNly: Normal disclosure – No restatemeNt - visualizatioN
This is a conceptual picture showing a three-dimensional positioning space on the 
axes of: probing depth (x-axis), public disclosure (y-axis), and (estimated) capture and 
biases (z-axis). It shows that analysts, relative to other gatekeepers (see figures 5.4 
and 5.5) use lower than expected probing, disclose more than other gatekeepers and 
have some bias.2
Figure 5.3 shows the relative and conceptual visualization of the Analyst as gatekeeper. 
Our investigations in this study show that analysts’ probing activities improve (from 
-3 to -1), however, shallow answers are still accepted (see Study 1); disclosures on non-
financial data relevant to assessing the company increase (from +2 to +4); capture 
and bias also increase, as is supported to an extent by our findings in Study 2 (and 3). 
The analysts’ relevance in the ‘disclosure’ process increases from 2 to 3 (relatively to 
other gatekeepers) 
If we would extend this three-dimensional model of primary gatekeeper functions to 
other gatekeepers in the current governance paradigm – what does it reveal about 
these individual gatekeepers as professionals in restatement (and/or crisis) situations, 
2  We used ‘relative’ scales for all three dimensions from -5 to +5. In addition the relevance of a particular gatekeeper group in a company’s ‘disclo-
sure verification’ process was conceptually represented by the relative size of the gatekeeper ‘sphere’ (from 1 (unimportant), to 5 (very important). 
In the No restatement Graph for Analysts: x = -3, y = +2, z = =3; Sphere relevance = 2). Note: these are conceptualizations and are based on the 
authors’ estimates and not on exact data from this study.
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and can we suggest improvements both at the individual gatekeeper level, and on 
the current, collective ‘system’ of gatekeepers? This question will be addressed in the 
discussion section which follows.
Figure 5.3 aNalysts oNly: restatemeNt hits – capture aNd biases - visualizatioN 
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5.4 Discussion Themes
5.4.1	wHat	blinds	gatekeePers	during	restatements?	
In the general context of corporate governance, the core function of gatekeepers 
is reducing the undesirable effects of informational asymmetries caused by the 
segregation of owners and managers of firms, and simultaneously reducing agency 
costs of management arising from this split. More specifically, and in the context 
of financial reporting fraud, corporate gatekeepers should act as independent third-
party monitors capable of interdicting in the wrongdoing of corporate executives by 
withholding their necessary cooperation. This cooperation mainly concerns attesting 
to the reliability and appropriateness (quality) of corporate information or actions. 
Examples include auditor opinions on financial statements, downgrades of bonds 
by credit rating agencies, fairness opinions of investment banks, securities analysts’ 
earnings estimates and recommendations, and attorneys acting as securities 
transaction reviewers.
Current academic research on corporate gatekeepers (including their failures) is 
mainly derived from the framework developed earlier in 1984 by Gilson and Kraakman 
(2003). In a series of articles, they conceptualized corporate gatekeepers as third-party 
corporate monitors with the capacity to intervene in wrongdoing by withholding 
their required cooperation. The collapse of Enron and the subsequent avalanche of 
financial restatements, corporate scandals, and also the recent credit crisis, have 
resulted in substantial criticism of the role that gatekeeper institutions played. 
Most of these criticisms are either directed at a specific gatekeeper institution, or 
are composed from a single discipline point of view (legalistic, auditing, governance 
and/or regulatory). Since Enron’s failure, academics and regulators have abundantly 
and exuberantly addressed failures in the system design and operations of individual 
gatekeeper institutions – expressed clearly by Katsoris and quoted by Gilson and 
Kraakman (2003: 6) as follows:
The amount of culpability may be exceeded only by the volume of related 
scholarship, simply illustrated by the number of symposia on corporate 
fraud and misreporting since Enron’s bankruptcy.
In our view, however, the causes of individual gatekeeper failures should not be 
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addressed from a single discipline perspective, but rather, based on the findings of 
our three studies, corporate governance system overhauls should concentrate on 
two overarching questions fundamental to the problem:
1. How can gatekeepers avoid being blinded and captured by the dominant 
logic of their profession in gatekeeper situations? We think this can be 
achieved by probing deeper and by recognizing gatekeeper biases and 
boundedness.
2. How can inter-gatekeeper cooperation be improved? How can the walls of 
professional (protective) immune systems be torn down? We think this can 
be achieved by cooperative disclosures, which need to be coordinated by 
the firm’s audit committee.
5.4.2	 How	 can	 gatekeePers	 avoid	 being	 blinded	 and	 caPtured	 by	 tHe	 dominant	
logic	oF	tHeir	ProFession?
Dominant logic can be defined as: 
…Embedded in standard operating procedures, shaping not only how the 
members of the organisation act but also how they think … becomes the lens 
through which managers see all emerging opportunities … If the competitive 
environment is subject to rapid changes, however, the blinders of dominant 
logic will make it hard to recognise new threats and opportunities (Prahalad, 
2004: 2).
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) mainly wrote on dominant logic from the perspective of 
corporate strategy, however, their research findings have been used to explain other 
corporate processes as well, such as the effects of diversity on firm performance. Cyert 
& March (1963) wrote on the concept of the dominant coalition as those members of 
an organization who effectively determine and guard the strategic and operational 
preferences. Both concepts can also be applied to the functioning of gatekeepers. 
Almost by definition, today all gatekeepers are functioning in a professional system, 
which includes requirements on education and qualification, accreditation and public 
responsibility, professional rules and regulations, and rules of ethics.
Next to these individual professional requirements, as institutions, gatekeeper 
professions have become the subject of  demanding laws and regulations covering 
268
268
profession management aspects, which include quality control systems, review by 
regulators, independence requirements, insurance coverage, compliance with rules 
and regulations, and an ever-increasing administrative burden. The combination of 
these individual gatekeeper demands and compliance with ‘institutional’ requirements 
can lead to professionals being blinded by the avalanche of rules and regulations. 
The individual efforts to stay ‘in-line’ and adhere to an absolute no-exceptions basis 
within these rules, puts a weighty burden on the shoulders of individual gatekeepers. 
Compliance competes with, and eats away at, not-insignificant components of 
available intellectual energy and professional appreciation. 
The agency problem of keeping managers aligned with the goals of the corporation 
also applies to gatekeeper firms and the relationship they have with their agents, 
the individual gatekeepers. Professionalism and identification with the gatekeeper 
firm (whether its brand or reputation), are two factors identified by Fox (2008), 
which can be seriously affected in a negative sense by the notions of increased 
compliance and administrative demands referred to previously. As professionals, 
individual gatekeepers – be it analysts, auditors or rating agents – are expected to 
identify themselves with the ‘larger’ public purpose of their professions. However, 
increased compliance demands, and the consequential overload of administrative 
requirements, could potentially blind professionals by hindering intellectual 
inquisitiveness, impair sound professional scepticism, and limit probing efforts. 
Identification by gatekeeper-agents with their gatekeeper firm has been potentially 
damaged by the demise of Andersen in 2002, more recent failures (or closing) of 
some of the renowned investment banks, and also the inability of rating agencies, 
investment bankers, and central bankers (acting as regulators and supervisors) to 
warn about the looming credit crisis.
Also, the increasing size and corporate culture prevalent in most gatekeeper firms 
can be considered as twin forces, which together seriously weaken a gatekeepers’ 
identification with the firm they are working for. This could result in gatekeeper 
agents’ underperformance in their higher-level social role connected with their 
professions. These threats to function and alignment of individual gatekeepers have 
been noted to an extent by management of gatekeeper firms. Typical reactions have 
been to develop training programs on the importance of compliance. However, 
both gatekeepers’ senior management and regulators have underestimated the 
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behavioural consequences of the current compliance culture. Some new initiatives 
need to be developed. 
Figure 5.4 gatekeepers: Normal disclosure - No restatemeNt situatioN - visualizatioN
The relative positions of the various gatekeepers in a ‘business as usual’ setting can 
be estimated (on average) for conceptual visualization based on the table shown 
below. Of interest is that those with the greatest probing abilities (External Auditors 
(EA) and Audit Committee (AC), disclose the least; while Analysts and Rating Agencies 
(RA), probe low and disclose relatively more. 
table 5.1 gatekeepers relative positioNiNg aNd assigNed values – Normal disclosure, No restatemeNt 
situatioN
Axes
(An)
Analysts
(AC) Audit 
Committee
(EA)External
Auditors
(IA) Internal 
Audit
(RA) Rating
Agents
(Reg)
Regulators
X - 3 + 1 + 4 + 2 - 5 + 2
Y + 2 - 3 - 3 - 5 + 1 - 5
Z + 2 + 3 - 4 - 2 + 3 - 4
5.4.3	How	to	imProve	inter-gatekeePer	cooPeration?
In his book Gatekeepers, Coffee (2006) writes how auditors, attorneys, securities 
analysts, credit-rating agencies and investment bankers, as professions, have 
evolved, performed, and changed their behaviour over the last century. He assigns 
gatekeepers the functionality of standing outside, and acting as an independent 
watchdog or monitor. Gatekeepers screen out flaws or defects, or verify compliance 
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with standards or procedures. And on the basis of their professional and/or legal 
standards, gatekeepers can withhold consent or necessary cooperation.
An essential ingredient of gatekeepers in the corporate world is that they are ‘repeat’ 
players – they act therefore as so-called ‘reputational intermediaries,’ adding some 
sort of assurance value to the information signals sent by corporations and their 
executives. Gatekeepers can function only when they have sufficient reputational 
capital at risk. This, however, leads precisely to our argument that gatekeepers, in 
order to protect their capital, will throw up barriers of professional rules to augment 
their immunity from attacks on their reputational capital. Gatekeepers function as 
reputational intermediaries, and according to Coffee (2006) they can only operate 
effectively if their reputational capital is both considerable, and surrounded by strong, 
reliable defences. However, as noted earlier, these protective devices also result in an 
overly inward-looking attitude, which can easily lead to ‘groupthink,’ and irrational 
behaviour (Janis, 1982). 
Consequently, the chances of contagion from within-group predispositions and/or 
biases increase, as is also evidenced by this study. Changes in rules and regulations, 
particularly those dealing with updating corporate governance systems after a 
corporate scandal has emerged, only contributed to this inward and group-focused 
protection. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act led to increasing demands for all 
gatekeeper groups (auditors, independent board members, legal counsel, and 
analysts), around technical competencies, objectivity, and independence and 
professional standards. These enhanced ‘professional’ requirements, while indeed 
leading to higher-quality gatekeepers, at the same time lead to thicker protective 
immune-system layers, impenetrable by most non-professionals and lay-persons. 
Herding and informational cascading within these gatekeeper groups only serves to 
further exacerbate the situation.
Proposed solutions to gatekeeper failures:
After considerable deliberations, Coffee (2006) suggests the appointment of an 
attorney, or an investment banking firm, as a firm’s disclosure counsel, reporting 
directly to the audit committee – ultimately preferring an attorney to take on this new 
gatekeeper function. He also suggests additional rules for the existing gatekeepers, 
mainly to resolve possible hidden conflicts of interests and independence issues, 
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and proposes additional liabilities when these rules are violated. Fox (2008) chooses 
the investment banker as the primary ‘new’ gatekeeper. The argument Fox uses is 
that the investment bank already has in-depth experience with reviewing corporate 
disclosures in public offerings. However, the demise of many of the most-respected 
and most-venerable investment banks during the current credit crisis has had 
severe implications to their ‘reputational capital’ – not even considering their 
monetary capital, which in some cases, no longer exists. Some recommendations on 
resolving the above findings and/or discrepancies have been addressed in section 5.6 
Managerial Implications.
5.4.4	ceo	Power	in	restatement	situations	and	indePendent	board	‘caPture’	
How do CEOs get away with financial reporting fraud? What causes gatekeeper 
failure by independent boards? Financial reporting fraud, in many cases, is not 
only perpetrated by the CEO, but other gatekeepers (including independent board 
members, legal counsel, and/or the CFO and lower management echelons), who act 
as partners in crime, or succumb to pressures by the CEO. Many academic studies, 
reports by regulators, and litigation following restatements, confirm this fact (GAO 
reports; PwC Securities Litigation Survey; Hall, 2006; Tillman, 2008; Tourigny, Dougan, 
Washbush & Clements, 2003: 5). These last authors write:
Often, boards do not include outsiders who are likely to play the role of the 
devil’s advocate in the decision-making processes. Unchallenged agreement 
is more likely to occur when a majority of directors have significant friendship 
or business relationships with other board members. Boards of Directors 
may thus ignore important warnings, hold negative, stereotypical views 
of stakeholder groups who present strong opposition to their prescribed 
courses of action, and exercise pressure on one another to conform to group 
norms. Such behaviors would reflect the presence of groupthink (Janis, 1972), 
a phenomenon that can lead to spectacularly defective decisions.
On the Enron case, McLean and Elkind, in The Smartest Guys in the Room wrote: 
Enron’s corporate culture hints that there was an intense psychological 
dynamic at work in which ego, hubris, narcissism, rationalization and self-
deception were strong forces at both the individual and organizational 
levels.
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Corporate dishonesty has also been studied from a psychological angle. Hall (2006) 
and Langevoort (2004) link corporate dishonesty to specific cognitive biases, 
including: self-attribution bias (pre-occupation with self-image), confirmation bias 
(deflecting negative information) and to commitment bias (adhering to positions 
already taken). 
Figure 5.5 gatekeeper: restatemeNt hits - relative positioNiNg - visualizatioN
Figure 5.5 shows, again, based on a subjective assessment and relative positioning, 
that those with the greatest probing abilities (and possibilities) in restatement 
situations, are either relatively more ‘captured’ by the board (and are hence biased), 
such as the Audit Committee; or, are less biased, like the Internal Auditors (IA) and 
External Auditors (EA), but are unable, under current regulations, to disclose great 
detail on their findings and probing. The ‘ideal’ space in this conceptualization 
(high probing, high disclosure, and low capture/bias, is not ‘occupied’ by any of the 
gatekeepers. The above conceptual picture is based on the following subjective 
assignment of values:
table 5.2 gatekeeper relative positioNiNg aNd assigNed values: restatemeNt hits:
Axes
(An)
Analysts
(AC) Audit 
Committee
(EA)External
Auditors
(IA) Internal 
Audit
(RA) Rating
Agents
(Reg)
Regulators
X - 1 + 3 + 5 + 3 - 2 + 5
Y + 4 + 2 - 4 - 5 - 3 - 1
Z +  4 + 4 - 2 - 1 + 1 - 2
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 Please also note the subjective assignment of relevance of the various gatekeepers 
(i.e. size of ‘sphere’) based on the table below.
table 5.3 gatekeeper relative importaNce
Axes
(An)
Analysts
(AC) Audit 
Committee
(EA)External
Auditors
(IA) Internal 
Audit
(RA) Rating
Agents
(Reg)
Regulators
No Restat 2 2 3 1 1 1
Yes Restat 3 4 3 1 2 3
As Langevoort notes, many of these biases are also applicable to gatekeepers, such as 
independent board members, auditors, and analysts. Such self-deception, combined 
with a lack of awareness of other cognitive biases (see Chugh & Bazerman’s (2007) 
concept of bounded awareness), can lead persons astray in ethical judgments of 
both themselves and of those whom they should monitor. Conversely, there are well-
known examples that, irrespective of companies’ and their boards’ compliance with 
state-of-the-art governance practices, have still seen corporate scandals occur below 
their noses. Langevoort (2004: 289) writes: 
The recent financial reporting scandals have cast ample doubt on the efficacy 
of corporate boards as monitors. Many of the boards in question, including 
Enron’s, exceeded common best-practices standards for independence and 
committee structure, yet there were still dramatic failures.
In his essay, ‘Resetting the Corporate Thermostat…’, Langevoort (2004) develops logic 
that as long as the CEO uses his or her executive powers to a degree that it might 
embarrass independent directors in their networks, directors tend to go along with the 
CEO. However, it is when the CEO faces incurring damage to their own ‘reputational 
capital,’ that they object and take action. The next argument which Langevoort 
develops, as to why boards fail to stop misreporting (or other irregularities), is that 
boards need to act collectively. If an individual board member protests, he or she 
could easily lose the support of other board members, and hence, damage their own 
prestige and position. Recent corporate disasters in the credit crisis again confirm 
this phenomenon (ABN Amro (Smit, 2008), Fortis, RBS). Next, board members spend 
a limited amount of time in their monitoring role, and mainly act with an external 
view as a reality-check for management’s development and execution of corporate 
strategy. Seldom will board members use the investigative and probing powers given 
to them under corporate statutes. Finally, board members are dependent on the 
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information they receive from executives, which – considering the complexities of 
the data – can easily be manipulated.
For board members to judge management’s credibility and integrity, they can rely 
on only a limited number of ‘objective’ resources made available to them, including 
an independent auditor’s report, reports on internal controls, internal audit reports, 
and reports and/or investigation by legal counsel. In conclusion, independent board 
members are therefore ‘captured’ by the executives, are under pressure to stick to 
the status-quo, and they tend not to probe sufficiently, as that could risk opening a 
Pandora’s Box of unwanted and uncontrollable events.
Finally, an individual firm’s misreporting activities may have negative spill over to 
related firms, governments, and investors. For example, Sidak (2003) argues that 
fraudulent disclosures and financial reports can send false signals to industry 
players about new investment opportunities, lead governments to pursue incorrect 
regulatory policies, and cause capital rationing in the industry.
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5.5 Theoretical Relevance
This dissertation makes several contributions to the existing literature on behavioural 
accounting, corporate governance and reputation management.
First, we developed a simplified model of restatement severity and linked the two 
dimensions of this model with theories as to what constitutes effective corporate 
communication. To date, studies on the severity of restatements (Palmrose et 
al., 2004; Hirschey, Palmrose & Scholz, 2003; Anderson & Yohn, 2002), are mainly 
based on archival data, associating characteristics of restatements (typology, 
fraud, financial impact, governance structures) with the movement of stock prices. 
Our first study builds on this knowledge through the identification and analysis of 
forces that exacerbate perceived restatement severity. Through the extension of our 
model of restatement severity, with perception components on the axes of intent 
and information distortion, this dissertation deepens prior studies on perception 
management that have examined identity signalling to stakeholders and subsequent 
behavioural reactions (Berens, Van Riel, & Van Bruggen, 2005; Brown, 1998; Fombrun 
& Shanley, 1990). However, those prior studies did not provide insight into the role 
of organizational power games and governance breakdowns and the corresponding 
threats they signal for both corporate and CEO reputation. Our first study also 
contributes to the crisis management literature, extending studies on the role of 
corporate executives in crisis remediation (Coombs, 2007; Kim et al., 2006) with an 
analysis of CEO reputation threats arising from forensic investigations following 
a restatement.  Next, as our first study used corporate communication discourse 
(between executives and analysts), we contributed to the literature studying the 
relationship between communication tone and investor perceptions (Craig & 
Amernic, 2004; Davis et al., 2008).
Second, our studies contribute to literature on earnings management. The wave of 
accounting scandals and restatements between 2001 and 2007 strongly increased 
the demand for Earnings Management research – for a recent overview see Ronen & 
Yaari (2008). Earnings management consists of a collection of acts by executives that 
influences reported accounting earnings or affects their qualitative interpretation. 
These acts include production and investment decisions, construction of legal formats 
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and contractual parameters of transactions, choosing accounting frameworks, and 
often include the application of judgment in accounting estimates. However, many 
instances of earnings management involve the aggressive application of accounting 
principles, enabling management to ‘control’ reported short-term earnings. 
Following the accounting scandals, some studies focused on suggesting measures 
to avoid earnings management (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Coffee 
Jr., 2004b,  2006); other studies attempted to find explanation as to why the earnings 
management phenomenon exists (Dechow et al., 1996; Skinner & Dechow, 2000; 
Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Hunton, Libby & Mazza, 2006; Van der Tas, 1996); 
while still others investigate the consequences for long-term financial performance 
(Roosenboom, Van der Goot & Mertens, 2003; Teoh, Welch & Wong, 1998).
Many studies on earnings management use archival data to model causes and 
consequences of earnings management, concentrating  on providers of earnings 
management (mostly senior executives), or focusing on the receivers of earnings 
information – either plain users (investors, regulators, creditors or consumers), or 
gatekeepers. Our study contributes to the earnings management literature as we 
analyse the interaction between the providers (senior executives), and primary users 
of earnings information, the analysts. Rather than using archival data we have polled 
analysts directly on their perceptions as to whether earnings management pressures 
on CEOs exist and have also asked analysts for their assessment of CEO behaviour, both 
before and after a restatement. Therefore, by directly addressing analyst perceptions 
of CEO behaviour, we believe our research provides a unique contribution to existing 
earnings management literature. Our study also confirms and extends earlier findings 
that earnings management is not always considered a capital crime. Graham finds 
that both CFOs and CEOs prefer to smooth earnings, rather than have large volatility 
in reported earnings (Graham et al., 2005). Our study confirms that analysts too prefer 
companies (and executives), that can ‘reliably’ produce steady earnings more so than 
companies with surprising ‘un-managed’ earnings. However, this seems to conflict 
with a recent (unpublished) analysts’ survey study (De Jong, Mertens, Van der Poel & 
Van Dijk, 2008) which finds that only some 13 per cent of analysts prefer companies 
to carry out earnings management at the sacrifice of longer-term performance. This 
could be explained by the ‘bargaining’ format of questioning used in De Jong et al.’s 
study; however, this area requires further research.
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In developing the concept of executive job demands and its consequences for 
strategy (Hambrick et al. 2005a; Hambrick et al. 2005b; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2006), 
Hambrick and his colleagues suggested that excessive job demands could be (part of) 
an explanation for why executives, facing severe pressure, commit reporting fraud. 
To our knowledge, our research is the first contribution to this theory that actually 
measures the constructs underlying executive job demands and how they are 
perceived by one gatekeeper group. Through the lens of analysts, we have measured 
perceptions of executive aspiration levels, job demands and task demands. Through 
our subsequent interviews and the combination of our measurements centred on 
perceived CEO dominance, CEO accounting aggressiveness, and CEO communication 
skills in restatement situations, we also provide additional insights into narcissistic 
attributes of CEOs, as developed by (Chatterjee & Hambrick 2006) and (Kets de Vries, 
2003).
 
Third, we contribute to the literature on analyst forecasting. In particular, our study 
contributes to a number of dimensions that Ramnath et al. (2008) distinguish based 
on a review of some 250 papers on analysts which have appeared in 11 major research 
journals since 1991. First, we contribute to the literature on analysts’ decision processes 
by extending earlier work (Previts et al. 1994: Lang & Lundholm 1996: Rogers & Grant 
1997) on which information sources and considerations analysts utilize in making 
their assessments. We confirm earlier findings that analysts are mainly focused on 
information related to short-term earnings. In addition, we provide evidence that 
analysts seem to be less interested in more intangible information, indicative of 
longer-term value, such as CEO competence and integrity, governance structures, 
and qualifications of countervailing powers (those of the CFO, Board and Audit 
Committee). Next, we extend earlier findings on the nature of analyst expertise, 
which studies are mainly based on archival data analyses (Clement et al., 2007; 
Bouwman, Frishkoff & Frishkoff, 1987; Hunton, McEwan & Bhattacharjee, 2001). 
Our findings confirm that analysts have strong beliefs in their own capacities and 
typically deny that they are influenced by reports and/or the assessments of other 
analysts. This contradicts pertinent findings of herding behaviour (Graham, 1999; 
Bernhardt et al., 2006; Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2001) amongst analysts and proves that 
they are boundedly aware of their own behaviour. This self-knowledge or rather, the 
impediments therein, are part of the dimension Ramnath et al. (2008) categorize as: 
‘Analysts’ incentives and behavioural biases.’ Some authors find that analysts suffer 
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from overconfidence (Daniel et al., 1997; Lin et al., 2006), which leads them to biased 
judgments, although others (Abarbanell & Lehavy, 2003; Amir & Ganzach, 1998) 
assert that the literature on analysts biases have produced conflicting evidence.
Through our direct measurement of bounding factors as perceived by the analysts 
themselves, we add important insights to the literature on analyst bias which, to date, 
is mainly based on archival data research (Friesen & Weller, 2006). Consistent with 
theories of counterfactual thinking (Roese & Olson, 1996, 1997; Sanna & Turley, 1996) 
and with theories on investor regret (Lin et al., 2006), we find that analysts overreact 
to restatement announcements and blame others for their incorrect assessments. 
We also find that analysts are blinded by overconfident CEOs, which is consistent 
with research on how other gatekeepers seem to be ‘captured’ (Langevoort, 2004; 
Moore & Healy, 2008; Paredes, 2005). Our study extends findings around the so-
called ‘slippery slope to fraud,’ which may possibly be applicable to analysts and other 
gatekeepers as well. In a state of ‘bounded awareness’ combined with mechanisms 
of capture and other biases, gatekeepers all seem to lose their ability to break away 
from the herd, and offer their own clear-eyed assessment of a company – they miss 
out on ‘long necks’ and a 20/20 vision.
We used a combination of content analyses, a comprehensive survey, and structured 
interviews to focus on the phenomenon of how ‘blinders’ in restatement situations 
arise, and how far the implications of those blinders may extend. This multiple 
format research enabled us to achieve an integrated perspective, and design and 
test a model on how financial misreporting affects analysts and the companies they 
follow. Our comprehensive survey, which consisted of 136 questions (Likert-scaled) 
and subsequent interviews, allowed us to create a number of new measurement 
constructs, which we then used in our model as to how analysts perceive CEOs in 
financial reporting crisis situations. The survey and interview methods also provided 
us with explanations about why analysts have favourable views, with respect to 
earnings management pressures and executive job demands, before a restatement 
is announced.
Finally, we contribute to literature on reputation management by showing how 
a group of stakeholders with a very high degree of expertise and involvement in 
the companies they evaluate (financial analysts) form perceptions of companies 
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in a crisis situation. While some previous studies have investigated reputation 
management in crisis situations (e.g. Benoit, 1997; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Klein & 
Dawar, 2004; Arpan & Pompper, 2003), they have generally focused on stakeholders 
with a relatively low involvement and expertise regarding the companies concerned 
(e.g. consumers, the general public). Similarly, while some studies have examined 
reputation management among audiences with a higher expertise and involvement, 
such as investors and employees (e.g. Smidts, Pruyn & Van Riel, 2001; Roberts & 
Dowling, 2002), these studies have generally not looked at crisis situations. Our 
studies show that perceptions of companies and their managers by highly involved 
and expert audiences in crisis situations are still subject to both biases and bounded 
rationality.
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5.6 Managerial Implications
We can discuss managerial implications of our research at several levels. First, there is 
the matter of preparers and users of firms’ financial statements, and the implications 
of the necessity to restate. In particular, we discuss some of the implications for 
the firm’s executives who are primarily responsible for ‘misreporting’ the true and 
fair view of these statements. Next, we will discuss some implications for analysts 
following companies. Finally, and in addition to the recommendations already 
made in the previous sections, we will discuss how independent boards, and more 
specifically, the audit committee, can improve their monitoring roles. 
The implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, including its severe penalties for 
engaging in financial reporting fraud (and the similar tightening of governance laws 
and regulations in other countries) has almost made financial misreporting a capital 
crime. Clearly, malicious intent in restatements is something only those, who Kets 
de Vries calls ‘Fools and Impostors’ (Kets de Vries, 2003) will engage in. However, 
managers need to be aware that the psychology of getting into corporate misreporting 
(Hall, 2006; Feng, Ge, Luo & Shevlin, 2008) often is taken in small, incremental steps 
over time, known as the ‘slippery slope’ (Schrand & Zechman, 2008). This ‘sliding off’ 
can be better illustrated by quoting remarks from a letter dated, 7 January  2009, by 
the (now) infamous ex-chairman of a global IT company Satyam, which  found itself 
in the midst of a reporting scandal recently (Raju, 2009):
What started as a marginal gap between actual operating profit and the 
one reflected in the books of accounts continued to grow over the years. It 
has attained unmanageable proportions as the size of company operations 
grew.
It was like riding a tiger, not knowing how to get off without being eaten.
The restatements we studied reveal that once a restatement is required, all earlier 
use of accounting discretion, interpretation, and decision-making by executives is 
judged with the unavoidable benefit of hindsight. Therefore, executives as well as 
their immediate gatekeepers need to take account of this and should openly and 
frequently discuss and record their accounting decision-making. Further, if mis-
reporting has occurred, our findings suggest that managers should be aware of the 
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acute information needs of analysts on both the causes and consequences of the 
required adjustments. Transparent and comprehensive reporting can be further 
stimulated by improved disclosures of how accounting discretion was used, providing 
the details necessary to properly assess the situation and addressing questions 
upfront, such as detailing past considerations and whether the restatement is a ‘true’ 
attack on net equity, or merely due to income-timing issues. The current upheaval 
around fair value accounting will put earnings volatility management in a different 
perspective for years to come – managers need to voice their concerns in this respect 
on a more coordinated and cohesive basis. 
Our research further suggests that the focus on short-term earnings, both by 
executives and analysts, needs serious reconsideration as it proves to be the culprit 
in the current company performance reporting paradigm. We find that even in 
misreporting crisis situations the focus of managers and analysts continuous to be 
on short-term value drivers. Consistent with the recommendations made by the 
American Chamber of Commerce, our findings would strongly support measures 
to abandon the expensive circus around quarterly earnings guidance. Rather, our 
findings indicate that if managers would pay greater attention to longer-term value 
drivers, again consistent with abundant studies, a company’s reputational endurance 
(staying-power) could greatly be enhanced as protection to short-term attacks caused 
by accounting errors.
For analysts, our findings suggest a need for more extensive education and training 
on accounting judgments and decision-making. A deeper understanding of how 
and where managers can properly utilize accounting discretion will sharpen the 
discussions in corporate conference calls. This would also imply that they have 
to upgrade their probing skills and ask more in-depth questions. Irrespective of 
reciprocity threats, if analysts individually and collectively pursued sharper and more 
probing questions, a more transparent information-sharing level would result. This 
benefits firms, their executives, and the analysts in their gatekeeper roles. 
 
R	1:	Recommendations	based	on	our	findings:	
Corporate Governance regulators and law-makers should consider assigning •	
‘super-gatekeeper’ powers to the audit committee of the independent board. 
The following powers need to be considered:
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• Convening bilateral and/or multilateral information exchange sessions 
with all other gatekeepers – internal and external legal counsel, internal 
audit, investor relations, external audit, and regulatory and/or supervisory 
representatives.
• Passive participation from audit committees in conference calls with 
analysts.
• Establishment of an inter-gatekeeper information-sharing/discussion 
platform. The open-access platform could also include an electronic 
repository of corporate ‘probing’ activities based on XBRL technologies. 
Probing activities would include audits, regulatory examinations, analysts’ 
industry reports, and rating considerations.
R	2:	Recommendations	based	on	our	findings:
‘Board capture’ needs to be elicited with the help of a dedicated ‘capture’ •	
diagnostic tool. The capture diagnosis should be carried out at the individual 
(independent) board member level, and should be reported to the chair of 
the audit committee. Based on the diagnostic tool, a capture report should 
be prepared to be shared with internal and external gatekeepers. Similar to 
reporting under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, significant capture situations should be 
considered for public disclosure. The three dimensions of our probe and disclose 
model – probe/verify, disclose relevant and comprehensible information, and 
assess impact of bias – should be an integral component of the ‘board-capture’ 
diagnosis model. We recognize that concentrating more powers with the chair 
of the audit committee leads to power concentration, and potentially to an 
‘inverse’ capture exposure – the CEO being captured by the audit committee. 
However, we believe that transparency on this topic and sharing information on 
it with other gatekeepers mitigates those risks.
The Remuneration Committee of the independent board needs to make regular •	
and explicit assessments of executive job demands and connect this assessment 
with risk management (risk appetite) policies, and the reward systems of 
executives. This triangulation of information, which could detect primary causes 
of misreporting and other corporate scandals, should include benchmarking 
with peer-group data. Again, the report must be shared with gatekeepers.
Considering the repetitive nature of corporate scandals, alongside the failure of •	
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gatekeepers in the current credit crisis, law-makers and regulators should act 
now to develop an appropriate academic research agenda:
• Study how the apparently structural presence of biases in gatekeepers 
affects their individual and collective monitoring effectiveness – what 
biases are structural, how do those spread throughout similar gatekeeper 
groups; which interactions and catalysts exist between these biases; and 
how are gatekeeper groups exposed to information through cascading 
and herding behaviour?
• Through regulation (or other means), ensure that academics can access 
sufficient numbers of primary gatekeepers, allowing them to conduct 
statistically powerful research on gatekeeper effectiveness.
• Universities should include behavioural accounting curricula in their 
gatekeeper education programs. They should consider at a minimum 
education centred on auditing and accounting, finance and risk 
management, investor relations and corporate communication, and a 
reward system design. Awareness programs on the causes and effects of 
common biases in crisis situations should be embedded in all corporate 
governance (training) programs.
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5.7 Limitations of This Study
Findings, conclusions and also the discussion section of this dissertation should 
be considered bearing some limitations in mind. In our first study, we developed 
a simplified model of restatement severity and used the two axes of the model 
to measure analyst’s severity ratings for the second study. We recognize that 
restatement severity is dependent on the viewpoint and function of the person 
gauging it. Disadvantaged shareholders, creditors facing insolvency, employees who 
lost their jobs, regulators who did not identify loopholes in laws and legislation, 
prosecuting lawyers, each may have a different view on the dimensions of severity, 
which is obviously dependant on the extent of damage incurred by victims. Also, the 
forces identified as having a potentially negative impact on restatement situations 
were limited to those readily observable in the case studies we conducted. If our 
sample of cases would have been extended, other relevant forces could have been 
identified. Similarly, our identification of reputational remediation actions (open, 
comprehensive and positive communication), was based on the same sample. The 
coding scheme we developed for the first study followed a grounded-theory approach. 
In working with the case study materials and developing the coding scheme, we 
may have developed views which were not representative of the total population of 
restatements at that time.
Finally, our first study could only use restatement documentation available in the 
public domain. We realize, and know from practice, that restatement situations 
lead to extensive debate and power struggles amongst internal gatekeepers – legal 
counsel, independent board members, the audit committee, internal audit, investor 
relations and corporate communication executives all playing a role. We have not 
been in a position to compare the publicly available material with internally available 
evidence, thus limiting the conclusions drawn and recommendations made. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the survey methodology suffers from several potential 
limitations. Our survey measures analysts’ perceptions, which may not always 
coincide with their actual judgments and decision-making on the companies they 
follow. In addition, analysts can potentially parrot explanations and reasoning that 
they learned in their professional education, or make mental references to standards 
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of work as promulgated by their profession (the CFA Institute). Also, of note, if we 
polled analysts on a subject which potentially damaged their career, their views 
could be tainted, or they may have provided socially – and/or politically – preferred 
responses. 
In our analyses of survey data we did not distinguish between certain analyst 
categories, such as experience, professional training background and/or country 
residence. The majority of analysts polled have an Anglo-Saxon background which 
could have tainted their views due to being closer to the bigger corporate scandals. 
They could be biased by their media exposure and/or association with some of 
the larger stock broker (analyst) firms. Further, analysts provide large collections 
of data on their assessments, including earnings estimates and company ratings. 
Our research concentrated on modelling analysts’ perceptions of CEO behaviour in 
restatement situations; we used analysts’ external data sources only for validating 
our construct of analysts’ severity assessments. Other constructs in our model, 
such as CEO competence and CEO integrity, were not compared to outside data to 
corroborate their validity. We believe that corroborating our findings with external 
data sources could further contribute to the depth of our analysis and should be done 
in future research.
Perhaps some of the survey questions were misunderstood, irrespective of our efforts 
in the introductory DVD (sent together with the survey invitation letter), to explain 
the background and formats of the questions. It is also possible that the respondents 
are not representative of the underlying total analyst population. Our sample of 
larger companies with a restatement which had a significant restatement share price 
effect after the restatement was announced, could also taint the analyst population 
and cause our sample not to be representative. 
The survey tool we used consisted of a large number of questions, which had the 
advantage of allowing us to gain a ‘complete’ picture. However, the danger is that 
after some time, the concentration of analysts may falter, and the questionnaire could 
be completed in a rush. Answers therefore, may be less reliable. Further, we measured 
that the average time analysts spent on the questionnaire was some 40 minutes. 
This is slightly longer than we expected, perhaps indicating that analysts found the 
questions difficult to comprehend, or that they had to dig deeper into their memory. 
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This brings us to the next limitation. We used various formats for questioning, which 
included questions with the instruction to either not use hindsight, or alternatively, to 
indeed use the benefits of hindsight. So, for some questions, analysts had to go back in 
their memory (and/or documentation) and elicit thoughts and assessments they had 
a few years ago when the restatement they were queried on had actually occurred 
(or even further back, in the time leading up to when the financial misstatements 
occurred, or were announced).
We have some indication as to the validity of these hindsight judgments by the fact 
that there was a significant positive correlation between the degree to which analysts 
reported in the questionnaire that before the restatement, they felt that they were 
misled by management, and the actual ratings they issued before the restatement 
(with ‘higher’ ratings being less positive). Nevertheless, the size of this correlation 
(0.40) was not such that it could remove any doubts about hindsight bias, and it 
only provides information on this particular question. The explicit request not to use 
hindsight creates potential weaknesses in the validity of the information received 
– we cannot know, nor does the analyst, whether he/she can properly recollect the 
thoughts he/she had earlier. In addition, hindsight also affects foresight. Therefore, 
answers from analysts concerning our questions about the restatement remediation 
period can be biased by the prior questions they just answered. 
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5.8 Agenda for Future Research
Based on the studies we conducted we can suggest a number of areas which 
warrant deeper analysis, or which indicate that some boundary-spanning research 
efforts should be undertaken. In our research, and in formulating our objectives 
and hypotheses, we combined knowledge derived from a variety of academic fields, 
including: behavioural accounting, corporate communication, crisis and corporate 
reputation management, organizational behaviour and corporate governance. 
Recently, many authors have suggested that combinations of behavioural sciences 
with research into the more ‘traditional’ fields of economics, finance, and accounting 
deliver useful insights into, and complement, our understanding of real world 
economic and/or financial market’s phenomena. In 2003, Gilson and Kraakman 
reviewed lessons learned from 20 years of behavioural finance research efforts. The 
authors conclude that in addition to understanding how human biases influence 
decision making, we also need to get a deeper understanding of the mechanisms 
for communicating corporate valuation information – a quote from their study 
illustrates this as follows:
We will not fully understand the import of psychological distortions on the 
functioning of the capital market until we first understand the institutional 
limitations on the production and distribution of valuation information. The 
well-documented list of cognitive biases that motivates much of behavioural 
finance allows so many degrees of freedom that the framing of testable 
predictions about real world financial markets is difficult.
That is, future studies could further investigate the degree to which cognitive biases 
actually play a role in the communication efforts of gatekeepers who are tasked to 
monitor accounting and financial reporting. While our studies provide some insights 
into this issue, more research is needed. Particularly, future studies could use research 
methods that avoid the problems of hindsight bias and common method bias, such 
as experiments and archival studies.
Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998) have extensively written on how our understanding 
of human behavioural limitations (boundedly rational, boundedly self-interested 
and bounded ethicality and will power) has implications for the design and 
implementation of laws and regulations. More recently, in connection with the credit 
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crisis they have suggested how public policy determination should take account of 
those well studied human biases. These authors conclude that many laws are based 
on the simple neoclassical economic model of maximizing utility. They point out that 
researchers should study, how the legal system can be improved by taking account of 
common human biases, including bounded will-power and bounded self-interest. 
Behavioural accounting professor Bonner (2008) writes that the environment in which 
accounting-related judgment and decisions are made is extraordinarily complex. 
This complexity of the ‘accounting environment’, which can be well illustrated by the 
recent turmoil on fair value accounting and its alleged contributions to causing the 
credit crisis, prove that behavioural studies in general, and behavioural accounting 
more specifically can provide significant contributions to preventing and managing 
financial crisis situations.
The complexities of the accounting environment, combined with the proliferation 
of the financial media and the involvement of regulators, provide interesting 
opportunities for future research (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008). The finance literature 
indicates that media coverage of firms influences stock prices (Barber & Odean, 
2008). Similarly, Yu (2008) finds that firms followed by more analysts manage their 
earnings less. These findings can be complemented with the notion that also during 
the current credit crisis, the media apparently contributed to information cascading 
(Sunstein & Kuran, 2007) which also lead to herding by capital market participants 
and the media. If the media, through attention-grabbing news, have such an extensive 
influence on behaviour of investors, politicians and regulators, then future research 
should measure whether and how judgment by these constituents is influenced. 
Does the power of the media, as measured by coverage, air-time, reputation etc, 
influence their judgments on otherwise technical issues? For example, how does 
a media-invented, or at least promoted phrase, such as ‘toxic assets’ influence 
professionals’ views on how to technically address the ‘true’ nature of the underlying 
instruments – does it affect their otherwise rational approach of the subject matter?. 
The literature on stigmatization can perhaps show some directions for future 
research. In this context academic researchers could seek cooperation with media 
analysis companies, enabling them to get access to underlying data. In study 1, we 
carried out such an analysis by engaging Factiva (a Dow Jones company) into our 
comparative discussions of Freddie Mac and Nortel.
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Also within the context of the ‘board capture’ phenomenon (Langevoort, 2004; Hall, 
2006) researchers should investigate how gatekeepers, and board members more 
particularly, are influenced in their judgment on CEO performance and remuneration 
by the celebrity status of many CEOs in the media. Ranft, Ferris, Zinko and Buckley 
(2006) describe the benefits and costs of CEO reputation, both for the firm and for 
the individual CEO. They also describe some of the risks involved and note that high 
reputations can also push CEOs into less desired behaviour or decisions – he needs 
to meet market expectations which are based on perceptions, which could lead to 
delimiting his set of choices. Researchers should investigate to what extent those 
monitoring the CEO are able to dissect which decision taken by the CEO are less 
desirable as they do not match with rational choice behaviour.
As referred to earlier gatekeepers are heavily depending on information they receive 
from the individuals they are supposed to monitor (Coffee, 2004). Researchers could 
investigate whether probing skills of analysts, board members and other gatekeepers 
are dependent on skills, motivation and/or any known biases. Further, as technology 
makes access to company data easier - in particular the XBRL developments - 
researchers could investigate which information retrieval processes gatekeepers 
would utilize in various data availability scenarios. For example, if external audit 
data, which under current regulations in most territories is proprietary to the audit 
firm, would be accessible by other gatekeepers, which searches would they typically 
perform and why? Would these possibilities improve gatekeepers’ monitoring 
capabilities? 
Bonner (2008) makes reference to the implications of so-called intuitive theories. 
Investors and/or the public may believe that accounting principles and auditing 
standards are relatively easy to apply and that auditors are to blame if financial 
misstatements or frauds come to light. This pre-occupation with who should 
be blamed in today’s media driven world, can quickly lead to negativity bias. 
Corporate reputation researchers and accounting scholars should work together 
and investigate which communication techniques can be utilized as countervailing 
powers, in particular for those gatekeepers, who cannot defend themselves publicly. 
The expectation gap in the auditing domain persists: there is a gap between what 
readers of financial statements expect of an audit report and the level of assurance 
an audit report actually provides. In that connection the discussions between the 
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AICPA auditing standards board (ASB), which drafts auditing standards for non-public 
entities in the US and the PCAOB, who looks after similar standards for listed entities, 
and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board have tried to make 
some progress in that area. However, as Goldwasser (2005) notes, the discussions 
of what constitutes ‘reasonable assurance’ versus what is ‘a high level of assurance’, 
is difficult to grasp for the general public. Accounting researchers again should 
team up with communication scholars to analyze how auditors’ rhetoric, including 
persuasion, influences financial statement users’ perceptions.
In sections 5.4.2 through 5.4.4 we discuss how gatekeepers can avoid being blinded and 
captured, and how they could work more closely together. Traditionally, gatekeepers 
are judged on two dimensions: probing depth (information gathering ability) and 
disclosure effects (public/private). We developed some arguments on why market 
participants and regulators would welcome a deeper insight into where the various 
gatekeepers are positioned in this two-dimensional space – and what that implies 
for understanding their monitoring roles. Based on our three studies we suggested 
to add a third dimension to this information sharing – the ‘capture’ dimension (how 
biased are gatekeepers?). A theory on what being ‘captured’ means needs further 
development and can be compared with theory development on what it means of 
‘being independent’. In the accountancy domain a great deal has been written on 
independence in fact, and independence in appearance. We propose that research 
efforts on the independence dimension should be extended to include the concepts 
of biases and capture.
We believe that many of the above suggested multidisciplinary studies will contribute 
to and enhance our understanding of how gatekeepers function in their assessment 
of restatement situations, and how this functioning could be improved.
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5.9 Concluding Remarks
The avalanche of recent accounting scandals, coupled with the current global 
credit crisis, re-iterate that our knowledge of corporate governance failures needs 
continuous upgrading.
This dissertation contributes to understanding why the watchdogs did not bark, 
and also dissects how common human biases affect mechanisms of corporate 
monitoring roles, in particular during restatement crises. Three connecting studies 
were conducted. After lining up theory and regulatory reports on restatements, the 
first qualitative study develops a model for gauging restatement severity and provides 
insight into the forces blurring 20/20 perspective on restatements situations – the 
study clarifies how management can best communicate in those circumstances. A 
second quantitative study follows and is the first to comprehensively elicit perceptions 
of analysts on CEO pressures and behaviours during restatements. We analyse 
how earnings management pressures and executive job demands affect analysts’ 
perceptions of (often) overconfident CEOs in the period leading up to the restatement. 
Next, we associate how these pressures and behaviours influence analysts’ views of 
CEOs in the reputation remediation period. A third study corroborates our findings 
through in-depth interviews with analysts following restatement companies. We 
show that analysts regret in failing to recognize red flags leads to irrationality in their 
judgment and decision making during a financial reporting crisis.
This dissertation shows that bounded awareness and common human biases heavily 
influence functioning of executives, and their gatekeepers, in protecting corporate 
reputation during financial statement restatements.
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Appendix 1.1 Materiality Considerations
Today, viewing SAB No. 99 with hindsight in Division of Enforcement cases, the 
SEC has noted that a danger exists in applying the staff view in a manner that is 
overly subjective, or inconsistent. The devil is in the details of SAB No. 99, and its 
application, particularly after-the-fact, is a tricky one. Among the bulletin’s qualitative 
considerations listing are items that ‘may well render material a quantitatively small 
misstatement of a financial item’, such as:
• Whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or other trends.
• Whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus 
expectations for the enterprise.
• Whether the misstatement changes a loss into income or vice versa.
• Whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with 
regulatory requirements.
As the bulletin states: ‘The staff believes that a registrant and the auditors of its 
financial statements should not assume that even small intentional misstatements 
in financial statements, for example those pursuant to actions to ‘manage’ earnings, 
are immaterial.’
 
As a threshold matter there is the question of whether new or revised materiality 
guidance is necessary. While it is possible that existing authoritative documents, 
including FAS 154 and SAB No. 99, could be revised, that option seems far from 
practical in the short-term. In addition, the frameworks that set forth  the evaluation 
of both quantitative and qualitative factors seem to meet the needs of most 
constituencies using financial statements. The question becomes whether these 
standards are being interpreted in a manner that is too restrictive when it comes to 
the restatement question.
A subcommittee of the SEC working on the financial reporting progress report makes 
the following comment on the issue of materiality:
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The subcommittee believes that materiality guidance should be similar in 
both directions. Specifically, the subcommittee believes that there should 
be a ‘sliding scale’ for evaluating errors. On this scale, the higher the 
quantitative significance of an error, the stronger the qualitative factors 
must be to result in a judgment that the error is not material. Conversely, the 
lower the quantitative significance of an error, the stronger the qualitative 
factors must be to result in a judgment that the error is material.
The suggestion that the qualitative aspects should cut in two directions arises from 
the underlying concept that the primary driver of the restatement question ought 
to be what is helpful to current investors. By emphasizing the interests of current 
investors, it may be possible to avoid some restatements that do not enhance the 
usefulness of financial information for their purposes.
A principle difference exists between accounting irregularities, defined as, 
‘Intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures’, and accounting 
errors defined as ‘unintentional misstatements or omissions’. Once detected, 
error or irregularity must be restated if material. The distinction between these 
two categories can be deemed fundamental with respect to reputation, credibility 
management, and (potential) restatement crisis management. In this study, we shall 
consider two dimensions of the restatement phenomenon – first, the significance of 
the information distortion, and second, the level of management intent.
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Appendix 1.2 The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Restatements
In the context of the current financial credit crisis, it is interesting to note that the 
FBI’s 2007 report that classified financial crimes, also singled out subprime mortgage 
lending practices. The report said such practices were receiving priority attention from 
the combined forces of the Department of Justice (DOJ), FBI and SEC, and that the trio 
of agencies was already in the process of investigating – and possibly prosecuting – 
lenders for accounting fraud:
As publicly traded subprime lenders have suffered financial difficulties due to 
rising defaults, analyses of company financials have identified instances of false 
accounting entries, and fraudulently inflated assets and revenues. Investigations 
have determined that many of these bankrupt subprime lenders manipulated their 
reported loan portfolio risks and used various accounting schemes to inflate their 
financial reports. In addition, before these sub prime lenders’ stocks rapidly declined 
in value, executives with insider information sold their equity positions and profited 
illegally. The FBI is working with the US Department of Justice (DOJ), the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and other US regulatory agencies to identify 
possible subprime lenders engaged in corporate fraud and insider trading.
Within the playing field of subprime mortgages, publicly held firms involved in the 
securitizing business will have to face up to some very difficult accounting issues, 
such as whether gain-on-sale treatment under FAS 140 was appropriate in the first 
instance, whether the original complex calculations of the gains on the sales of the 
collateral were reasonable, and whether the residuals these firms carry on their 
balance sheets as assets have been impaired and, consequently, should be written 
down. These issues could well lead to restatements of previously issued financial 
statements, or charges to reduce the carrying value of residuals. If that is the case, 
these securitization firms may well face securities class litigation, through which 
shareholders of the securitizers may claim that they were taken in by misleading, or 
incomplete disclosures, concerning these issues. Since June 2007, the SEC has opened 
at least 12 investigations into potential securities fraud related to securitization and 
sale of subprime loans, and that number will almost certainly increase in the future.
Appendix 1.2 The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Restatements
313
313Appendices
The current credit crisis and the ensuing discussions on the effects of fair value 
accounting will have consequences for the accounting profession. This can also be 
illustrated by studies into the litigation connected with bank failures. In November 
2008, a comprehensive study was published (Bethel, Ferrell & Hu, ‘Legal and 
Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from the 2007-2008 Credit Crises’, 2008). The 
paper summarizes the extensive litigation that is underway, including the Rule 
10b-51 class-action lawsuits that have already been filed against banks, pending the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) litigation, the causes-of-action 
available to Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) and Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDO) purchasers, and litigation against the rating agencies. The paper by Bathel et 
al., discusses three principles that will likely prove central in the resolution of the 
securities class-action litigation: (1) ‘no fraud by hindsight;’ (2) ‘truth on the market;’ 
and, (3) ‘loss causation.’ In Study 2 we note the existence of ‘hindsight bias’ and 
later refer to an important concept applied in securities litigation, that of ‘no fraud 
by hindsight.’ As mentioned earlier, the FBI is already investigating the accounting 
practices and pricing of securities of several major banks, and additional civil 
investigations are being conducted by the SEC and state attorneys general. This 
combination of government investigations is important not only in their own right, 
but also because they can potentially reveal information that may further fuel private 
class-action litigation and result in an additional wave of financial restatements. In 
the period from February 2007 through November 2008, more than 250 class-action 
lawsuits were filed on the basis of Rule 10b-5, or ERISA litigation was started against 
some 95 companies. Much of this litigation is directly related to the extensive asset 
write-downs taken by banks.
1   Rule 10b5-1, an administrative rule enacted by the SEC which deals with the intent to defraud which is essential for proving a violation of 
insider trading laws. The ‘manipulative and deceptive devices’ prohibited by Section 10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5 there under include, among 
others, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of 
a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the holders of that issuer, or to any 
other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information.
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Appendix  2.1 Timelines Freddie Mac and nortel
1-2003
2-2003
3-2003
4-2003
5-2003
6-2003
7-2003
8-2003
9-2003
10-2003
11-2003
12-2003
22-1-2003 | PressRel Restatement Expected23-1-2003 | Analyst Report JP Morgan
27-1-2003 | PressRel Upwards Restatement27-1-2003 | Conference Call Q4 2002
28-1-2003 | Analyst Report Piper jaffray
28-1-2003 | Analyst Report JP Morgan
25-3-200 | PressRel Restatement Update
9-6-2003 | Analyst Report Raymond James
26-6-2003 | Analyst Report JP Morgan
22-11-2003 |Analyst Report BearStearns
22-8-2003 | PressRel Replace CEO
25-3-2003 | Analyst Report JP Morgan
10-6-2003 | Analyst Report JP Morgan
23-7-2003 | PressRel Board Council Report
4-12-2003 | PressRel Carl joins Board of Directors
25-9-2003 | PressRel Update Timing Restatement Results
24-4-2003 | PressRel Update Restatement
11-6-2003 | PressRel SEC Update
23-7-2003 | Conference Call Results Investigation
7-12-2003 | PressRel Richard Syron CEO
25-9-2003 | Analyst Report Piper Jaffray
24-4-2003 | Analyst Report Raymond James
16-6-2003 | PressRel Update Provisions Retired Executives
23-7-2003 | Analyst Report Prudential
31-12-2003 | Analyst Report Prudential
29-10-2003 | PressRel New Organizational Structure
7-6-2003 | PressRel New Leadership
25-6-2003 | PressRel Restatement Prcess
24-7-2003 | Analyst Report JP Morgan
21-11-2003 | Analyst Report Barney
9-6-2003 | PressRel New CEO
25-6-2003 | Conference Call Restatement Update
24-7-2003 | PressRel Q2 2003 Results
21-11-2003 | Conference Call Discuss Restatement
9-6-2003 | Conference Call New Leadership
25-6-2003 | Analyst Report Raymond James
25-8-2003 PressRel CEO Stock Trades
21-11-2003 | PressRel Restatement Results
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Nortel
10-2003
11-2003
12-2003
1-2004
2-2004
3-2004
4-2004
5-2004
6-2004
7-2004
8-2004
9-2004
10-
2004
11-2004
12-2004
1-2005
23-10-2003 | PressRel Planned Restatement
23-10-2003 | PressRel Expected Timing 2003 10-Q
23-10-2003 | Conference Call Q3 2003
24-10-2003 | Analyst Report JPMorgan
24-10-2003 | Analyst Report Deutsche Bank
24-10-2003 | Analyst Report Prudential
14-11-2003 | Analyst Report Nesbitt
30-1-2004 | Analyst Report JPMorgan
5-4-2004 | Analyst Report CIBC
11-11-2004 | PressRel Status Update
2-6-2004 | Analyst Report Baird
19-11-2003 | PressRel Filing
10-3-2004 | PressRel Delay Filing 2003 
financial statements
13-4-2004 | PressRel Update OSC Inquiry
11-11-2004 | Analyst Report Prudential
2-6-2004 | Analyst Report Prudential
20-11-2003 | Analyst Report JPMorgan Q3 2003 10-Q
11-3-2004 | Analyst Report Legg Mason
26-4-2004 | Analyst Report Prudential
21-12-2004 | PressRel Status Update
2-6-2004 | Conference Call Status of Restatement
23-12-2003 | PressRel Confirm Restated Financial Results
15-3-2004 | Analyst Report JPMorgan
28-4-2004 | Analyst Report CIBC
3-1-2005 | PressRel NYSE Grants 3 months extension
6-1-2005 | PressRel Status Update
10-1-2005 | PressRel Nortel to file Financial statements
11-1-2005 | PressRel filing 2003 Financial statements
11-1-2005 | Conference Call Restatement Results
16-8-2004 | PressRel update RCMP Review
29-12-2003 | Analyst Report Prudential
15-3-2004 | PressRel Announcement Interim CFO
28-4-2004 | PressRel New President&CEO
16-8-2004 | Analyst Report Prudential
29-12-2003 | Analyst Report Baird
29-3-2004 | PressRel Update Timing Q1 2004 Results
28-4-2004 | Conference Call Update Independant Review
19-8-2004 | Analyst Report CIBC
29-1-2004 | PressRel Q4 2003 
5-4-2004 | PressRel Update SEC Inquiry
2-6-2004 | PressRel Update Restatement
19-8-2004 | PressRel Status Update
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Appendix 2.2 Coding Scheme
OPEN (OPE)
• Restat FinPos effect, precise
• Restat Business effect, precise
• Restat Period, precise
• Provides explanation of (valid) causes
• Responds with explanation
• Data collection process explained
• OPE-other
CLOSED (CLO)
• Restat FinPos effect, not precise
• Restat Business effect, not precise
• Restat Period, not precise/revisions
• Obscure cause reference
• Incomplete response or selective
• Tedious process/ not explained
• CLO-other
CONFIRM in proper context of problem (CON)
• Confirm accounting misinterpretation
• Confirm accounting error
• Confirm accounting irregularity/ fraud
• Confirm numbers game
• Confirm accounting system weakness
• CON-other
DENY (DEN)
• Deny accounting misinterpretation
• Deny accounting error
• Deny accounting irregularity/ fraud
• Deny numbers game 
• Spinning
• DEN-other
BLAME TAKING (BLT)
• Apology
• No intent assertion
• Takes blame: Control Deficiencies
• Takes blame: Operational Irregular
• BLT-other
BLAME GIVING (BLG)
• Blaming CEO
• Blaming CFO
• Blaming Internal Control Deficiencies
• Blaming Operational Irregularities
• BLG-other
ACT AS IF GOVERNANCE IN CONTROL – and in Power 
(GOV)
• Governance/ remedial actions – taken
• Forensic investigation explained
• No fraud – conclusive evidence
• Reassurance on business
• Board expertise assertion/credentials
• GOV-other
GOVERNANCE GONE – out of Power (GON)
• Vague on corrective measures
• Resist investigation
• Conclusive evidence of fraud/ 
irregularities
• Uncertainty re company survival
• Uncertainty re Complete info
• GON-other
ACT IN NORM CONFORMITY
(Sarbanes-Oxley as standard) (NRM)
• Code of conduct upgrade
• Accounting policies improvement
• Accounting operations/ systems improve
• Regulator settlement 
• Litigation settled
• Audit firm has helped; explicit NRM other
ACT NOT IN CONFORMITY (NOC)
• Audit firm qualifies accounts
• No accounting policy change
• No system improvements
• Regulators continue investigation
• Justice department involved
• Litigation against audit firm
NOC-other
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Appendix 2.3 Overview of Coding Data and Results
Number oF documeNts aNd quotatioNs
case
total Number 
oF documeNts
iNterNal press 
releases
traNscripts 
coNFereNce calls
aNalysts 
reports
quotatioNs
Adecco 16 8 3 5 188
Ahold 58 38 7 13 788
Cablevision 22 4 3 15 138
Computer Associates 27 8 6 13 237
ElPaso 23 7 3 13 201
FreddieMac 41 19 7 15 963
Goodyear 17 6 4 7 120
Interpublic 16 8 4 4 210
Nortel 41 20 5 16 366
Parmalat 12 7 1 4 206
Qwest 45 12 10 23 443
Shell 26 11 6 9 531
Symbol 29 15 7 7 381
Tyco 34 14 9 11 403
Total 407 177 75 155 5175
codiNg scores aNd coheN’s kappa
case
aaNtal 
quotatioNs
board   
total pos
board  
total Neg
kappa 
board
duur case 
iN dageN
start eiNde
Adecco 188 78,49% 21,51% 0,738485 239 12-1-2004 7-9-2004
Ahold 788 78,13% 21,87% 0,729682 549 24-2-2003 26-8-2004
Cablevision 138 74,42% 25,58% 0,754288 258 18-6-2003 2-3-2004
Computer Associates 237 78,79% 21,21% 0,803187 350 8-10-2003 22-9-2004
ElPaso 201 68,00% 32,00% 0,58748 188 17-2-2004 23-8-2004
FreddieMac 963 80,74% 19,26% 0,589919 574 22-1-2003 18-8-2004
Goodyear 120 72,88% 27,12% 0,796959 381 21-10-2003 5-11-2004
Interpublic 210 75,89% 24,11% 0,729425 226 5-8-2002 19-3-2003
Nortel 366 72,25% 27,75% 0,691 446 23-10-2003 11-1-2005
Parmalat 206 62,86% 37,14% 0,793 188 11-11-2003 17-5-2004
Qwest 443 70,81% 29,19% 0,684393 619 11-3-2002 19-11-2003
Shell 531 78,86% 21,14% 0,716545 228 9-1-2004 24-8-2004
Symbol 381 72,67% 27,33% 0,749766 820 6-3-2002 3-6-2004
Tyco 403 74,07% 25,93% 0,780124 610 3-6-2002 3-2-2004
Gemiddeld  74,20% 25,80% 0,72459 405,4286   
Totaal 5175      
318
318
codiNg scores by positive aNd Negative sub-codes
Bo
ar
d 
Co
di
ng
 
Sc
he
m
e
O
pe
n
Co
nfi
rm
Bl
am
e 
Ta
ki
ng
g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
In
 C
on
tr
ol
n
or
m
 
Co
nf
or
m
it
y
To
ta
l P
os
Cl
os
ed
D
en
y
Bl
am
e 
g
iv
in
g
g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
g
on
e
n
ot
 in
 
n
or
m
 
Co
nf
or
m
it
y
To
ta
l 
n
eg
A
de
cc
o
25
,8
1%
2,
15
%
1,0
8%
39
,7
8%
9,
68
%
78
,4
9%
11
,8
3%
1,0
8%
2,
15
%
1,0
8%
5,
38
%
21
,5
1%
A
ho
ld
37
,10
%
1,9
7%
1,9
7%
30
,4
7%
6,
63
%
78
,13
%
13
,7
6%
0
,4
9%
0
,4
9%
4,
91
%
2,
21
%
21
,8
7%
C
ab
le
vi
si
on
32
,5
6%
9,
30
%
0
,0
0
%
20
,9
3%
11
,6
3%
74
,4
2%
13
,9
5%
0
,0
0
%
2,
33
%
4,
65
%
4,
65
%
25
,5
8%
C
om
pu
te
r 
A
ss
oc
ia
te
s
16
,3
6%
5,
45
%
1,8
2%
36
,3
6%
18
,7
9%
78
,7
9%
3,
0
3%
3,
64
%
7,
27
%
3,
0
3%
4,
24
%
21
,2
1%
El
Pa
so
28
,0
0
%
0
,0
0
%
1,3
3%
36
,0
0
%
2,
67
%
68
,0
0
%
17
,3
3%
4,
0
0
%
1,3
3%
4,
0
0
%
5,
33
%
32
,0
0
%
Fr
ed
di
eM
ac
32
,19
%
6,
60
%
1,5
8%
36
,4
1%
3,
96
%
80
,7
4%
5,
0
1%
2,
11
%
7,
92
%
2,
90
%
1,3
2%
19
,2
6%
G
oo
dy
ea
r
49
,15
%
8,
47
%
0
,0
0
%
8,
47
%
6,
78
%
72
,8
8%
10
,17
%
0
,0
0
%
6,
78
%
1,6
9%
8,
47
%
27
,12
%
In
te
rp
ub
lic
43
,2
6%
0
,7
1%
2,
84
%
24
,8
2%
4,
26
%
75
,8
9%
15
,6
0
%
4,
96
%
0
,7
1%
2,
13
%
0
,7
1%
24
,11
%
N
or
te
l
30
,8
9%
1,0
5%
0
,0
0
%
34
,5
5%
5,
76
%
72
,2
5%
14
,14
%
0
,5
2%
3,
14
%
3,
66
%
6,
28
%
27
,7
5%
Pa
rm
al
at
27
,14
%
0
,0
0
%
0
,0
0
%
25
,7
1%
10
,0
0
%
62
,8
6%
20
,0
0
%
4,
29
%
8,
57
%
2,
86
%
1,4
3%
37
,14
%
Q
w
es
t
27
,3
3%
6,
21
%
3,
11
%
33
,5
4%
0
,6
2%
70
,8
1%
19
,2
5%
1,2
4%
3,
11
%
3,
73
%
1,8
6%
29
,19
%
Sh
el
l
31
,8
8%
1,0
1%
2,
35
%
26
,8
5%
16
,7
8%
78
,8
6%
13
,7
6%
1,6
8%
2,
68
%
1,3
4%
1,6
8%
21
,14
%
Sy
m
bo
l
36
,6
7%
0
,6
7%
0
,6
7%
29
,3
3%
5,
33
%
72
,6
7%
13
,3
3%
0
,6
7%
0
,6
7%
4,
67
%
8,
0
0
%
27
,3
3%
Ty
co
37
,4
5%
4,
94
%
0
,0
0
%
29
,2
2%
2,
47
%
74
,0
7%
6,
58
%
2,
0
6%
12
,7
6%
1,6
5%
2,
88
%
25
,9
3%
M
ea
n
32
,5
6%
3,
47
%
1,2
0
%
29
,4
6%
7,
52
%
74
,2
0
%
12
,7
0
%
1,9
1%
4,
28
%
3,
0
2%
3,
89
%
25
,8
0
%
Appendix 2.3 Overview of Coding Data and Results
319
319Appendices
320
320 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
321
321Appendices
322
322 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
323
323Appendices
324
324 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
325
325Appendices
326
326 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
327
327Appendices
328
328 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
329
329Appendices
330
330 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
331
331Appendices
332
332 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
333
333Appendices
334
334 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
335
335Appendices
336
336 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
337
337Appendices
338
338 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
339
339Appendices
340
340 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
341
341Appendices
342
342 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
343
343Appendices
344
344 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
345
345Appendices
346
346 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
347
347Appendices
348
348 Appendix 3.1 Analysts Survey 
349
349Appendices
350
350
Appendix 3.2 Analysts’ Survey – Bridge to Constructs
Construct Item number Item name
Reference 
to Analysts 
Questionnaire
Question 
Format
Earnings 
Management 
Presuures
EM Pressures 1/2 EM Pressures Board 1a, 1b I
EM Pressures 5/8 EM Pressures Analysts 7a I, 7b I I
EM Pressures 6/9 EM Pressures Shareholders 7a II, 7b II I
EM Pressures 7/10 EM Pressures Media 7a III, 7b III I
EM Pressures 3/4 EM Pressure Rewards 2a, 2b I
CEO Job Demands
Job Demands 1/5 Lack of Resources 23a I, 23b I II
Job Demands 2/6 Company Politics 23a II, 23b II II
Job Demands 3/7 Workaholic 23a III, 23b III II
Job Demands 4/8 Time Pressure 23a IV, 23b, IV II
Task/Performance 
Challenges
Task Challenges 1/7 Complexity Industry 20a I, 20b I I
Task Challenges 2/8 Potential for Sales Growth 20a II, 20b II I
Task Challenges 3/9 Potential for Earnings Growth 20a III, 20b III I
Task Challenges 4/10 Resources available 20a IV, 20b IV I
Task Challenges 5/11 Demanding Strategy 20a V, 20b V I
Task Challenges 6/12 Complex Structure 20a VI, 20b VI I
Analyst Regret Regret 1/2 Regret 19a, 19b III
CEO Dominance
Dominance 1/2 CEO Dominant Behaviour 4a, 4b I
Dominance 2/4 CEO using Manoeuvring Space 24a, 24b I
Gatekeeper 
Latitude
Latitude 1/2 Auditor Conflict of Interest 8a, 8b I
Latitude 3/4 Complexity Accounting Rules 9a, 9b I
Latitude 5/6 Scope for Manoeuvring 21a, 21b I
Gatekeeper 
Competence
Gatekeeper Competence 1/3 CFO Competence 22a II, 22b II I
Gatekeeper Competence 2/4 Audit Committee Competence 22a III, 22b III I
Analyst 
Competence
Analyst Competence 1/2 Probing Skills 14a, 14b II
Analyst Competence 3/4 Knowledge Accounting Issues 15a, 15b II
Analyst Competence 5/9 Feeling Misled 16a I, 16b I II
Analyst Competence 6/10 Analysis not Suspicious 16a II, 16b II II
Analyst Competence 7/11 Analysis not probing enough 16a III, 16b III II
Analyst Competence 8/12 Herding 16a IV, 16b IV II
Pressure Before 
Restatement
Governance Pressure 1 Auditor Pressure Before 10a I II
Governance Pressure 2 Shareholder Pressure Before 10a II II
Governance Pressure 3 Analysts Pressure Before 10a III II
Governance Pressure 7 Pressure to Dismiss CEO Begin 11a III
Appendix 3.2 Analysts’ Survey – Bridge to Constructs
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Construct Item number Item name
Reference 
to Analysts 
Questionnaire
Question 
Format
Pressure During 
Restatement
Crisis
Governance Pressure 4 Auditor Pressure During 10b I II
Governance Pressure 5 Sharholder Pressure During 10b II II
Governance Pressure 6 Analysts Pressure During 10b III II
Governance Pressure 8 Pressure to Dismiss CEO End 11b III
Opennness Pressure 1/4 Analysts Pressure 13a I, 13b I III
Openness Pressure 2/5 Regulator Pressure 13a II, 13b II III
Openness Pressure 3/6 Shareholder Pressure 13a III, 13b III III
CEO Competence
CEO Competence 1/4
Accounting and Financial 
Reporting
6a I, 6b I II
CEO Competence 2/5 Communication Skills 6a II, 6b II II
CEO Competence 3/6 Commitment to Compliance 6a III, 6b III II
Severity
Severity 1/3 Significance Adjustment 17a I, 17b I III
Severity 2/4 Malicious Intent 17a II, 17b II III
CEO Behaviour 
Before
Restatement
Governance Before 1/2 Managing Fraud Risks 3a, 3b I
Governance Before 3 Governance Effectiveness 5a II
Governance Before 4 Commitment to Governance 6a IV II
Integrity Before 1 Fair Decisions 25a I II
Integrity Before 2 Trustworthy 25a II II
Integrity Before 3 Good Example 25a III II
Integrity Before 4 Tone at the Top 25a IV II
Integrity Before 5 Pressure on Auditors 26a I II
Integrity Before 6 Pressure on Audit Committee 26a II II
Integrity Before 7 Pressure on Analysts 26a III II
Integrity Before 8 Use of Complex Language 28a II
Integrity Before 9 CEO Misleading 29a II
Openness Before 1 Information on Materiality 27a I II
Openness Before 2 Discussion Manoeuvring Space 27a II II
Openness Before 3 Discussion Accounting Choices 27a III II
352
352
Construct Item number Item name
Reference 
to Analysts 
Questionnaire
Question 
Format
CEO Behaviour 
During
Restatement Crisis
Openness During 1 Information on Materiality 27b I II
Openness During 2 Discussion Manoeuvring Space 27b II II
Openness During 3 Discussion Accounting Choices 27b III II
Openness During 4/5 Adequacy of Information 30a, 30b III
Governance During 1 Overall Effectiveness 5b II
Governance During 2 Commitment to Governance 6b IV II
Governance During 3/4 Initial Effectiveness 31a, 31b III
Integrity During 1 Fair Decisions 25b I II
Integrity During 2 Trustworthy 25b II II
Integrity During 3 Good Example 25b III II
Integrity During 4 Tone at the Top 25b IV II
Integrity During 5 Pressure on Auditors 26b I II
Integrity During 6 Pressure on Audit Committee 26b II II
Integrity During 7 Pressure on Analysts 26b III II
Integrity During 8 Use of Complex Language 28b II
Integrity During 9 CEO Misleading 29b II
Blame Taking/
Giving
Blame Taking 1/2 By CEO 32a I, 32b I III
Blame Giving 1/5 Blaming CFO 32a II, 32b II III
Blame Giving 2/6 Blaming Lower Echalons 32a III, 32b III III
Blame Giving 3/7 Blaming Auditors 32a IV, 32b IV III
Blame Giving 4/8
Blaming Complexity 
Accounting
32a V, 32b V III
Appendix 3.2 Analysts’ Survey – Bridge to Constructs
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Appendix 3.3 Partial Least Squares Path Model
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‘Financial Statement Restatements’ betreft de in ondernemingen vaak zwaar beladen 
taak om eerder gepubliceerde jaarstukken te corrigeren omdat fundamentele fouten 
zijn geconstateerd. In het begin van de jaren 2000 nam de hoeveelheid restatements 
sterk toe: van ongeveer maximaal 200 in de jaren 90 tot meer dan 1500 in 2006. 
Zoals later zal blijken werd deze sterke toename gevoed door twee met elkaar 
samenhangende fenomenen. Enerzijds nam de druk op bedrijven sterk toe om omzet 
en winst verwachtingen die zij eerder in de markt hadden geventileerd, te realiseren 
– bestuurders en analisten speelden de zogenaamde ‘Numbers  game’. Anderzijds 
zorgden sterk overdreven beloning pakketten van bestuurders ervoor dat de belangen 
van de onderneming op lange termijn werden verkwanseld aan kortzichtige winst 
maximalisatie. Hebzucht van bestuurders, of het nu ging om macht of om hun 
financiële beloning, zorgden ervoor dat het ‘agency probleem’ wederom volop in de 
belangstelling kwam te staan zowel academici en toezichthouders. 
Dit ‘agency probleem’ betreft de mogelijke belangenconflicten die kunnen 
optreden tussen de eigenaren van een onderneming - de aandeelhouders - en de 
managers van de onderneming. De eigenaren delegeren immers de bestuurstaken 
aan het management van de onderneming. Omdat aandeelhouders daardoor op 
redelijk grote afstand staan van de dagelijkse gang van zaken en maar beperkte 
informatie van het management ontvangen, hebben zij weinig tot geen grip op 
het management om de belangen van de aandeelhouders op de juiste wijze te 
behartigen. Het agency probleem heeft in het verleden al veel stof doen opwaaien 
onder corporate governance geleerden en toezichthouders. Waarom zijn een hele 
batterij aan poortwachters (gatekeepers) niet in staat om bestuurders in de greep te 
houden en hoe komt het dat deze poortwachters toch iedere keer weer geringeloord 
worden door vaak dominante en zichzelf overschattende CEOs? Restatements  zijn bij 
uitstek een bijzonder giftige representant van het agency probleem: managers, onder 
extreme winst maximalisatie druk, gaan boekhoudregels toepassen vergelijkbaar 
met zwarte magie. Zij verdraaien de zakelijke feiten en passen regels toe naar eigen 
inzicht. Zodra deze vaak opzettelijk verkeerde toepassing van boekhoudregels aan het 
licht komt, veroorzaakt zij het herstelproces van de gemaakte fouten in de financiële 
verantwoording – de gevolgen zijn veelal desastreus – enorme reputatieschade voor 
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de onderneming (en daarmee sterke koersval), maar ook een smet op het blazoen van 
bestuurders en poortwachters. 
Deze studie tracht meer inzicht te krijgen in hoe de beelden van ondernemingen die 
een restatement moeten uitvoeren in de markt, gevormd worden. Tevens bestuderen 
we de rol die analisten daarin spelen. Kort samengevat luidt de kernvraag van onze 
studie:
Welke factoren kunnen in restatement situaties het beeld van de betrokken 
poortwachters vertroebelen en daarmee tot reputatieschade leiden van de 
onderneming? Meer in detail stellen we de volgende vragen:
• Welke factoren vertroebelen communicatie over restatements en 
beïnvloeden daarmee de gepercipieerde inschatting van hoe erg ze zijn?
• Welke factoren verhinderen een klare blik van analisten in restatement 
situaties? Hoe worden analisten beïnvloed in hun kijk op de reputatie 
herstelpogingen die de onderneming en haar bestuurders initiëren? 
• Vormen die verblindingfactoren een verklaringsgrond voor het falen van 
analisten in hun poortwachter rol? Kan daarmee ook worden verklaard 
waarom restatements zich toch vaak aandienen als een ‘voorspelbare 
verrassing’?
In het eerste hoofdstuk plaatsen we allereerst het restatement fenomeen in de context 
van keer op keer terugkerende governance problemen en verwijzen daarbij naar een 
belangwekkend rapport van de American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Ook de 
huidige kredietcrisis en nieuwe fraude schandalen kunnen in het verlengde daarvan 
worden begrepen. We geven een overzicht van de voornaamste rapporten welke zijn 
opgesteld over het restatement fenomeen. Vanzelfsprekend concentreren we ons 
daarbij op de situatie in de VS – door het systeem van daar geldende boekhoudregels 
(US GAAP) traden restatements voornamelijk in dat land op de voorgrond. Echter, ook 
bedrijven met een beursnotering in de VS stonden bloot aan boekhoudschandalen – we 
hoeven daarbij slechts te verwijzen naar Ahold, Parmalat, Nortel om dat weer paraat 
in het geheugen te hebben. De rekenkamer in de VS (Government Accountability 
Office) was  in 2002 de eerste instantie met een uitgebreid overzicht van het hoe en 
waarom van restatement situaties. Onder wetenschappers wordt het restatement 
fenomeen uit meerdere oogpunten geanalyseerd. Kwantitatieve studies, die vaak zijn 
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gebaseerd op historische dataverzamelingen, geven inzicht in de volgende aspecten: 
de effecten op markt kapitalisatie, restatements als bewijs voor winstmanipulatie, 
de kennisattributen en de rol van poortwachters, besmettinggevaar voor andere 
ondernemingen en bestuurders, het fenomeen buiten de US, en de rol van de media 
en populaire pers bij het verslaan van financiële fraude. In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt 
ook een korte samenvatting over de effecten van de boekhoudschandalen op de 
reputatie van de onderneming gegeven. Het wordt besloten met een toelichting op 
de hierboven genoemde onderzoeksvragen.
In hoofdstuk twee presenteren we de resultaten van een kwalitatief onderzoek. 
Gestoeld op de zogenaamde ‘Grounded Theory’ benadering, analyseren we met behulp 
van een codering protocol ongeveer 5000 communicatieve expressies. Het betreft 
hier ondernemingen die betrokken zijn geraakt bij een boekhoudschandaal. Onze 
inhoudanalyse richt zich op de persberichten van die ondernemingen en analyseert 
ook wat analisten daarover schrijven in hun rapporten. Een derde bron van analyse 
zijn de transcripts van de conference calls tussen bestuurders en de analisten die de 
onderneming volgen. De studie stelt vast dat er een aantal krachten zijn waarmee 
in boekhoudschandalen rekening gehouden dient te worden om bovenmatige 
reputatieschade te beperken. Deze krachten bestaan uit: het in diskrediet geraken van 
het topmanagement; leemtes in de begripsruimten over boekhoudschandalen; het 
‘topje-van-de-ijsberg’ effect; communicatie verlammingverschijnselen; en, het langs 
elkaar lopen van bestuurders en poortwachters. De studie vervolgt heel praktisch 
met het aanreiken van methoden en technieken om deze krachten te neutraliseren. 
Deze reputatie herstelpogingen moeten bestaan uit de volgende communicatie 
technieken en acties: het boekhoudschandaal onderkennen en toegeven, precies 
aangeven hoe diep en omvangrijk het probleem is, verantwoordelijkheid nemen 
en excuses aanbieden, en als laatste, open en oprecht de boodschap brengen. 
Daarnaast vraagt de markt om acties op het gebied van interne controle en corporate 
governance. Deze eerste studie welke uitging van case analyse van 13 ondernemingen 
(zowel in de VS als in Europa) eindigt met een analyse van twee, min of meer 
tegenovergestelde situaties. We analyseren hoe Freddie Mac en Nortel omgingen 
met hun boekhoudkundig falen en stellen vast dat Freddie Mac de aanbevelingen uit 
onze studie beter had gevolgd dan Nortel – managers kunnen hier een beter inzicht 
in restatement crises door krijgen.
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De tweede studie gaat een niveau dieper. We willen een beter inzicht krijgen in hoe 
analisten, die een onderneming met een boekhoudschandaal volgen, reageren op het 
gedrag van de CEO. De vraag die gesteld wordt, is of analisten niet verblind zijn door 
teleurstelling over de financiële rapportering en misleiding daarover en daardoor 
verzeild raken in niet rationele besluitvorming over de financiële prestaties van het 
bedrijf. Daarbij moeten we ons ook afvragen of de analisten de CEO niet bovenmatig 
afstraffen voor zijn/haar rol in de verdoezelingoperatie? Om onze onderzoekdoelen 
te bereiken is een uitgebreide vragenlijst opgesteld die aan ongeveer 1500 analisten 
is opgestuurd. De vragenlijst was samengesteld met behulp van aanwijzingen over 
boekhoudfraude die zijn beschreven in de uitgebreide standaarden voor accountants. 
In die aanwijzingen voor controle aanpak is helder geformuleerd in welke situaties 
druk ontstaat op managers om fraude te plegen. Tevens wordt in die standaarden 
aangereikt waarom managers ertoe over gaan om fraude te plegen – wat is hun 
reden om van het rechte pad af te raken? Naast de zogenaamde ‘winstmanipulatie’ 
drukmiddelen, die uitgebreid in onze literatuurstudies aan de orde komen, kijken we 
ook naar de ‘executive job demands’ zoals die zijn gemodelleerd in onderzoek door 
Hambrick en Finkelstein. Naast deze twee, door analisten redelijk goed in te schatten 
verzamelingen van drukaspecten, formuleren we ook een aantal meer endogene 
factoren van CEOs die van invloed kunnen zijn op hoe analisten de CEO evalueren. 
We willen antwoord hebben op de volgende vragen: hoe dominant is de CEO, hoe 
sterk zijn de interne poortwachters, wat zijn de accounting en financiële rapportering 
vaardigheden van de CEO, welke ethische kenmerken heeft de CEO? We vergeten 
daarbij niet om ook de zuiverheid van het oordeelsvermogen van analisten eens 
onder de loep te nemen en stellen vragen die zouden kunnen duiden op irrationaliteit 
in de oordeelvorming van analisten bij hun evaluatie van de CEO. Ook komen 
daarbij aspecten aan de orde die meten hoe ernstig de analisten de correctie van de 
boekhoudfouten zelf schatten.
Mede op grond van onze uitgebreide literatuur studie en bevindingen uit de 
eerste studie stellen we een model op van oorzaken en gevolgen betreffende de 
percepties van analisten over de druk op, en het gedrag van CEOs voor en na een 
boekhoudschandaal. Het vereenvoudigde model van onze tweede studie toont een 
aantal constructen dat specifiek voor onze studie is opgesteld en ziet er als volgt uit:
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Earnings
Management
Pressures &
Job Demands
Analyst Regret
Other factors:
• CEO Dominance
• Gatekeeper Latitude
• Internal Gatekeeper Competence
• Analyst Competence
• Pressure for Positive Behaviour
• CEO Competence
CEO Behaviour Before Restatement
CEO Behaviour During Restatement Crisis
Met behulp van ongeveer 120 vragen in de Analisten Vragenlijst hebben we de 
percepties van analisten over de CEOs in kaart gebracht. Daarbij hebben we ook 
gebruik gemaakt van drie verschillende soorten vragen. We onderscheiden vragen 
die betrekking hebben op de oorzaken of aanleiding tot de restatement (periode A), 
en vragen die zich concentreren op de gedragingen van de CEO zowel in periode A 
als in periode B, die we de reputatie herstel periode noemen. De constructen hebben 
we opgesteld op basis van theoretische overwegingen waarbij aansluiting is gezocht 
met bestaande literatuur. Omdat de constructen veelal werden gevoed door data 
uit diverse vragen hebben we de interne consistentie vastgesteld met behulp van 
Crohnbach’s Alfa, met factor analyse en met Partial Least Square modellering. 
Vervolgens hebben we 20 hypothesen opgesteld welke associaties toetsen tussen de 
verschillende constructen in deze studie.
Bij de hypotheseontwikkeling gingen we uit van de volgende overwegingen. Veel 
studies over de gevolgen van excessieve druk op managers om winstverwachtingen 
te overtreffen laten zien dat managers uiteindelijk de verleiding niet kunnen 
weerstaan en zich laten verleiden tot verkeerde toepassing van de boekhoudregels 
– vaak met in het achterhoofd dat deze winstverwachting overtreffen ook gunstig is 
voor de eigen beloning. Deze studies laten ook zien dat de gevolgen voor beurskoers 
en reputatie van de onderneming vaak desastreus uitpakken. We veronderstellen dan 
ook dat ervaren analisten bekend zijn met deze gang van zaken en nemen aan dat 
zij bovenmatige druk op managers zullen beoordelen als een rode vlag – een signaal 
dat er boekhoudfraude op komst is. Hetzelfde geldt voor de te hoge ‘executive job 
demands’; indien de strategische doelstellingen van de CEO te hoog zijn gegrepen 
360
360
zouden analisten ervan uit moeten gaan dat vroeg of laat de CEO zichzelf in het 
boekhoud vagevuur (of soms hel) zal begeven. Ook hier zou dezelfde redenering 
kunnen worden opgesteld: analisten die deze signalen van CEO zelfoverschatting 
herkennen zullen de onderneming tijdig daarvoor afstraffen en het niet aan laten 
komen op een boekhoudvergrijp.
Niets is minder waar. Analisten worden meegenomen door een overmoedige en 
zichzelf overschattende CEO en komen terecht in ‘positivity bias’. Met als gevolg 
dat ze een zekere mate van blindheid vertonen voor het dreigende boekhoudgevaar. 
Strijdig met onze verwachting beoordelen analisten CEO gedrag juist positiever in 
de periode voor de restatement naarmate de druk om te presteren als groter wordt 
gezien. Met andere woorden: hoe groter de druk om winst te manipuleren des te 
positiever de analisten zijn gestemd over het gedrag van de CEO. Dit druist in tegen 
alle theoretische redeneringen op dit terrein en kan worden bestempeld als een 
‘voorspelbare verrassing’. De informatie over een op komst zijnde ramp is aanwezig 
maar wordt (door blindheid) genegeerd. De gevolgen zijn zoals we verwachten: 
analisten zijn teleurgesteld, maar zeker niet in hun eigen kunnen. Krachtig zullen zij 
hun ratings van het bedrijf dat ze volgen naar beneden bijstellen – koersduikelingen 
en aanzienlijke reputatieschade zijn het onvermijdbare gevolg.
In de derde studie (het vierde hoofdstuk) gaan we de bevinding van de twee eerdere 
studies trachten te bevestigen aan de hand van gestructureerde interviews met een 
dertigtal analisten. Ook hier weer blijkt het aan de praat krijgen van analisten een 
redelijk intensieve inspanning vereist – zoals al eerder tijdens het uitvoeren van de 
analisten survey was geconstateerd. De derde studie bevestigt inderdaad de eerdere 
bevindingen en voorziet ons ook van een aantal verklaringsgronden voor het min 
of meer irrationele gedrag van analisten voor en tijdens een restatement situatie. 
Dit flipflop gedrag kan worden verklaard door de besmettelijkheid van bovenmatig 
CEO zelfvertrouwen. Daarnaast blijkt in de literatuur dat analisten ook een voorkeur 
hebben voor bedrijven die beter presteren dan de benchmark en die wat financiële 
aansturing aangaat meer voorspelbaarheid hebben en daarnaast een lagere 
volatiliteit in winstrapportering laten zien. 
In het vijfde hoofdstuk sluiten we af met een samenvatting van de conclusies en enkele 
verhandelingen over wat onze bevindingen impliceren voor andere poortwachters. 
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Op basis van literatuur studie over hoe andere poortwachters gevangen zijn in het 
net van CEO invloed stellen we vast dat onze eigen waarnemingen deze ‘capture’ 
situaties onderschrijven. Om dit te begrijpen dienen we terug te vallen op cognitief 
psychologische studies die het gedrag beschrijven van CEO’s op weg naar onoorbare 
ondernemingspraktijken. Studies van Hall (2006), Schrand en Zechman (2008), 
Langevoort (2004) en Paredes (2005) laten zien hoe deze ‘capture’ mechanismen 
werken en hoe zij resulteren in het falen van ‘countervailing powers’ – de poortwachters 
zijn te zwak en zitten vast in hun ivoren toren! We geven een aantal aanbevelingen 
om deze ‘capture’ situaties effectief het hoofd te kunnen bieden. Onze aanbevelingen 
zijn gericht op het in kaart brengen van bias en ‘capture’ situaties, met dien verstande 
dat de voorzitter van de audit committee belast wordt met deze taak. 
We sluiten de dissertatie af met een overzicht van de bijdragen welke onze studies 
leveren aan zowel de academische gedachtevorming en de invloed van onze 
bevindingen en aanbevelingen op de management praktijk. 
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HOW COMPANIES AND ANALYSTS TAME FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS AND
INFLUENCE CORPORATE REPUTATION
The primary objective of financial statements is to provide capital market participants
with information that enables them to make informed decisions. They also serve to
alleviate the so-called ‘agency problem’ – through true and fair disclosures, financial state -
ments contribute to keeping the interest of outsiders (shareholders) aligned with those of
the insiders (executives). Material errors, however, will render these financial statements
unreliable and can cause great uncertainties to investors and other stakeholders. Subse -
quent correction of these errors – restatements – often leads to the following question: Can
management still be trusted? And subsequently: Where were the gatekeepers?
The avalanche of accounting scandals a few years ago, coupled with the current global
credit crises, reiterate that our knowledge of corporate governance failures needs continuous
upgrading. This dissertation contributes to understanding why the watchdogs did not
bark, and also dissects how common human biases affect the mechanisms of corporate
monitoring roles, in particular during restatement crises. 
Three connected studies were conducted. A first qualitative study develops a model for
gauging restatement severity and provides insight into the forces blurring the 20/20 vision
on restatement situations. A second quantitative study is the first study to comprehen -
sively elicit analysts’ perceptions of CEO pressures and behaviours during restatements. A
third study corroborates our findings through in-depth interviews with analysts. Combined
the studies show that bounded awareness and common human biases heavily influence
functioning of executives and gatekeepers in safeguarding corporate reputation during
restatements. 
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